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Essays on Executive Compensation
Abstract
I study executive compensation in various situations, including the cases where (i) CEOs have relative wealth
concerns (RWCs); (ii)inside debt can be a part of an optimal contract; (iii) there are ambiguous information
about firm value.
The first chapter, "Relative Wealth Concerns and Executive compensation", studies the implications of RWCs
on executive compensation. I first study the case in which a CEO's effort increases firm value without
changing firm risk. In this case, RWCs will result in an increase in CEO incentives. This effect is larger if
aggregate risk is higher, so RWCs can lead to a positive relation between CEO incentives and aggregate risk.
CEOs with RWCs willingly risk exposure to aggregate shock to keep up with their peers. This help to reduce
risk premium paid to the CEOs. As a result, RWCs can be beneficial to shareholders' payoffs. I also provide a
simple explanation for the pay-for-luck puzzle. I next examine the case in which the CEO's effort affects both
the mean and variance of firm value. I show that RWCs can lead to a negative relation between CEOs' risk-
taking behavior and their incentives, which is consistent with some empirical evidence. Lastly, I show that
RWCs render options preferable to stock where aggregate risk is much larger than idiosyncratic risk.
The second chapter, "Inside Debt", is a coauthored paper with my advisor Alex Edmans. We justify the use of
debt as efficient compensation. We show that inside debt is a superior solution to the agency costs of debt
than the solvency-contingent bonuses proposed by prior literature, since its payoff depends not only on the
incidence of bankruptcy but also firm value in bankruptcy. Contrary to intuition, granting the manager equal
proportions of debt and equity is typically inefficient. The optimal ratio depends on the trade off of the
importance between project selection and effort. The model generates a number of empirical predictions
consistent with recent evidence.
In the last chapter, "Incentive Contracting under Ambiguity-Aversion", I study the effect of ambiguity on the
pay structure of executive compensation. I show that when there is ambiguity in firm risk and if a manager is
risk-averse and ambiguity-averse, stock-based contracts always impose a high risk premium. But option-based
contracts can induce the manager to perceive a low risk and thus pay a low risk premium, which makes options
less costly than stock. I also show that a manager tends to perceive a higher risk when she is granted higher
incentives, which makes shareholders reluctant to grant managers high incentives and take advantage of some
small improvements. As a result, compensation contracts exhibit an inertia property. Lastly, if ambiguity
comes from the expected market returns, tying CEO pay to the market is optimal, which provides an
explanation for the pay-for-luck puzzle.
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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
Qi Liu
Alex Edmans
I study executive compensation in various situations, including the cases where (i) CEOs have relative
wealth concerns (RWCs); (ii) inside debt can be a part of an optimal contract; (iii) there are ambiguous
information about firm value.
The first chapter, "Relative Wealth Concerns and Executive compensation", studies the implications
of RWCs on executive compensation. I first study the case in which a CEO’s effort increases firm value
without changing firm risk. In this case, RWCs will result in an increase in CEO incentives. This effect
is larger if aggregate risk is higher, so RWCs can lead to a positive relation between CEO incentives and
aggregate risk. CEOs with RWCs willingly risk exposure to aggregate shock to keep up with their peers.
This help to reduce risk premium paid to the CEOs. As a result, RWCs can be beneficial to shareholders’
payoffs. I also provide a simple explanation for the pay-for-luck puzzle. I next examine the case in which
the CEO’s effort affects both the mean and variance of firm value. I show that RWCs can lead to a negative
relation between CEOs’ risk-taking behavior and their incentives, which is consistent with some empirical
evidence. Lastly, I show that RWCs render options preferable to stock where aggregate risk is much larger
than idiosyncratic risk.
The second chapter, "Inside Debt", is a coauthored paper with my advisor Alex Edmans. We justify
the use of debt as efficient compensation. We show that inside debt is a superior solution to the agency
costs of debt than the solvency-contingent bonuses proposed by prior literature, since its payoff depends
not only on the incidence of bankruptcy but also firm value in bankruptcy. Contrary to intuition, granting
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the manager equal proportions of debt and equity is typically inefficient. The optimal ratio depends on
the trade-off of the importance between project selection and effort. The model generates a number of
empirical predictions consistent with recent evidence.
In the last chapter, "Incentive Contracting under Ambiguity-Aversion", I study the effect of ambiguity
on the pay structure of executive compensation. I show that when there is ambiguity in firm risk and if a
manager is risk-averse and ambiguity-averse, stock-based contracts always impose a high risk premium.
But option-based contracts can induce the manager to perceive a low risk and thus pay a low risk pre-
mium, which makes options less costly than stock. I also show that a manager tends to perceive a higher
risk when she is granted higher incentives, which makes shareholders reluctant to grant managers high
incentives and take advantage of some small improvements. As a result, compensation contracts exhibit
an inertia property. Lastly, if ambiguity comes from the expected market returns, tying CEO pay to the
market is optimal, which provides an explanation for the pay-for-luck puzzle.
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Chapter 1
Relative Wealth Concerns and Executive
Compensation
1.1 Introduction
While standard economic models usually assume that an agent’s utility is derived from the absolute level
of her own consumption, economists have long believed that relative consumption effects are important
(i.e., one’s evaluation of her consumption depends on how much the other people are consuming, Veblen
(1899)). A growing body of literature incorporates such effects into asset pricing models (Abel (1990),
Constantinides (1990), Galí (1994), and Campbell and Cochrane (1999)). Such relative consumption ef-
fects, however, are not extensively studied in corporate finance. In this paper, I incorporate relative wealth
concerns (RWCs) into a standard principal-agent model and study how CEO compensation is affected by
such relative consumption effects.
Some empirical evidence already suggests that RWCs matter in CEO compensation. Bouwman (2011),
for example, finds that CEO compensation depends on the compensation of geographically-close CEOs.
An examination of the relation between geography and executive compensation shows that the results are
most consistent with RWCs. Shue (2011) documents the phenomenon of “pay for friend’s luck”: pay re-
sponds to lucky industry-level shocks to the compensation of peers in distant industries. Therefore, peer
effects in compensation are not driven by similarities in underlying managerial productivity; instead,
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RWCs might be the driving forces. Bereskin and Cicero (2011) study developments in Delaware caselaw
in the mid-1990s and find that firms not directly impacted by legal changes increased their CEOs’ com-
pensation when the legal changes directly affected a substantial number of firms in their industry. RWCs
could be a potential explanation.1 If RWCs play a role in CEO compensation, then it is not surprising to
see that the level of CEO pay is affected by peer compensation, e.g., Bouwman (2011), Bizjak, Lemmon,
and Naveen (2008), Faulkender and Yang (2010) find that the level of CEO pay increases in the average
level of CEO pay in a reference group.2 Although the correlation among the level of CEO pay has been
examined, the interaction among CEO incentives has not been studied empirically. In this paper, I will fo-
cus on the RWCs’ effects on CEO incentives. I derive the closed-form solutions in the model. The model’s
tractability enables me to obtain a number of clear economic effects on CEO incentives and explain their
intuitions transparently.
First, I study the case in which a CEO’s effort increases firm value without changing firm risk. I set
up the model with a continuum of firms and CEOs. I assume that a CEO’s utility function exhibits a
consumption externality. In particular, I define that a CEO’s RWCs are given by the product of a parameter
measuring her concerns and the sum of all the CEOs’ compensation (see Definition 1.2.1 in the model). A
CEO’s utility is not determined by the absolute level of her compensation, but depends on the difference
between her compensation and her RWCs. The participation constraint will require a premium for the
CEO’s RWCs, i.e., the CEO desires to have higher compensation when her peers’ compensation is high.
Therefore, a CEO’s contract must achieve two goals: one is to induce the CEO to work; the other is to
make the CEO satisfied with her contract when she compares herself to her peers. The contract has to
pay a premium for the CEO’s RWCs, which I refer to as a “RWCs’ premium”.
By granting CEOs equity to induce them to work, CEO pay is positively correlated with aggregate
shock (i.e., the state of the whole economy); thus, their RWCs also depend on the aggregate shock. Be-
cause CEOs are risk-averse, it is less costly to pay the RWCs’ premium by using a type of payment linked
to the aggregate shock rather than cash; stock, then, is preferred to cash. So RWCs lead to an increase in
1There are also some other explanations; in the paper, Bereskin and Cicero point to market competition as an explanation
for their results.
2Note that the positive correlation in the level of CEO pay might be caused by many factors (e.g., competition, living costs, a
common shock to managerial productivity, RWCs). Among these three papers, only Bouwman (2011) shows that her results are
most consistent with RWCs.
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CEO incentives. Since a CEO’s RWCs also depend on how many incentives the other CEOs are granted,
the model predicts that individual CEO incentives increase with an increase in aggregate CEO incentives.
If aggregate risk is higher, then a CEO will face a higher risk to fall behind other CEOs; thus, stock com-
pensation becomes more attractive than cash. Therefore, RWCs can result in a positive relation between
CEO incentives and aggregate risk. On the other hand, according to the informativeness principle, firms
should use fewer incentives when firm risk (which is the sum of aggregate risk and idiosyncratic risk)
is higher, because the observable outcome (i.e., stock price) becomes less informative. Due to the two
conflicting effects, the relation between CEO incentives and aggregate risk can be negative or positive,
depending on the coefficient of a CEO’s RWCs on aggregate shock. Empirical studies have found mixed
evidence as to the relation between CEO incentives and firm risk. Many of them document no signifi-
cant relation, or even a positive relation between incentives and firm risk (Prendergast (2002)), which is
inconsistent with a standard principal-agent model. My model predicts that if the coefficient of a CEO’s
RWCs on aggregate shock is large, then there is a positive relation between incentives and aggregate risk;
otherwise, the relation remains negative.
The optimal CEO incentives depend on individual RWCs, which depend on other CEOs’ incentives. In
equilibrium, each firm will choose its contract optimally given other firms’ contracts. I show that because
each individual CEO incentives depend on the aggregate CEO incentives linearly, this linearity leads to a
unique equilibrium. In addition, notice that in the presence of RWCs, a CEO is willing to risk exposure
to aggregate shock to keep up with her peers to some extent: the CEO becomes less risk-averse due to
her RWCs. Thus RWCs help to reduce the risk premium paid to the CEO. In other words, the presence of
RWCs allows shareholders to grant a CEO more incentives to induce a higher effort, but without paying a
higher risk premium. In particular, if a CEO’s productivity is high, choosing a CEO with RWCs is beneficial
to shareholders’ payoffs.
In reality, however, shareholders may not be able to observe a CEO’s RWCs, I also study the case
where the CEO’s RWCs are not observable. In this case with asymmetric information, a CEO can extract
an information rent, i.e., the CEO can receive a contract which makes her utility above the reservation
utility. I show that for each firm, a pooling on CEO types – giving the same contract to CEOs of different
3
types – may exist. 3 This pooling result could help to explain the practice of benchmark pay (Bizjak,
Lemmon and Naveen (2008), Faulkender and Yang (2010)). For firms with certain similarities, they may
fall into the same region of pooling, so they will use other firms’ contracts as a benchmark. Since CEOs’
incentives depend on each other, and the CEO’s type at the reservation utility also depends on other
CEOs’ compensation, I find that multiple equilibria can arise with asymmetric information.
Lastly, I study the case where relative performance evaluation can be used. I show that if a CEO is
also concerned about her friends or neighbors – entrepreneurs, investment bankers, and private equity
investors for example – whose income is correlated with some lucky shock (market shock for example),
then firms should compensate the CEO by a means that will correlate with that shock. Thus the model
provides a simple explanation for the pay-for-luck puzzle documented by Bertrand and Mullainathan
(2001).4
I then turn to study the case in which a CEO’s effort affects not only the mean but also the variance of
firm value. To improve firm value, a CEO may need to undertake risky projects; these decisions also in-
crease the variance of firm value. By combining risk-taking efforts and RWCs, the model generates some
new predictions on executive compensation. Because a CEO’s effort also increases the variance of firm
value and the CEO is risk-averse, higher incentives do not always lead to a higher effort. As I demon-
strate that an incentive-threshold exists such that the CEO’s effort decreases in her incentives when her
incentives exceeds the threshold. If the CEO has no RWCs, at the optimum, the optimal CEO incentives
will never exceed the threshold, because doing this will only reduce the CEO’s effort and increase the risk
premium paid to the CEO. Thus her effort is increasing in her incentives. However, if the CEO has RWCs,
shareholders may have to grant the CEO incentives above the threshold to pay the RWCs’ premium. Thus,
if the CEO’s RWCs are intensive, her effort can be decreasing in her incentives at the optimum. Because of
this non-monotonicity between efforts and incentives, and because CEO incentives depend on peer in-
centives, I show that multiple equilibria could exist, such that in one equilibrium, CEOs’ efforts increase
in their incentives; in another equilibrium, CEOs’ efforts decrease in their incentives.
So far I have confined the discussions to linear contracts for tractability.5 In practice, however, options
3This pooling result seems quite unique to RWCs in the sense that in the model I also tried some other cases, e.g., a CEO’s
productivity or a CEO’s risk-aversion is not observable, then I only get separating on CEO types.
4Gopalan, Milbourn and Song (2010), Noe and Rebello (2008), and Oyer (2004) provide alternative explanations.
5Many papers specify the form of contracts for tractability (e.g., Holmstrom and Tirole (1993), Jin (2002), Oyer (2004), and
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are widely used, I extended the model to account for non-linear contracts. In particular, I compare stock
to options in the presence of RWCs in a simple example. I establish that RWCs have two effects when
comparing stock to options. First, the effect of RWCs on incentivizing CEO effort is stronger for options
than stock. This is because if the CEO chooses to shirk, stock still remains exposed to aggregate shock;
in contrast, options are more likely to expire with value zero making them completely insensitive to the
shock. But, as previously explained, in the presence of RWCs, CEOs willingly risk exposure to aggregate
shock because it helps them to keep up with their peers. Thus the effect of RWCs on incentivizing a CEO’s
effort is larger for an option-based contract. Second, because RWCs make CEOs willing to risk exposure
to aggregate shock, they can help to reduce the risk premium associated with aggregate risk. Notice that
stock is fully exposed to risk, but options are only partially exposed to risk; thus, RWCs reduce the risk pre-
mium more for stock than options. I show that when aggregate risk is much larger than idiosyncratic risk,
the first effect dominates the second one such that options become more preferable. Where idiosyncratic
risk is not too small compared with aggregate risk, however, stock will be more efficient.
This paper is related to several strands of literature. First, it is related to the literature that examines
RWCs’ effects. This has been extensively studied in asset pricing models. For example, relative consump-
tion effects are used to examine equity premium puzzle (Abel (1990), Constantinides (1990), Galí (1994),
Campbell and Cochrane (1999)). García and Strobl (2011) study the complementarities in information
acquisition using RWCs. DeMarzo, Kaniel and Kremer (2008) show how RWCs can result in financial bub-
bles. Roussanov (2010) explains the under-diversification puzzle by emphasizing the desire to “get ahead
of the Joneses”. In corporate finance, Goel and Thakor (2010) explore merger waves using envy-based
preferences. The concerns for “equity”are applied to study the dynamics of workers’ wages (Cabrales,
Calvó-Armengol and Pavoni (2007)). This paper introduces RWCs into a standard principal-agent model
and examines how CEO incentives will be affected. Miglietta (2010) finds that RWCs make agents prefer
positively correlated payoffs. Using a case involving one principal and two agents, Miglietta (2008) ex-
plains the use of firm-wide incentive contracts to employees who do not seem to need any incentive. In
this paper, I focus on the interactions between shareholders and a CEO within a firm, as well as interac-
tions among firms. I derive the optimal contract for each firm and also show that RWCs may sometimes
Bolton, Scheinkman and Xiong (2006)).
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be beneficial to shareholders’ payoffs. The case in which a CEO’s effort affects both the mean and variance
of firm value is also discussed.
Second, my paper is related to the literature on executive compensation. By incorporating RWCs into
the model, I show that many features in CEO compensation can be rationalized. The standard principal-
agent model predicts a negative relation between incentives and risk. However, many empirical stud-
ies find no significant relation, or even a positive relation between incentives and firm risk (Prendergast
(2002)). RWCs can explain this contradiction: the relation between incentives and aggregate risk can be
either negative or positive, depending on the coefficient of a CEO’s RWCs on aggregate shock. Bertrand
and Mullainathan (2001) document that CEOs are paid for market upswings that are beyond their con-
trol, a so-called “pay-for-luck”puzzle. Gopalan, Milbourn and Song (2010) argue that if a CEO can exert
an effort to explore future market conditions and decide the firm’s exposure to the market risk, then it is
necessary to tie CEO pay to luck. In the model, I provide a simple explanation by showing that if a CEO
compares her compensation with that of friends or neighbors, especially those whose income is corre-
lated with lucky shock, then it is optimal to compensate the CEO by a means that is also correlated with
the shock. Many empirical studies (Bizjak, Brickley and Coles (1993), Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006),
Aggarwal and Samwick (2006), Gormley, Matsa and Milbourn (2011)) have documented a negative rela-
tion between CEOs’ risk-taking behavior and their incentives. I show that if a CEO’s RWCs are intensive,
then shareholders have to pay the RWCs’ premium using more shares of stock such that a negative re-
lation between the CEO’s risk-taking behavior and her incentives arises at the optimum. Dittmann and
Maug (2007) calibrate a standard principal-agent model and find that options should not be used. In con-
trast, I provide a rationale for the use of options by demonstrating that the incentives provided by RWCs
to induce efforts are stronger for options than stock, and this effect will be dominant if aggregate risk is
much larger than idiosyncratic risk.
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1.2 Efforts Only Affect the Mean of Firm Value
1.2.1 Model
Suppose there is a continuum of firms and CEOs: i ∈ [0,1]. CEO i is assigned to firm i .6 For each firm
i , consider the following principal-agent model: an all-equity firm is owned by risk-neutral shareholders
and managed by a risk-averse CEO. At t = 0, the CEO is offered a contract. At t = 1, she exerts an effort
a i , which is unobservable. The firm’s terminal value at time t = 2 is given by
Vi =pii a i + m˜ +ηi , (1.1)
where m˜ is the aggregate shock with mean 0 and variance σ2m ; ηi is firm i ’s idiosyncratic shock with
mean 0 and variance σ2ηi ; m˜ and (ηi )i∈[0,1] are independent of each other. I assume that (σ
2
ηi )i∈[0,1] are
uniformly bounded, i.e., there existsσmax such thatσηi ≤σmax for each i ∈ [0,1]. pii > 0 is the measure of
CEO i ’s productivity.
For tractability, I confine the current discussion to linear contracts which consist of a base salary αi 7
and βi ≤ 1 shares of stock. Then CEO i ’s payoff at time t = 2 is
w i =αi +βi Vi =αi +βi (pii a i + m˜ +ηi ).
At time t = 1, CEO i exerts an effort a i to maximize her expected utility. I introduce RWCs into a CEO’s
utility function and assume that a CEO’s utility is not determined by the absolute level of her wage, but
depends on the difference between her wage and a portion of other CEOs’ wage. Specifically, I assume
that CEO i ’s utility is given by
Ui = E [u i (a i ),Hi ] = E [w i −Hi ]−
1
2
λi V a r [w i −Hi ]−
1
2
a 2i ,
8 (1.2)
6Here, I do not study the problem of matching firms and CEOs. Gabaix and Landier (2008) and Edmans and Gabaix (2011)
present competitive assignment models of the managerial labor market.
7I do not put restrictions onαi . In Proposition 1.2.2, we will see thatαi depends on the CEO’s reservation utility u i . So αi can
be negative if u i is low.
8In fact, this is the certainty-equivalent of exponential utility function E [−e −λi (wi−Hi− 12 a 2i )] if all the shocks are normally dis-
tributed.
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where λi is the measure of CEO i ’s risk-aversion;
1
2
a 2i is the cost of her effort. The novel part in the utility
function is the incorporation of RWCs H i . I define the CEO’s RWCs as follows:
Definition 1.2.1. A CEO’s RWCs are the product of a parameter measuring the CEO’s concerns about other
CEOs’ pay and the sum of all the CEO pay. Specifically, for CEO i , her RWCs are denoted by
Hi = ri
∫ 1
0
wk d k ,
where ri ≥ 0 is a parameter measuring CEO i ’s concerns about other CEOs’ pay. A larger ri means that CEO
i cares more about other CEOs’ compensation.
∫ 1
0
wk d k is the sum of all the CEO pay.
The RWCs Hi can be simplified to
Hi = ri (W +M m˜ ), 9 (1.3)
where W =
∫ 1
0
(αk +βkpik a k )d k = ri
∫ 1
0
E [wk ]d k is the sum of the expected CEO pay, and M =
∫ 1
0
βk d k =∫ 1
0
∂wk
∂ m˜
d k is the sum of the sensitivity of CEO pay to aggregate shock (i.e., aggregate CEO incentives in
this case).
Shareholders will choose a contract to maximize the expected firm value net of CEO pay. For brevity,
I drop the subscript i . For each firm, we have the following principal-agent problem:
Program 1.
max
α,β
E [V −w ]≥ 010
such that
IC: a ∈ arg max
aˆ
E [u (aˆ ),H ],
IR: E [u (a ),H ]≥ u ,
where u is the CEO’s reservation utility.
Proposition 1.2.2.
9See Appendix for the derivation.
10If the shareholders’ expected payoff is negative, I assume that shareholders will not hire the CEO and all the agents get zero
payoff in expectation. See Section 1.2.2 for discussions.
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1) Given a linear contract w =α+βV , the optimal effort taken by the CEO is a =piβ , thus ∂ a
∂ β
> 0, i.e.,
the CEO’s effort is always increasing in incentives.
2) If r Mσ2m ≥ σ2m +σ2η, then β ∗ = 1. In this case, we have a corner solution, i.e., it is better for share-
holders to sell the firm to the CEO.
If r Mσ2m <σ
2
m +σ
2
η, then we have an interior solution. In this case, the optimal contract (α
∗,β ∗) is



α∗ =
(pi2−λr Mσ2m )(pi2+λr Mσ2m )
2[pi2+λ(σ2m+σ
2
η)]
− pi
2(pi2+λr Mσ2m )
2
[pi2+λ(σ2m+σ
2
η)]
2 + r W +
1
2
λr 2M 2σ2m +u ,
β ∗ =
pi2+λr Mσ2m
pi2+λ(σ2m+σ
2
η)
.
2i) β ∗ is increasing in pi, r and M ; decreasing in λ andσ2η.
2ii) The relation betweenβ ∗ andσ2m is ambiguous. If r

∂M
∂ σ2m
σ2m +

1− λσ
2
m
pi2+λ(σ2m+σ
2
η)

M

> pi
2
pi2+λ(σ2m+σ
2
η)
,
then β ∗ is increasing in σ2m ; if r

∂M
∂ σ2m
σ2m +

1− λσ
2
m
pi2+λ(σ2m+σ
2
η)

M

< pi
2
pi2+λ(σ2m+σ
2
η)
, then β ∗ is decreasing in
σ2m .
2iii) The expected CEO pay is
E [w ] =
pi4
2[pi2+λ(σ2m +σ
2
η)]
+ r W +
1
2
λr 2M 2σ2m

1− λσ2m
pi2+λ(σ2m +σ
2
η)

+u ,
which is increasing in r , W and M .
Now we discuss the intuitions behind Proposition 1.2.2. In part 1), since a CEO’s effort only increases
the mean of firm value, but has no effect on the variance, giving a CEO higher incentives will always
induce her to exert a higher effort. Note that a CEO’s effort decision is determined by her productiv-
ity of effort and her cost of effort; at the optimum, the marginal benefit of effort for the CEO equals to
the marginal cost of effort. Also note that when the target CEO’s incentives are given, the other CEOs’
contracts and efforts do not affect either the productivity or the cost of effort of the target CEO, so the
target CEO’s effort is not affected by other CEOs’ contracts or efforts, even if she cares about other CEOs’
compensation.11
In part 2i), the relations between β ∗ and pi, λ, σ2η are standard: a higher pi (which is the measure of
a CEO’s productivity) means that the benefit of a CEO’s effort is greater, thus shareholders would like to
11In Section 1.3.1, I will show that RWCs provide additional incentives for the CEO to work when her effort also affects the
variance of firm value.
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grant a CEO more incentives to induce a higher effort whenpi increases. Since the CEO is risk-averse, a rise
in λ orσ2η makes it more costly to induce a CEO’s effort, so β
∗ is decreasing in λ andσ2η. The novel results
of part 2i) are the relations between β ∗ and r and M . In the presence of RWCs, a CEO’s contract plays two
roles: one is to induce the CEO to work; the other is to make the CEO satisfied with her contract when
she compares it to those of her peers, i.e., the contract has to pay a “RWCs’ premium” to the CEO. Since
CEOs are risk-averse, note that the RWCs are positively correlated with aggregate shock, thus it is less
costly for shareholders to make a payment that is related to the shock, rather than pay cash to the CEO.
In other words, stock compensation is better. Thus as r or M goes up, CEO incentives will rise as well.
Recall that M is the sum of the sensitivity of CEO pay to aggregate shock (aggregate CEO incentives, in this
case), hence the model predicts that individual CEO incentives increase when aggregate CEO incentives
increase. Similarly, since participation constraint requires a premium for RWCs, part 2iii) shows that the
expected CEO pay is increasing in W (aggregate expected CEO pay) and M (aggregate CEO incentives).
Bouwman (2011), Bizjak, Lemmon, and Naveen (2008), and Faulkender and Yang (2010) find that the
level of CEO pay increases in the average level of CEO pay in a reference group,12 which is consistent with
the model. The model also predicts a positive relation between individual CEO incentives and aggregate
CEO incentives, an interesting result to be tested in the future.
Part 2ii) shows that the relation between incentives and aggregate risk depends on a CEO’s RWCs. In
the benchmark case with no RWCs (r = 0), as aggregate risk goes up, it becomes more difficult to distin-
guish a CEO’s effort from observable outcomes. According to the informativeness principle, a firm should
use fewer incentives, thus the optimal incentives are decreasing in aggregate risk. This is consistent with
the standard principal-agent model. When a CEO has RWCs (r > 0), however, there is another effect that
affects the relation between incentives and aggregate risk. As explained above, it is less costly to pay the
RWCs’ premium by using stock compensation than using cash. Thus, when aggregate risk goes up, stock
compensation becomes more attractive than cash compensation. Shareholders are more willing to use
stock to pay the RWCs’ premium as aggregate risk increases. Therefore, when r is large, RWCs’ effects
are dominant, which leads to a positive relation between incentives and aggregate risk. This result can
be used to explain the mixed empirical evidence on the relation between CEO incentives and firm risk.
12Bouwman (2011) use geographically-close firms as a reference group; Bizjak, Lemmon, and Naveen (2008), Faulkender and
Yang (2010) use similar-sized firms in the same industry as a reference group.
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The standard principal-agent model predicts that there should be a negative relationship between CEO
incentives and firm risk. Yet, some empirical studies show that there is no significant relationship, or
even a positive relationship between incentives and firm risk (Prendergast (2002)). By incorporating a
CEO’s RWCs into the model, although the relation between CEO incentives and a firm’s idiosyncratic risk
is still negative, the relation between CEO incentives and aggregate risk can be positive. 13 In particular,
the model shows that if the aggregate CEO incentives are high, then there is a positive relation between
individual CEO incentives and aggregate risk, which is a new testable prediction.
Lastly, part 2iii) predicts that the expected CEO pay increases with aggregate expected CEO pay and
aggregate CEO incentives. This result is intuitive: the participation constraint requires a premium for a
CEO’s RWCs, which depend on other CEOs’ income. If aggregate expected CEO pay goes up, individual
expected CEO pay goes up as well. The increase of aggregate CEO incentives makes each individual CEO
face a higher risk to fall behind other CEOs’ payoffs. This has to be compensated by increasing CEO pay.
1.2.2 Equilibrium
When a CEO has RWCs, the optimal CEO incentives will depend on other CEOs’ incentives by Proposition
1.2.2. Thus, I define an equilibrium as follows:
Definition 1.2.3. A subgame perfect equilibrium is a set of functions (αi ,βi ,a i )i∈[0,1] that satisfy the fol-
lowing properties:
1) at time 0, for each firm i , given all the other firms’ contracts (αj ,βj )j 6=i , the contract (αi ,βi ) solves the
principal-agent problem optimally for firm i .
2) at time 1, for the CEO in firm i , given her contract and all the other firms’ contracts, a i maximizes
CEO i ’s utility.
If a CEO’s RWCs are too big, i.e., if r is large, then it becomes too costly to compensate the CEO. As
a result, shareholders will decide not to hire the CEO, in which case all the agents get zero payoff. In the
following lemma, I study the case in which each firm will hire its CEO. I provide a necessary and sufficient
condition under which a unique (hiring) equilibrium exists.
13 Jin (2002) obtains the same result under the assumption that a CEO is risk-averse and shareholders are risk-neutral to a
firm’s idiosyncratic risk but risk-averse to aggregate risk.
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Lemma 1.2.4. There is a unique equilibrium in which each firm will hire its CEO (and the optimal contract
for each firm is given by Proposition 1.2.2), if and only if
∫ 1
0
ri d i < 1, and (1.4)
ri Mσ
2
m ≤σ2m +σ2ηi for each i ∈ [0,1], and (1.5)
pi2i (pi
2
i +λi ri Mσ
2
m )
pi2i +λi (σ
2
m +σ
2
ηi )
− E [w i ]≥ 0 for each i ∈ [0,1], (1.6)
where M =
∫ 1
0
pi2
i
pi2
i
+λi (σ
2
m+σ
2
ηi
)
d i
1−
∫ 1
0
λi ri σ
2
m
pi2
i
+λi (σ
2
m+σ
2
ηi
)
d i
is aggregate CEO incentives;
W =
∫ 1
0

pi4
i
2[pi2
i
+λi (σ
2
m+σ
2
ηi
)]
+ 1
2
λi r
2
i M
2σ2m

1− λiσ
2
m
pi2
i
+λi (σ
2
m+σ
2
ηi
)

+u i

d i
1−
∫ 1
0
ri d i
is aggregate expected CEO pay;
E [w i ] =
pi4i
2[pi2i +λi (σ
2
m+σ
2
ηi )]
+ ri W +
1
2
λi r
2
i M
2σ2m

1− λiσ
2
m
pi2i+λi (σ
2
m+σ
2
ηi )

+u i is the expected CEO pay for firm
i .
Note that (1.5) guarantees that the optimal incentives for each firm do not exceed 1. (1.4) and (1.6)
guarantee that the shareholders in each firm have nonnegative payoffs. From Proposition 1.2.2, it can be
seen that a CEO’s effort decision is determined only by her own contract, even if she cares about other
CEOs’ compensation. Also, a CEO’s effort is always increasing in her own incentives linearly. As a result,
although RWCs make a CEO’s optimal incentives depend on the other CEOs’ incentives, this dependence
only results in a linear relation between individual CEO incentives and aggregate CEO incentives. By
aggregating all the CEOs’ incentives, we will eventually obtain unique aggregate CEO incentives, which
in turn determine unique optimal CEO incentives for each firm. The equilibrium is therefore unique.
1.2.3 Are RWCs Good or Bad for Shareholders?
In this section, I explore the following question: if shareholders can observe the parameter r and choose
a CEO from a pool of CEOs with a different r , then will they choose a CEO with r = 0 or a positive r ?
In other words, do RWCs always hurt shareholders’ value? When a CEO has RWCs, it has two effects on
shareholders’ payoffs. On one hand, shareholders have to pay a premium for a CEO’s RWCs due to the
participation constraint; this will reduce shareholders’ payoffs. On the other hand, shareholders’ payoffs
12
can also benefit from a CEO’s RWCs for the following reason: in the presence of RWCs, a CEO willingly
risks exposure to aggregate shock to keep up with her peers. Thus RWCs help to reduce the risk premium
paid to the CEO. The risk premium paid to a CEO for the aggregate risk that she bears is not proportional
to her owned shares, but is proportional to the difference between her owned shares and the coefficient of
her RWCs on aggregate shock (which is β−r M ). Hence, when r is positive, it allows shareholders to grant
a CEO more incentives to induce a higher effort, but without paying a higher risk premium. In particular,
if a CEO’s productivity is high, the second effect could dominate the first effect so that a positive r is
optimal for shareholders.
Lemma 1.2.5. If
λMσ2mpi
2
pi2+λ(σ2m +σ
2
η)
>W , (1.7)
then the optimal r ∗ is positive, which is given by r ∗ =
λMσ2mpi
2−W [pi2+λ(σ2m+σ2η)]
λM 2σ2m (pi
2+λσ2η)
. The optimal r ∗ is increasing
in pi; decreasing in W andσ2η.
As we argued above, the presence of RWCs has two effects on shareholders’ payoffs: first, it reduces
the shareholders’ payoffs, as the participation constraint requires a premium for a CEO’s RWCs; second,
it may also increase the shareholders’ payoffs, since it allows shareholders to grant a CEO more incentives
to induce a higher effort without paying a higher risk premium. If pi (the productivity of a CEO’s effort) is
large, then it strengthens the second effect; therefore, the optimal r ∗ is increasing in pi. If W (aggregate
expected CEO pay) is large, then the first effect is stronger because it now requires a higher premium for
CEOs’ RWCs; thus, the optimal r ∗ is decreasing in W . The increase of a firm’s idiosyncratic riskσ2η reduces
the optimal CEO incentives, which reduces the second effect; so the optimal r ∗ is decreasing inσ2η.
1.2.4 Optimal CEO Incentives When CEOs’ RWCs Are Unobservable
In reality, a CEO’s RWCs may not be known by shareholders. If a CEO’s RWCs are not observable, then how
will they affect the optimal CEO incentives? Suppose that r ∈ [0,rmax] is unobservable to shareholders.
The shareholders’ beliefs on r are represented by the probability density function f (r ) with the associ-
ated cumulative distribution function F (r ). I assume that the distribution function satisfies the relevant
13
monotone hazard rate conditions:
F (r )
f (r )
is increasing in r and
1−F (r )
f (r )
is decreasing in r .14
The timeline of the model is: at t = 0, shareholders offer a menu of contracts to a CEO; at t = 1,
the CEO chooses a contract and exerts an effort; at t = 2, all the agents’ payoffs are realized. Note that
when a CEO is choosing a contract and exerting an effort, both he and the shareholders do not know
the other CEOs’ types. As a result, the CEO and shareholders both face the uncertainty about the other
CEOs’ types when they are evaluating the contract and their utilities. In particular, the values of W (ag-
gregate expected CEO pay) and M (aggregate CEO incentives) will affect a CEO’s relative payoff. Given the
distributions of ri for i ∈ [0,1], each realization of (ri )i∈[0,1] determines each CEO’s choice of her contract,
which determines the values of W and M . Thus the distributions of W and M depend on the distributions
of (ri )i∈[0,1]. Assume that the distributions of (ri )i∈[0,1] are independent of the distributions of aggregate
shock m˜ and idiosyncratic shocks (ηi )i∈[0,1], thus the distributions of W and M are independent of the
distributions of aggregate shock m˜ and idiosyncratic shocks (ηi )i∈[0,1]. Let FW (x ) and FM (x ) denote the
cumulative distribution functions for W and M , respectively.15
To distinguish CEOs of different types, shareholders offer a menu of contracts to a CEO. Each contract
consists of a base salary and some shares of stock. Specifically, in response to a CEO’s claimed RWCs rˆ ,
the contract specifies a base salary α(rˆ ) and β (rˆ ) shares of stock. Let U (rˆ |r ) denote the CEO’s expected
utility, given that the CEO’s type is r but he claims to be of type rˆ . Then the shareholders’ objective is:
Program 2.
max
α(r ),β (r )
∫ rmax
0
E [V −w |r ] f (r )d r
such that
IC: U (r |r )≥U (rˆ |r ), for any rˆ ,r
IR: U (r |r )≥u , for any r, .
Lemma 1.2.6. Given a menu of contracts {(α(r ),β (r )}r∈[0,rmax], and suppose thatβ (r ) is differentiable, then
the contracts satisfy the IC constraint, if and only if
14Many distribution functions satisfy this property, e.g., uniform, normal, logistic, exponential, and Laplace.
15Because there is a continuum of firms, it can be shown that by Kolmogorov’s strong law of large numbers, M converges to
E [M ] and W converges to E [W ] almost surely.
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1)
∂ β (r )
∂ r
≥ 0;
2)
∂ α(r )
∂ r
=−
n
[pi2−λ(σ2m +σ2η)]β (r )+λr E [M ]σ2m
o ∂ β (r )
∂ r
.
The coefficient of a CEO’s RWCs on aggregate shock is r M . So to catch up with the other CEOs’ expo-
sure to aggregate shock, a CEO with a higher r is more willing to choose a contract with higher incentives.
Thus to distinguish CEOs of different types, it is necessary to grant higher incentives to the CEO with a
higher r .
Due to the asymmetric information between shareholders and the CEO, it is possible for the CEO to
receive a contract that gives her a utility above the reservation utility.16 I refer to U (r |r )−u as information
rent. The optimal incentives will be a trade-off between the cost of information rent and the efficiency of
incentives. A CEO with a higher r is more willing to risk exposure to aggregate shock because it helps her
to keep up with her peers. Thus a CEO with a higher r will gain more from a high-incentives contract. In
other words,∆U =U (r +δr |r +δr )−U (r |r ), the difference in utility between two near types, is increasing
in incentives. Thus, if the CEO of type r0 is at the reservation utility with her contract, then for r < r0,
information rent is decreasing in incentives β (r ); for r > r0, information rent is increasing in incentives
β (r ). Therefore, to lower the information rent, shareholders would prefer to grant high incentives to
the CEOs of types below r0, and low incentives to the CEOs of types above r0. Further, because the IC
constraint requires that incentives must be increasing in a CEO’s type, there could be a pooling on CEOs’
types around r0; that is, the contracts are the same for the CEOs of types around r0. This result helps
to explain why benchmark pay is so widely used in practice (Bizjak, Lemmon and Naveen (2008) and
Faulkender and Yang (2010)). For firms with certain similarities, they may fall into the same region of
pooling, so they will use other firms’ contracts as a benchmark.
Proposition 1.2.7. Suppose r0 = argminr∈[0,rmax]U (r |r ) is the type such that the CEO of type r0 is at the
reservation utility with her contract, if maxr∈[0,rmax]σ2m E [M ]
h
r +
F (r )
f (r )
i
≤σ2m +σ2η (this is a sufficient con-
dition to ensure an interior solution), then
16Note that in the case where the CEO’s RWCs are observable, the base salary is always set to make her utility at the reservation
utility.
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1) if r0 = 0, then the optimal incentives are β ∗(r ) =
pi2+λσ2m E [M ]
h
r− 1−F (r )
f (r )
i
pi2+λ(σ2m+σ
2
η)
;
2) if r0 = rmax, then the optimal incentives are β ∗(r ) =
pi2+λσ2m E [M ]
h
r+
F (r )
f (r )
i
pi2+λ(σ2m+σ
2
η)
;
3) if 0< r0 < rmax, then there must exist r1 ≤ r0 ≤ r2 such that β ∗(r ) =
pi2+λσ2m E [M ]
h
r+
F (r )
f (r )
i
pi2+λ(σ2m+σ
2
η)
for 0≤ r ≤ r1,
β ∗(r ) is constant for r1 ≤ r ≤ r2, and β ∗(r ) =
pi2+λσ2m E [M ]
h
r− 1−F (r )
f (r )
i
pi2+λ(σ2m+σ
2
η)
for r ≥ r2.
Most of comparative statics are the same with Proposition 1.2.2: β ∗(r ) is increasing in pi, r ; decreasing
in λ and σ2η; the relation between β
∗(r ) and σ2m is ambiguous. But the relation between β
∗(r ) and the
aggregate CEO incentives E [M ] becomes negative when r > r0 and r − 1−F (r )f (r ) < 0.
The reason why the incentives for the types above r0 can be decreasing in aggregate CEO incentives is
due to the cost of information rent. As argued above, when aggregate CEO incentives go up, it is less costly
to use stock compensation than cash to pay a CEO’s RWCs’ premium. But where information asymmetry
is present, granting a CEO more shares of stock also increases the information rent extracted by the CEOs
of types above r0. As a result, the optimal individual incentives may be decreasing in aggregate CEO
incentives, if the cost of information rent is more important.
When r is unobservable, the optimal incentives for a CEO of type r depend on the relative position
between r and r0. As argued above, when r < r0, it is necessary to keep the CEO incentives as high as
possible to reduce the information rent; when r > r0, it is necessary to keep the CEO incentives as low
as possible to reduce the information rent. Meanwhile, the location of r0 depends on M (aggregate CEO
incentives), i.e., r0 depends on other CEOs’ incentives. Hence, multiple equilibria can arise in the case
with asymmetric information, such that r0 is low in some equilibria and high in some other equilibria. In
the following example, I show that there could exist multiple equilibria.
Example 1. Suppose all the firms are identical, i.e. λi = λ, pii = pi, σ
2
ηi = σ
2
η, ri are independently and
uniformly distributed over [0,rmax]. Let
M1 =
pi2
pi2+λ(σ2m+σ
2
η)
, W1 =
1
2
[pi2 +λ(σ2m +σ
2
η)]

1− 1
3

λσ2m rmax
pi2+λ(σ2m+σ
2
η)
2
M 21 + u , M 2 =
pi2
pi2+λ(σ2m+σ
2
η)−λσ2m rmax
,
W2 =
1
1−rmax

1
2
[pi2+λ(σ2m +σ
2
η)]

1− λσ
2
m rmax(2−rmax)
pi2+λ(σ2m+σ
2
η)
− 1
3

λσ2m rmax
pi2+λ(σ2m+σ
2
η)
2
M 22 +u

.
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If
λM 21σ
2
m ·min
 
1− 1
2
rmax,1−
λσ2m rmax
pi2+λ(σ2m +σ
2
η)
!
−W1 ≥ 0,
λM 22σ
2
m ·max
 
1− 1
2
rmax,1− rmax+
λσ2m rmax
pi2+λ(σ2m +σ
2
η)
!
−W2 ≤ 0,
then there exist at least two equilibria such that
1) in one equilibrium, r0 = 0. The optimal incentives for each firm are low and given by β ∗(r ) =
pi2+λσ2m M 1(2r−rmax)
pi2+λ(σ2m+σ
2
η)
. The aggregate incentives are M 1, and the aggregate expected CEO pay is W1.
2) in another equilibrium, r0 = rmax. The optimal incentives for each firm are high and given by β ∗(r ) =
pi2+2rλσ2m M 2
pi2+λ(σ2m+σ
2
η)
. The aggregate incentives are M 2, and the aggregate expected CEO pay is W2.
1.2.5 A Simple Explanation of Pay-for-Luck
Empirical studies document that CEOs are often rewarded for factors that are beyond their control, i.e.,
paid for luck (Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001)). This phenomenon gives rise to criticism that executive
compensation is inefficient and is in fact decided by executives themselves. In this section, I use RWCs to
make a simple explanation of this puzzle. The intuition is as follows: suppose that firm value is affected
by some lucky shock beyond a CEO’s control. A CEO with RWCs will require a RWCs’ premium due to the
participation constraint. Because the CEO is risk-averse, if the CEO’s RWCs depend on the lucky shock,
then it is less costly to compensate the CEO by a means that correlates to the shock, rather than to pay
cash to the CEO. In other words, shareholders should not subtract the lucky shock from the firm’s terminal
value when deciding CEO pay.
In (1.1), I refer to aggregate shock m˜ as the lucky shock, and assume that it is observable and con-
tractible. Then the shareholders can filter out the lucky shock from CEO pay and pay the CEO for the
shock separately. Hence for the CEO in firm i , her contract now has the following form:
w i =αi +βi (Vi − m˜ )+γi m˜ =αi +βi (pii a i +ηi )+γi m˜
A CEO may not only care about other CEOs’ pay, but also be concerned about her friends or neighbors –
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entrepreneurs, investment bankers, and private equity investors, etc – whose income is correlated with
the lucky shock m˜ . So I now assume that CEO i ’s RWCs are given by
Hi = ri
∫ 1
0
wk d k +b i m˜ ,
where the first term still reflects CEO i ’s concerns about other CEOs’ compensation; the second term
b i ≥ 0 reflects that the CEO will also compare her compensation to that of her friends, whose income is
positively correlated with the lucky shock m˜ .
Proposition 1.2.8. Suppose that
∫ 1
0
rk d k < 1. Then the optimal contract (α
∗
i ,β
∗
i ,γ
∗
i ) for firm i is given by

α∗i =
(λσ2ηi−pi2i )h4i
2(pi2i+λiσ
2
ηi )
2 + r W +u ,
β ∗i =
pi2i
pi2i+λiσ
2
ηi
,
γ∗i =
ri
∫ 1
0
bk d k
1−
∫ 1
0
rk d k
+b i ,
where W is the sum of the expected CEO pay. So as long as
∫ 1
0
bk d k > 0, γ
∗
i > 0 for each i ∈ [0,1], i.e., it is
optimal to pay CEOs for luck.
1.3 Efforts Affect the Mean and Variance of Firm Value
1.3.1 Model
In the last section, a CEO can improve firm value without changing firm risk, which is exogenous atσ2 =
σ2m +σ
2
η. In reality, however, a CEO’s action may not only affect the mean of firm value, but also the
variance of firm value. For example, if a CEO decides to invest in risky projects, investing in more projects
will expose the firm to more risk, because the success of a project is subject to the state of the whole
economy and the firm’s own idiosyncratic risk. Previous literature has argued that one objective of CEO
compensation is to induce a CEO’s risk-taking actions that increase both the mean and variance of firm
value. For example, risk-taking incentives are generally used to argue that options can be more efficient
than stock (Dittmann and Yu (2008) and Feltham and Wu (2001)).
18
In this section, I investigate the case where firm return depends on firm riskσ2 chosen by the CEO. As
in Sung (1995) and Dittmann and Yu (2009), I represent the CEO’s investment opportunity set by a frontier
in (σ,a ) space. A point on the frontier represents the maximum return that the CEO can achieve by
accepting the risk σ. Let a (σ) denote the maximum return associated with the target risk σ. To increase
return above a (σ), the CEO will have to take more positive-NPV projects. This can be operationalized
by allowing the CEO to choose a single action a which affects both the mean and variance of the return.
Thus, I assume that at t = 1, if a CEO exerts effort a , then the firm’s terminal value at time t = 2 is given
by
V =pia +a (m˜ +η), (1.8)
Compared to (1.1), in (1.8) the CEO’s effort also affects the volatility of firm value, which is proportional
to the effort a . Except that the form of firm value is different from Section 1.2.1, all the other assumptions
and specifications remain unchanged. In particular, I still confine the discussion to linear contracts for
tractability.17
Now since CEOs’ actions also affect their firms’ exposure to risk and all CEOs’ payoffs are subject to
aggregate shock, for any target CEO, if the other CEOs’ payoffs have a high exposure to aggregate shock,
it will also incentivize the target CEO to exert a higher effort for the purpose of keeping up with the other
CEOs’ exposure to the aggregate shock. Therefore, other CEOs’ incentives and actions can also affect the
target CEO’s effort decision. This is different from the basic model in Section 1.2.1, in which a CEO’s effort
decision is only affected by her own contract – even if she is concerned about the other CEOs’ payoffs.
Lemma 1.3.1. Given a linear contract w =α+βV , the optimal effort taken by a CEO is
a =
βpi+λβσ2m r M
λ(σ2m +σ
2
η)β
2+1
.
1) The CEO’s effort a is increasing in β if β <
q
1
λ(σ2m+σ
2
η)
and decreasing in β if β >
q
1
λ(σ2m+σ
2
η)
.
2) a is increasing in pi, r and M , decreasing in σ2η; but the relation between a and σ
2
m is ambiguous.
17 Edmans and Gabaix (2011) and Ou-Yang (2003) explore situations where a CEO’s effort affects the volatility of firm value in
a general contracting problem (i.e., they do not restrict to linear contracts). But they have some other assumptions to get the
closed form solution. Edmans and Gabaix (2011) assume that a CEO can observe the noise before taking the action to ensure
the optimality of log-linear contracts; Ou-Yang (2003) uses a continuous time framework as in Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987).
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If r
pi+λσ2m r M
∂ (σ2m M )
σ2m
>
β2
λ(σ2m+σ
2
η)β
2+1
, then a is increasing inσ2m ; if
r
pi+λσ2m r M
∂ (σ2m M )
σ2m
<
β2
λ(σ2m+σ
2
η)β
2+1
, then a is
decreasing inσ2m .
Since a higher effort leads to a larger variance of firm value, a risk-averse CEO will be reluctant to exert
a high effort when she is granted high incentives. Thus the CEO’s effort is increasing in her incentives
only when her incentives are not too high. This is different from the case in Section 1.2.1 where efforts
are always increasing in incentives. Given the incentives β , a CEO’s effort has two effects on her payoff:
first, it increases the mean of firm value. The marginal benefit of this effect is piβ , and the marginal cost
of this effect is a . Second, the effort also increases the variance of firm value. Since the CEO is risk-averse,
the marginal cost of increasing firm risk is λ(σ2m +σ
2
η)β
2a . Due to the CEO’s RWCs, the increase of firm
risk also helps the CEO to catch up with the other CEOs’ exposure to the aggregate shock. The marginal
benefit of this effect is λβσ2m r M . So the total marginal benefit of the CEO’s effort is βpi+ λβσ
2
m r M ,
and the total marginal cost of the CEO’s effort is a [λ(σ2m +σ
2
η)β
2 + 1]. Equating the benefit to the cost
yields the optimal effort in Lemma 1.3.1. Granting the CEO a few more shares will increase the marginal
benefit of effort bypi+λσ2m r M , and increase the marginal cost of effort by 2aλ(σ
2
m+σ
2
η)β . If the increase
in the marginal benefit is larger (smaller) than the increase in the marginal cost, then granting the CEO
more shares will increase (decrease) the CEO’s effort. Comparing the change in the marginal benefit and
marginal cost, it can be seen that there is a threshold
q
1
λ(σ2m+σ
2
η)
, such that when CEO incentives exceed
this threshold, the CEO’s effort will become decreasing in the incentives.
I now turn to the results in part 2) of Lemma 1.3.1. Since the increase of pi, r , and M will increase
the marginal benefit of the CEO’s effort, but has no effect on the marginal cost, the CEO’s effort a is
increasing in pi, r and M . Similarly, the increase ofσ2η only increases the risk that the CEO has to bear, so
it only increases the marginal cost of the CEO’s effort. Thus the CEO’s effort a is decreasing inσ2η. Lastly,
the increase of σ2m increases both the marginal benefit and marginal cost. On one hand, the increase of
σ2m decreases the CEO’s effort because the CEO is risk-averse and a higher CEO’s effort exposes the CEO’s
payoff to more risk. On the other hand, because other CEOs’ payoffs are correlated with aggregate shock, a
higher effort can help the CEO to catch up with the other CEOs’ exposure to aggregate shock. The benefit
from this effect is more valuable when the variance of aggregate risk goes up; thus the increase of σ2m
also increases the CEO’s effort due to her concerns about the other CEOs’ payoffs. So the two conflicting
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effects make the effect ofσ2m on the CEO’s effort ambiguous.
The shareholders will choose an optimal level of effort and a linear contract to implement the effort.
Solving the model, we can obtain that
Proposition 1.3.2. If r Mσ2m ≥ pi(σ2m +σ2η), then β ∗ = 1, i.e., it is better to sell the firm to the CEO. If
r Mσ2m <pi(σ
2
m +σ
2
η), then the optimal linear contract w =α
∗+β ∗V is given by
β ∗ =
2
1− λr Mσ
2
m
pi

+
Ç
1− λr Mσ
2
m
pi
2
+4λ(σ2m +σ
2
η)
,
where M =
∫ 1
0
∂wk
∂ m˜
d k is the sum of the sensitivity of CEO pay to aggregate shock. The base salaryα∗ is set to
make the participation constraint binding.
1) β ∗ is increasing in r and M ; decreasing in pi, λ, andσ2η;
2) The relation betweenβ ∗ andσ2m is ambiguous. When r M +rσ
2
m
∂M
∂ σ2m
<piβ ∗, β ∗ is decreasing inσ2m ;
when r M + rσ2m
∂M
∂ σ2m
>piβ ∗, β ∗ is increasing inσ2m .
3) If λr Mσ2m < pi, then β
∗ <
q
1
λ(σ2m+σ
2
η)
, which implies that ∂ a
∂ β
|β ∗ > 0, i.e., granting the CEO more
incentives will increase the CEO’s effort. If λr Mσ2m > pi, then β
∗ >
q
1
λ(σ2m+σ
2
η)
, which implies that ∂ a
∂ β
|β ∗ <
0, i.e., granting the CEO more incentives will decrease the CEO’s effort.
Compared to Proposition 1.2.2, there are two different results. In Proposition 1.3.2, the relation be-
tween β ∗ and pi is reversed. Now β ∗ becomes decreasing in pi. The reason is as follows: given CEO incen-
tives, a CEO will exert an optimal effort a that is proportional to her productivity pi. Thus the expected
firm value will be increased by pia , which is proportional to pi2 (because a is proportional to pi). But note
that the CEO’s effort also increases the variance of firm value, which is proportional to a 2. Because a is
proportional to pi, the risk premium paid to the CEO is also proportional to pi2. Hence from Proposition
1.3.2, we can see that when there are no RWCs (i.e. r = 0), the optimal incentives do not depend on pi
because the benefit and the cost are both proportional topi2. If the CEO has RWCs, they provide two ben-
efits on shareholders’ payoffs: Lemma 1.3.1 shows that the RWCs also provide incentives for the CEO to
work. Such a benefit is proportional to the CEO’s productivitypi. Secondly, since the risk premium paid to
the CEO for the aggregate risk that she bears is now equal to 1
2
λ(βa − r M )2σ2m . If r is positive, it helps to
reduce the risk premium. Savings on the risk premium are also proportional to pi. Thus when pi goes up,
21
the benefits for the shareholders from the CEO’s RWCs become relatively smaller when compared with
the benefit from the CEO’s effort and the cost of CEO compensation. Therefore, the optimal incentives
will move toward to the ones in the case with no RWCs: the optimal incentives will decrease as pi goes up.
Another different result is part 3) of Proposition 1.3.2. In Proposition 1.2.2, the CEO’s effort only af-
fects the mean, so her effort will always increase in the incentives. Here, the CEO’s effort also affects the
variance of firm value, so when the CEO’s incentives are too high, it reduces the CEO’s (risk-taking) ef-
fort. In part 3), if the CEO has no RWCs, at the optimum, β ∗ is less than the threshold
q
1
λ(σ2m+σ
2
η)
: the
CEO’s effort is increasing in the incentives. Intuitively, it is never optimal for shareholders to grant a CEO
more than
q
1
λ(σ2m+σ
2
η)
shares of stock, since doing so will only reduce the CEO’s effort and increase the
risk premium paid to the CEO. However, if the CEO has RWCs (r > 0), it is less costly to pay the RWCs’
premium by using stock than cash. When r is large, it could be optimal for shareholders to grant a CEO
more than
q
1
λ(σ2m+σ
2
η)
shares of stock to pay the RWCs’ premium. Thus in equilibrium, granting the CEO
more shares can decrease her (risk-taking) effort.18
As r increases, Lemma 1.3.1 shows that it directly increases CEO effort. On the other hand, the in-
crease of r also increases the optimal CEO incentives by Proposition 1.3.2. If the CEO’s RWCs are large,
then at the optimum the CEO’s risk-taking effort may be decreasing in her incentives. Thus the increase of
CEO incentives may reduce a CEO’s effort. Therefore the increase of r may have an indirect effect through
incentives to decrease a CEO’s effort. I show in the following lemma that the total effects of a CEO’s RWCs
on her (risk-taking) effort are positive, i.e., the optimal CEO’s effort is increasing in her RWCs. This sug-
gests that when a CEO’s RWCs go up, she will exert a higher effort. As a result, the covariance of firm value
with aggregate shock goes up. Similarly, if the sensitivity of other CEOs’ pay to aggregate shock goes up,
the total effects on the target CEO’s risk-taking action are also positive, which will push up the covariance
of the target firm value with the aggregate shock. The results are summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 1.3.3.
d a
d r
|β ∗ =
∂ a
∂ β
∂ β
∂ r
+
∂ a
∂ r
> 0.
Therefore, d
d r
Cov (V,m˜ )> 0. As a CEO’s RWCs increase, firm value becomes more covariant with the aggre-
18Carpenter (2000) and Ross (2004) show that granting a CEO options may reduce the CEO’s risk-taking incentives, but they
do not endogenize the optimal CEO incentives in the model. Here I show that by endogenizing the optimal CEO incentives,
granting her more incentives could reduce her risk-taking efforts only when the CEO has RWCs.
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gate shock.
Similarly, d a
d M
|β ∗ > 0 implies that as the sum of the sensitivity of CEO pay to aggregate shock goes up,
firm value becomes more covariant with the aggregate shock.
1.3.2 Equilibrium
When a CEO cares about other CEOs’ compensation, Proposition 1.3.2 shows that the optimal incentives
for one firm depend on other CEOs’ incentives. Lemma 1.3.1 shows that each CEO’s (risk-taking) effort
also depends on the other CEOs’ incentives and efforts. So an equilibrium requires that each firm chooses
a contract optimally given the other firms’ contracts, and each CEO exerts an optimal effort given the
other CEOs’ incentives and efforts.
Definition 1.3.4. A subgame perfect equilibrium is a set of functions (αi ,βi ,a i )i∈[0,1] that satisfy the fol-
lowing properties:
1) at time 0, for each firm i , given all the other firms’ contracts (αj ,βj )j 6=i , the contract (αi ,βi ) solves the
principal-agent problem optimally for firm i .
2) at time 1, for the CEO in firm i , given the other firms’ contracts and CEOs’ efforts, a i maximizes the
CEO i ’s utility.
If r is too big, there could be two results. First, it can become too costly to compensate the CEO. As a
result, shareholders will decide not to hire the CEO. Second, as CEOs’ effort decisions are affected by each
other, when some CEOs (a positive measure) increase their efforts, it will also incentivize the other CEOs
to exert higher efforts. This, in turn, will increase the original CEO effort, and so on and so forth. Then
RWCs eventually will have an amplifying effect on incentivizing a CEO’s effort. Thus, if r is too big, the
result could be that CEOs will exert an effort of infinite large, which is unrealistic. In the following lemma,
I provide a sufficient condition under which equilibrium exists; in equilibrium, CEOs are hired and their
efforts are bounded.
Lemma 1.3.5. Define that βi (M ) =
2
1− λiσ
2
m ri M
pii

+
r
1− λiσ
2
m ri M
pii
2
+4λi (σ2m+σ
2
ηi )
for each i ∈ [0,1] and W (M ) =
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∫ 1
0

1
2
βi (M )
2 (pii−λi ri Mσ2m )(pii+λi ri Mσ2m )
λi (σ
2
m+σ
2
ηi
)βi (M )
2+1
+ 1
2
λi r
2
i M
2σ2m

d i
1−
∫ 1
0
ri d i
. Suppose there exists a solution M > 0 to the equation
∫ 1
0
βi (M )2(pii +λiσ2m ri M )
λi (σ2m +σ
2
ηi )βi (M )
2+1
d i =M .
If the following conditions are satisfied, there must exist at least one equilibrium in which CEOs are hired
with the optimal contracts given by Proposition 1.3.2 and their efforts are bounded.
∫ 1
0
ri d i < 1, and (1.9)
riσ
2
m ≤
2(σ2m +σ
2
ηi )
1+
Æ
1+4λi (σ2m +σ
2
ηi )
for each i ∈ [0,1], and (1.10)
ri Mσ
2
m ≤pii (σ2m +σ2ηi ) for each i ∈ [0,1], and (1.11)
βi (M )pii (pii +λi ri Mσ2m )
λi (σ2m +σ
2
ηi )βi (M )
2+1
− E [w i ]≥ 0 for each i ∈ [0,1], (1.12)
where E [w i ] =
1
2
βi (M )2(pii−λi ri Mσ2m )(pii+λi ri Mσ2m )
λi (σ2m+σ
2
ηi )βi (M )
2+1
+ 1
2
λi r
2
i M
2σ2m + r W (M ).
Note that (1.10) guarantees that each CEO’s effort is bounded. (1.11) guarantees that the optimal CEO
incentives do not exceed 1. (1.9) and (1.12) guarantee that the shareholders’ payoffs are nonnegative for
each firm. Since the CEO’s effort not only affects the mean but also the variance of firm value, Lemma
1.3.1 sets forth that a CEO’s effort is not monotonically increasing in the incentives. There is a threshold,q
1
λ(σ2m+σ
2
η)
, such that the CEO’s effort is increasing in the incentives below the threshold and decreasing
in the incentives above the threshold. By Proposition 1.3.2, each CEO’s optimal incentives depend on
other CEOs’ incentives. If the other CEOs are granted low incentives, then the target CEO’s incentives
can be low, such that her effort is increasing in the incentives; but if the other CEOs are granted high
incentives, then the target CEO’s incentives has to be high and may exceed the threshold, such that her
effort becomes decreasing in the incentives. Therefore, there could exist multiple equilibria in this case.
I illustrate this in the following example.
Example 2. Suppose there are two types of firms. For i ∈ [0,k ], λi = λ, pii = pi, σ2ηi = σ2η, ri = r . For
i ∈ [1− k ,1], λi = λ, pii = pi, but σ2ηi = σ¯2η, ri = r¯ . Assume that the parameters satisfy the following
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conditions: 1) λ(σ2m +σ
2
η)> 1; 2) λr (σ
2
m +σ¯
2
η) =λr¯ (σ
2
m +σ
2
η); 3)
r¯
r
> 1; 4) r+r¯
2r¯

1+ r¯−rÆ
(r¯−r )2+4λ(σ2m+σ2η)r¯ r

<
σ2m+σ
2
η−σ2m r k
σ2m r (1−k )
< 1. 19 Then for firms in [0,k ], there must exist at least two equilibria: in one equilibrium,
the optimal CEO incentives are less than the threshold
q
1
λ(σ2m+σ
2
η)
, thus the CEO’s effort is increasing in the
incentives; in another equilibrium, the optimal incentives are greater than the threshold
q
1
λ(σ2m+σ
2
η)
, thus
the CEO’s effort is decreasing in the incentives.
1.4 Extension: An Example of Stock Versus Options
In Sections 2 and 3, I focus on linear contracts for the purpose of tractability. In practice, though, options
are widely used. Options provide insurance from the downside of returns, giving a CEO convex payoffs
and inducing her to take risk (Guay (1999), Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006)). Dittmann and Maug (2007),
however, calibrate a standard principal-agent model and find that options should not be used. In this
section, I will compare stock to options in the presence of RWCs in a simple example.
Suppose there are a continuum of firms and CEOs: i ∈ [0,1]. CEO i is assigned to firm i . All firms are
identical in the sense that the corresponding parameters are equal for each firm. For simplicity, I assume
that for each CEO, there is a binary effort decision {0 (shirk),1 (work)}. If CEO i chooses to shirk, then
there is no cost and firm value is Vi = e0(m˜ +ηi ). If she chooses to work, then there is a cost c for her
and firm value is Vi = pi+ e1(m˜ +ηi ), where m˜ refers to the aggregate shock that could be σm or −σm
with probability 1
2
for each; ηi is firm i ’s idiosyncratic shock that could be ση or −ση with probability
1
2
for each; m˜ and (ηi )i∈[0,1] are independent of each other. e0 is the firm’s exposure to risk if the CEO
shirks, and e1 is the firm’s exposure to risk if the CEO works. I assume that e 1 ≥ e0. If e0 = e1, then it
corresponds to the situation in which the CEO’s effort only increases the mean of firm value; if e 0 < e1,
then it corresponds to the situation in which the CEO’s effort increases both the mean and variance. For
simplicity, I make the following assumptions:
Assumption 1: It is always beneficial for shareholders to induce CEOs to work (i.e., 1 is the optimal
effort);
19 Note that since λ(σ2
m
+σ2
η
) > 1 and r¯ > r , r+r¯
2r¯

1+ r¯−rÆ
(r¯−r )2+4λ(σ2m+σ2η)r¯ r

< r+r¯
2r¯

1+ r¯−rp
(r¯−r )2+4r¯ r

= 1. So the condition 4) can
be satisfied.
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Because of the convex payoff of options, I will relax the restriction on linear contracts and make the
following assumption:
Assumption 2: For shareholders in each firm, they will use one of the two strategies to induce CEOs to
work: either use a stock-based contract (i.e., salary + stock), or use an option-based contract of exercise
price pi (i.e., salary+ options).
The CEO in firm i has RWCs with her expected utility defined in (1.2). The shareholders will choose
either stock or options to induce the CEO to work. For simplicity, I assume that when there is no difference
between stock and options, shareholders will choose to use stock to induce the CEO’s effort. Then, since
firms are identical, in equilibrium, either all the firms use options or all the firms use stock.
The presence of RWCs has two effects when comparing stock with options. First, if the CEO chooses
to shirk, then a stock-based contract still has an exposure e0 to aggregate shock; but an option-based
contract becomes more insensitive to shock, because options are more likely to expire with value zero.
Recall that in the presence of RWCs, CEOs are willing to risk exposure to aggregate shock because it helps
them to keep up with their peers. Thus, the effect of RWCs on incentivizing a CEO’s effort is larger for an
option-based contract than a stock-based contract. This “incentive effect” makes options more prefer-
able.
On the other hand, to some extent, RWCs make CEOs willing to expose to aggregate shock, which
reduces the risk premium associated with aggregate shock. Because stock is completely exposed to the
aggregate shock, while options are only partially exposed, the reduction in risk premium is larger for stock
than options. For this symmetric case, the proof in the Appendix shows that the ratio of the risk premium
of one unit of stock to the risk premium of one unit of options is
κ(r ) =
4[(1− r )2σ2m +σ2η]
(1− r )2σ2m +σ2η+min(σ2m ,σ2η)
,
which is decreasing in r . Thus this “risk premium effect” makes stock preferable. Therefore, depending
on which effect is more dominant, RWCs can render either stock or options more preferable.
Lemma 1.4.1. Suppose that r < 1 andpi≥ e0(σm +ση). Then there exists a cutoff pˆi such that shareholders
in all the firms will use stock if and only if pi≥ pˆi.
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1) If
ση
σm
→ 0, then ∂ κ(r )
∂ r
goes to 0, and ∂ pˆi
∂ r
> 0.
2) If σ2m ≥σ2η >
4λc (1−r )2
(1−r )(1−8λc )
p
1−6λc−8λcσ
2
m , then
∂ pˆi
∂ r
< 0.
3) If σm
ση
→ 0, then ∂ pˆi
∂ r
= 0.
In part 1) of Lemma 1.4.1, when aggregate risk is much more important relative to idiosyncratic risk,
we can see that the ratio of risk premiums converges to a constant, and the risk premium effect disap-
pears. As a result, the incentive effect dominates and renders options more preferable. Part 2) indicates
that if idiosyncratic risk is not too small compared with aggregate risk, then the risk premium effect can
dominate the incentive effect such that stock becomes more preferable. Part 3) suggests that if aggregate
risk becomes much smaller than idiosyncratic risk, then both effects tend to disappear. Therefore, RWCs
do not affect the comparison between stock and options.
1.5 Empirical Implications
By introducing RWCs, the model generates a number of empirical predictions on executive compensa-
tion. I outline the predictions below.
1. Individual CEO compensation and aggregate CEO compensation
Due to RWCs, one expectes to see a correlation between CEOs’ compensation. The model predicts
a positive correlation in the level of CEO pay and CEO incentives. Proposition 1.2.2 shows that the ex-
pected individual CEO pay is increasing in the level of aggregate expected CEO pay and aggregate CEO
incentives. Bouwman (2011), Bizjak, Lemmon, and Naveen (2008), as well as Faulkender and Yang (2010)
find that the level of CEO pay increases in the average level of CEO pay in a reference group. Although
market competition could also lead to a positive correlation among the level of CEO pay, it is not clear
how market competition will affect the relation between CEO incentives. My RWCs-based model predicts
a positive relation between CEO incentives. It will be interesting to test the positive relation between in-
dividual CEO incentives and aggregate CEO incentives. To test the relation, it is critical to identify the
reference group. Bouwman (2011) uses geographically-close firms as a reference group, Bizjak, Lemmon,
and Naveen (2008), Faulkender and Yang (2010) use similar-sized firms in the same industry as a reference
group. So geography, industry and firm size might be the potential factors to identify a reference group in
an empirical test. In addition, it is also a challenge to solve the causality problem, because the increase
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in individual incentives and aggregate incentives may be due to other factors – for example, a common
shock to aggregate risk may increase both individual incentives and aggregate incentives simultaneously.
2. CEO incentives and firm risk
Prendergast (2002) provides a survey of empirical evidence on the relation between CEO incentives
and firm risk. The results are mixed: three papers find negative relation consistent with the informative-
ness principle, but eight other papers find no significant or even a positive relation. In Proposition 1.2.2, I
show that while the relation between incentives and a firm’s idiosyncratic risk is negative, the relation be-
tween incentives and aggregate risk could be negative or positive, depending on the coefficient of a CEO’s
RWCs on aggregate shock (i.e., r M , where r measures the CEO’s concerns about other CEOs’ pay, and M is
aggregate CEO incentives). In particular, the model predicts that if r

∂M
∂ σ2m
σ2m +

1− λσ
2
m
pi2+λ(σ2m+σ
2
η)

M

>
pi2
pi2+λ(σ2m+σ
2
η)
, then β ∗ is increasing inσ2m . So if r is big, and (or) the aggregate incentives M is big, and (or)
the idiosyncratic risk σ2η is big, then there is a positive relation between incentives and aggregate risk.
The prediction that aggregate CEO incentives also affect the relation between individual CEO incentives
and aggregate risk is novel.
3. Pay for luck
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) document that CEOs are rewarded for factors that are beyond their
control, i.e., paid for luck. Proposition 1.2.8 provides a simple explanation of pay-for-luck puzzle. More-
over, it predicts that a CEO is paid more for luck if her concerns about other CEOs’ pay are more intensive
(i.e., r is bigger), or if other CEOs in the reference group are paid more for luck.
4. RWCs and risk-taking incentives
Empirical studies have documented a negative relation between a CEO’s sensitivity to stock price
movement and the CEO’s risk-taking behavior (Bizjak, Brickley and Coles (1993), Coles, Daniel and Naveen
(2006), Aggarwal and Samwick (2006)). But because CEO compensation is endogenously determined,
there is a causality problem when testing the relation between incentives and risk-taking behavior. Gorm-
ley, Matsa and Milbourn (2011) address this identification problem by studying unexpected changes in
the firms’ business environment that increase left-tail risk. They find that managers with incentives that
provide a high sensitivity to stock price movements respond to the increased tail risk with greater risk-
reducing activities. My model predicts that the relation between incentives and a CEO’s risk-taking be-
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havior depends on a CEO’s RWCs. Proposition 1.3.2 shows that if r M exceeds some threshold, then grant-
ing a CEO more incentives can reduce her risk-taking effort. Some other papers (Carpenter (2000), Ross
(2004)) also point out that granting a CEO stock options may reduce the CEO’s risk-taking incentives, but
those papers do not endogenize the optimal CEO incentives. My model shows that RWCs may cause the
optimal CEO incentives to be at a high level, such that a negative relation between CEO incentives and
risk-taking behavior arises at the optimum.
5. Stock versus options
Lemma 1.4.1 shows that if aggregate risk is much larger than idiosyncratic risk, then the incentive
effect is dominant, so options are more preferable. But if idiosyncratic risk is not dominated by aggregate
risk, then the risk premium effect is dominant such that stock becomes more efficient. To my knowl-
edge, the comparison between stock and options has not been associated with the relative importance of
aggregate risk and idiosyncratic risk in the previous literature.
1.6 Conclusion
Some recent empirical studies on executive compensation (Bouwman (2011)) find that relative wealth
concerns affect firm compensation policies. In this paper, I incorporate RWCs into a standard principal-
agent model and study how CEO compensation will be affected. I focus on RWCs’ effects on CEO in-
centives and find a number of interesting implications. I show that the relation between incentives and
aggregate risk could be negative or positive, depending on the coefficient of the CEO’s RWCs on aggregate
shock. This can help to explain the mixed empirical evidence on the relation between incentives and risk.
I also provide a simple explanation for pay-for-luck puzzle. If a CEO’s efforts also affect the variance of
firm value, I show that if the CEO’s RWCs are intensive, then it can lead to a negative relation between the
CEO’s risk-taking behavior and her sensitivity to stock price movement. Finally, I compare stock to op-
tions in the presence of RWCs. I find that RWCs may render options or stock more preferable, depending
on the relative importance of aggregate risk and idiosyncratic risk. This paper makes a number of pre-
dictions about RWCs’ effects on CEO compensation, as well as some predictions concerning the relation
between individual CEO compensation and aggregate CEO compensation (including the level of CEO pay
and CEO incentives). The predictions, however, pose certain challenges for empirical tests: how to iden-
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tify RWCs’ effects; how to find an appropriate measure for a CEO’s concerns about peer compensation;
and how to solve the causality problem.
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Chapter 2
Inside Debt
2.1 Introduction
Shareholders ultimately bear the agency costs suffered by other stakeholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).
Therefore, it appears intuitive that they should pay the manager according to firm value, rather than eq-
uity value alone. In particular, Jensen and Meckling speculated that granting the manager equal pro-
portions of debt and equity might attenuate the stockholder-bondholder conflicts that arise when the
manager is purely equity-aligned. However, this idea of compensating the manager with “inside debt”1
has not since been pursued further. Instead, the intervening three decades of compensation theories
have focused on justifying equity-like instruments, such as stock and options. In particular, a number
of models suggest that bonuses for avoiding bankruptcy, salaries or managerial reputation are adequate
remedies to the agency costs of debt, leaving no role for inside debt in efficient compensation (see, e.g.,
Hirshleifer and Thakor, 1992; Brander and Poitevin, 1992; John and John, 1993). However, the substantial
bondholder losses in the recent financial crisis suggest that the agency costs of debt are not fully solved.
Theorists’ focus on rationalizing equity pay has likely been driven by the long-standing belief that,
empirically, executives do not hold debt (see, e.g., the survey of Murphy, 1999). Accordingly, Dewatripont
and Tirole (1994) seek to answer the question “why are managers’ monetary incentives ... traditionally
correlated with the value of equity rather than the value of debt?” However, recent empirical studies
1This paper defines “inside” debt as debt (or any security with payoffs very similar to debt) held by the manager. It contrasts
with outside debt, which is held by external investors.
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(Bebchuk and Jackson, 2005; Sundaram and Yermack, 2007; Gerakos, 2007; Wei and Yermack, 2009) find
that U.S. CEOs hold substantial defined benefit pensions. These are unsecured, unfunded obligations
which, in nearly all cases, have equal priority with other creditors in bankruptcy and thus constitute
inside debt.2 Researchers have also noted the common use of deferred compensation, another form of
inside debt, although systematic studies have so far been limited by data availability.3
Inside debt is therefore widespread. Such compensation contrasts with existing theories, which do
not advocate debt but instead the exclusive use of equity-like compensation. Indeed, Sundaram and Yer-
mack note the lack of a theoretical framework for their results: “the possibility of using debt instruments
for management compensation has received little attention ... A top priority would appear to be the de-
velopment of theory that illustrates conditions under which debt-based compensation ... represent[s]
the solution to an optimal contracting problem.” Does the absence of a theoretical justification mean
that inside debt constitutes rent extraction, as argued by Bebchuk and Jackson?4 Or can it be part of effi-
cient compensation, and if so, under what conditions? Should the manager’s debt-equity ratio equal the
firm’s, so that he is aligned with firm value as Jensen and Meckling hypothesized? What factors affect the
optimal level of inside debt?
These questions are the focus of this paper. We start with a model in which the manager makes a
project selection decision; the optimal project depends on a signal privately observed by the manager
after contracting. We consider a set of standard securities: debt, equity and a fixed bonus that pays off
only in solvency, and initially assume that the manager holds an exogenous equity stake to create risk-
shifting incentives. We demonstrate that inside debt is a superior remedy to the agency costs of debt than
the bonuses advocated by prior research. Bonuses are effective in encouraging the manager to avoid
bankruptcy, since they are only received in solvency. However, creditors are concerned with not only the
probability of default, but also recovery values in default. Optimal contracts should therefore depend on
the value of assets in bankruptcy, as well as the occurrence of bankruptcy. This is the critical difference
2See Section 4 for further discussion of the priority of pensions in bankruptcy.
3Despite limited data, anecdotal evidence suggests that such compensation may be substantial. For example, Roberto
Goizueta, the former CEO of Coca-Cola, had over $1 billion in deferred compensation when he died. Wei and Yermack (2009)
consider total inside debt holdings (pensions plus deferred compensation).
4An alternative view is that pensions are tax motivated. Bebchuk and Jackson (2005) and Gerakos (2007) provide a number
of arguments against this explanation, most notably that executive pensions enjoy a different tax status from employee pen-
sions. This paper takes a neutral stance: if pensions are indeed tax-motivated, the model investigates whether the tax system
encourages firms to adopt otherwise inefficient compensation schemes.
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between inside debt and bonuses: inside debt yields a positive payoff in bankruptcy, proportional to the
liquidation value. Thus it renders the manager sensitive to the firm’s value in bankruptcy, and not just
the incidence of bankruptcy – exactly as desired by creditors. By contrast, bonuses have zero bankruptcy
payoffs, regardless of the liquidation value, and so represent binary options rather than debt.
This difference in payoffs is important. Even in situations where bonuses can attenuate risk-shifting,
inside debt can be a cheaper solution since its sensitivity to liquidation values renders it a more powerful
instrument. Moreover, in some settings, bonuses aggravate risk-shifting owing to their binary nature.
Since they only pay off in solvency, the manager may inefficiently sacrifice liquidation value to gamble
for solvency. The same issues apply to other instruments which have zero payoff in bankruptcy regardless
of the liquidation value, e.g. salary (if it is junior to creditors) or reputation (under Hirshleifer and Thakor’s
(1992) assumption that the labor market can only assess the incidence rather than severity of bankruptcy.)
For brevity, we refer to all of these instruments as “bonuses.” These alternative measures were shown to
be adequate under specific frameworks in which only sensitivity to the incidence of bankruptcy matters,
such as where solvency can be guaranteed (John and John, 1993), or liquidation value is always zero
(Hirshleifer and Thakor). In the more general setup of this paper, the manager can affect the liquidation
value and so his compensation should be sensitive to it.
We then extend the model to incorporate an effort decision, which allows us to endogenize the man-
ager’s equity stake. This analysis extends previous models which focus on the agency costs of debt (project
selection) and do not incorporate the agency costs of equity (effort). This is a necessary extension, since
in the absence of a shirking problem, risk-shifting can be trivially solved by removing the manager’s eq-
uity and giving him a flat salary; here, equity compensation is optimal to induce effort. The compensation
scheme typically does not involve pure equity compensation (as advocated by some existing research) nor
giving the manager debt and equity in equal proportions (as intuition might suggest, and as Jensen and
Meckling hypothesized). In the most common case, equity is more effective than debt in inducing effort
and so an equity bias is desired, where the manager’s percentage equity stake exceeds his percentage debt
holding. Even though an equity bias leads to occasional risk-shifting, this is compensated for by greater
effort. The optimal debt-equity mix depends on the relative importance of these two agency problems
– the ratio of debt to equity is increasing in leverage, the probability of bankruptcy and the manager’s
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impact on liquidation value, but decreasing in growth opportunities (i.e. the effect of effort on solvency
value). However, a debt bias, where the manager’s percentage debt stake exceeds his percentage equity
holding, may be optimal if effort has a high expected payoff in bankruptcy, either because bankruptcy
is likely, or because effort is particularly productive in enhancing liquidation value. In contrast to the
“agency costs of equity” nomenclature, suboptimal effort may result from insufficient inside debt, rather
than equity. Indeed, a debt bias is found by Sundaram and Yermack (2007) in 13% of cases.
Finally, we relate the model’s empirical implications to recent findings. Most notably, inside debt
compensation is widespread, whereas solvency-contingent bonuses have not yet been documented. Also
as predicted, pensions are increasing in firm leverage (Sundaram and Yermack), decreasing in growth op-
portunities (Gerakos, 2007) and associated with lower risk-taking, as measured by the firm’s “distance to
default” (Sundaram and Yermack) or credit rating (Gerakos). Wei and Yermack (2009) find that disclosures
of large inside debt holdings lead to an increase in bond prices and a fall in equity prices. In addition, the
model provides a theoretical framework underpinning recent normative proposals to reform executive
pay by compensating the manager with debt as well as equity, to help prevent the significant bondholder
losses that manifested in the recent financial crisis (see, e.g., Bebchuk and Spamann, 2009.)
Jensen and Meckling (1976) were the first to theorize the agency costs of debt. They include a brief
verbal section wondering why inside debt (awarded in the same proportion as inside equity) is not used
as a solution, but are “unable to incorporate this dimension formally into our analysis in a satisfactory
way.” They speculate that the manager’s salary is a sufficient mechanism and thus have no role for inside
debt. This paper shows that salaries are problematic given their insensitivity to liquidation value, and
that equal proportions of debt and equity are generally suboptimal.
John and John (1993), Brander and Poitevin (1992) and Hirshleifer and Thakor (1992) also demon-
strate that the agency costs of debt can be alleviated through certain compensation instruments. Since
their goal is to show the effectiveness, rather than optimality, of their proposed solutions, they do not
consider whether alternative mechanisms, such as inside debt, would be superior. A second distinction
is that this paper incorporates the agency costs of equity as well as of debt. This provides an endogenous
justification for the equity compensation that is the cause of asset substitution and allows analysis of the
trade-off between effort and project selection, thus leading to empirical predictions on the optimal ratio
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of debt to equity.5 Hirshleifer and Thakor (1992) show that managerial reputation (assumed to be zero
in all bankruptcy states) can deter risk-shifting. In their model, liquidation value is always zero and so
only sensitivity to the probability of bankruptcy matters. In the more general setup of this paper, the
manager can affect the liquidation value and so his compensation should be sensitive to it, which is not
achieved by a binary instrument.6 John and John (1993) advocate two solutions to risk-shifting. The first
is a solvency-contingent bonus, which has similar issues to reputation owing to its binary payoff. The
second is to reduce the manager’s equity. This is possible as their model has no effort decision; indeed,
there is no reason to give the manager any incentive pay. Brander and Poitevin (1992) propose a more
general fixed bonus, which may be triggered at levels other than solvency. They note that if the firm is
sufficiently levered, no bonus can eliminate the agency costs of debt. Here, inside debt is effective even
where bonuses are impotent.
Dybvig and Zender (1991) (“DZ”) show that an optimal contract can alleviate the Myers and Majluf
(1984) “lemons” issue, thus resurrecting the Modigliani-Miller irrelevance theorems. Although they focus
on adverse selection rather than risk-shifting, the insight that incentives can achieve first-best is poten-
tially applicable to other agency problems. However, their interest is not on what the contract is, but that
an optimal contract (whatever form it may take) can render financing irrelevant. By contrast, this paper is
focused on the form of pay. First, it shows that inside debt can be superior to the instruments advocated
by a number of earlier papers, whereas DZ do not compare different contracts. Second, we analyze the
optimal relative proportions of debt and equity, generating empirical predictions on the cross-sectional
determinants of the inside debt level. While the optimal contract in the core DZ model aligns the man-
ager with firm value, here the manager should not hold debt and equity in equal proportions if there is an
effort decision.7
5Jensen and Meckling consider the agency costs of debt and equity separately, not simultaneously. Biais and Casamatta
(1999) and Hellwig (2009) do consider both agency costs together. They do not analyze executive compensation (which remains
pure equity), but an entrepreneur’s choice of outside financing. Stoughton and Talmor (1999) also consider contracting under
both an effort and investment decision. Investment is undertaken by shareholders (rather than the manager) and does not
involve risk-shifting as the firm is unlevered.
6While Hirshleifer and Thakor consider reputation in the managerial labor markets, Diamond (1989) considers reputation in
debt markets and shows that it can deter risk-shifting; however, it requires the manager to expect to continue to raise debt in the
future. The solutions considered here and in earlier papers work in a one-shot game.
7When DZ extend their model by introducing an effort decision, they are unable to solve for the optimal contract and note
that the solution may not exist. This does not matter for them, since the form of the contract and its comparative static deter-
minants are not the focus of their paper. Their goal is to show that “if there is a solution, it is independent of capital structure.”
35
2.2 Debt and Project Selection
2.2.1 The Model
The model consists of four periods. At t =−1, shareholders offer a contract to the manager. At t = 0, risky
debt is raised with face value of F and market value D0 < F . t = 0 total firm value (gross of expected pay)
is V0 = E0+D0. All agents are risk-neutral and the risk-free rate and reservation wage are normalized to 0.
Bondholders observe the manager’s contract when calculating D0, and so at t = −1, shareholders select
the contract that maximizes V0 minus expected pay. The assumption that F is exogenous is discussed at
the end of Section 2.2.2.
At t = 1, the manager chooses one of two mutually exclusive projects: R (risky) or S (safe). (S can be
thought of as the firm’s “status quo” state, and the manager is deciding whether to switch to the riskier
project R .) R has probability pR of “success,” in which case the firm is worth VG R at t = 2. In “failure”
(which occurs with probability (1−pR )), firm value is VBR . S pays VGS with probability pS , and VBS other-
wise. We assume that pR ≤ pS , VG R ≥ VGS ≥ VBS ≥ VBR , VG R > F and VBS < F : failure of either project leads
to bankruptcy, and success of R leads to solvency. We subdivide the model into two cases, depending on
whether the success of S leads to solvency: VGS ≥ F (Case 1) and VGS < F (Case 2). At t = 2, all payoffs are
realized and the debt matures.
If all parameters were known at t = −1, shareholders would know the optimal project and can im-
plement it with certainty. In reality, unforeseen projects often appear after pay is set, and so the contract
should induce the manager to accept (reject) any new project R that appears and offers a higher (lower)
NPV than the status quo S. We therefore assume VG R ∼U [VGS ,VG RH ] . The optimal project is not known in
advance; either R or S may be first-best depending on the realization of VG R , which is observed privately
by the manager at t = 1. All other parameters are public at t =−1.
While the core model focuses on project selection, it can easily be extended to involve other agency
costs of debt. Hence the terms “asset substitution” and “risk-shifting” should be interpreted as any action
that benefits shareholders but reduces total firm value. Other examples include debt overhang, conceal-
ing information, failing to disinvest, or paying excessive dividends. Many of these actions were believed
to be important in the recent financial crisis.
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Prior research on the solutions to (rather than causes of) risk-shifting typically take risk-shifting in-
centives as given by assuming that the manager exogenously owns a proportionα of the firm’s equity, and
shows that certain compensation instruments can remove these incentives (e.g. John and John, 1993).
This section follows this approach by also taking α as exogenous and deriving the optimal accompanying
compensation scheme; Section 3 endogenizes α through the introduction of an effort decision. Our goal
is to show whether and under what conditions debt is superior to the bonuses previously advocated, and
so we allow the accompanying scheme to consist of a fraction β of the firm’s debt and/or a bonus of J ,
paid if and only if the firm is solvent. The debt is “locked up” (similar to restricted stock) to prevent its
subsequent sale or renegotiation; indeed, pension claims and deferred compensation cannot be sold in
practice. β and J are choice variables, whereas α is currently fixed. Note that α> 0 can arise exogenously
even without the firm granting equity, for instance if the manager’s labor market reputation is linked to
the equity price (e.g. Hirshleifer and Thakor, 1992; Gibbons and Murphy, 1992).
Case 1: VGS ≥ F
Incentive compatibility requires the manager to choose S, i.e., inequality (2.2) below is satisfied, if and
only if it has a higher NPV, i.e., inequality (2.1) is satisfied:
pR VG R +(1−pR )VBR ≤ pSVGS +(1−pS)VBS , (2.1)
iff pR [α(VG R − F )+βF + J ]+ (1−pR )βVBR
≤ pS[α(VGS − F )+βF + J ]+ (1−pS)βVBS . (2.2)
The “and only if” requirement ensures that the contract does not lead to excessive conservatism. If and
only if R has a higher NPV, the contract must ensure that the manager chooses R over S. The Appendix
shows that the above is satisfied if and only if:
β =α− J (pS −pR )
F (pS −pR )+ (1−pS)VBS − (1−pR )VBR
. (2.3)
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Under first-best project selection, R is chosen if and only if VG R exceeds a cutoff V
∗∗
G R , where
V ∗∗G R =
pSVGS +(1−pS)VBS − (1−pR )VBR
pR
.
Let q = Pr(VG R > V
∗∗
G R ), i.e. the probability that R is first-best. The optimal compensation scheme is
the cheapest incentive compatible contract, i.e. solves
min
β ,J
q

pR
 
βF + J

+(1−pR )βVBR

+(1−q )pS  βF + J +(1−pS)βVBR s.t. (2.3). (2.4)
Proposition 2.2.1. If VGS ≥ F , the optimal compensation scheme (β ∗, J ∗) is given by

(α,0) if pR (1−pS)VBS > pS(1−pR )VBR ,
α− J (pS−pR )
F (pS−pR )+(1−pS )VBS−(1−pR )VBR , J

if pR (1−pS)VBS = pS(1−pR )VBR ,
where J ∈

0,α

F +
(1−pS)VBS − (1−pR )VBR
pS −pR

,
0,α

F +
(1−pS)VBS − (1−pR )VBR
pS −pR

if pR (1−pS)VBS < pS(1−pR )VBR .
(2.5)
If pS >> pR and VBS is close to VBR , the main advantage of S over R is its greater probability of solvency.
Hence the bonus should be used exclusively: its zero bankruptcy payoff makes it particularly sensitive to
solvency. Indeed, John and John (1993) assume pS = 1 and find that a bonus can be effective. However,
if pS is close to pR and VBS >> VBR , the main advantage of S is its greater liquidation value. Inside debt
should be used exclusively as, unlike the bonus, its payoff is sensitive to liquidation value. Indeed, if
pS = pR , the bonus is completely ineffective.
Case 2: VGS < F
If VGS < F , the firm is definitely liquidated if S is undertaken. Even though it leads to certain liquida-
tion, S can still be preferred, if (2.1) is satisfied. The incentive constraint (2.3) becomes:
β =α+
pR J
pSVGS +(1−pS)VBS − (1−pR )VBR −pR F
. (2.6)
Proposition 2.2.2. If VGS < F , the optimal compensation scheme (β ∗, J ∗) is given by β ∗ =α, J ∗ = 0.
In Case 1, (2.3) shows that bonuses (partially) alleviate asset substitution and reduce the amount of
38
inside debt required. In Case 2, bonuses exacerbate asset substitution owing to their binary nature. Since
VGS < F , the bonus is only received if the risky project is chosen and is successful. It thus induces the
manager to choose R , even if (2.1) is satisfied and so voluntary liquidation through the choice of S is
efficient. Introducing a bonus increases the level of debt required to achieve optimal project selection (see
(2.6)) and so is counter-productive. The optimal compensation scheme therefore involves zero bonus and
only inside debt. This may explain why the solvency-contingent bonuses advocated by prior literature are
rarely used. Since inside debt is even more favored in Case 2, we consider Case 1 for the remainder of the
paper.
2.2.2 Discussion
We now discuss whether alternative mechanisms can attenuate asset substitution and thus render in-
side debt unnecessary. Jensen and Meckling (1976) speculated that salaries might constitute inside debt.
Most theory papers (e.g. Innes, 1990) assume that salary is junior to creditors and thus not received in
bankruptcy; this is indeed the case in countries with pure liquidation bankruptcy codes and little room
for renegotiation in debt workouts (Calcagno and Renneboog, 2007). In such a case, salary functions like
a bonus and is thus different from inside debt. By contrast, Calcagno and Renneboog cite bankruptcy reg-
ulations in certain countries (e.g. US, UK and Germany) that management can use to ensure that salaries
are senior to creditors in a bankruptcy, and give a number of examples where this occurred. If salaries
are received in all states of nature, they have no effect on incentive constraints and thus the manager’s
decisions. (They do not mention any cases in which salaries have equal priority to other creditors, nor
are we aware of any.)
Private benefits, such as firm-specific human capital, prestige, perks, and the present value of future
wages are principally determined by whether the firm is solvent: if the manager is fired upon bankruptcy,
he can no longer derive benefits from incumbency, regardless of liquidation value. They therefore have a
very similar effect to bonuses J . Moreover, private benefits plausibly increase with shareholder value and
thus may be incorporated into α, increasing the need for inside debt.
In the model, the face value of debt is set at the first-best level F , which is optimal in the absence
of agency costs of debt. These costs are foreseen by rational creditors and thus shareholders suffer a
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discount when raising debt. Alternatively, the trade-off theory would advocate lowering debt to a second-
best level F S B < VBR , so that the firm is never bankrupt and no discount is suffered. This loses some of
the benefits of debt, such as tax shields. Either way, shareholders have an incentive to reduce the agency
costs of debt, to augment tax shields or to reduce the discount. Results would be unchanged (at the cost
of complicating the model) if F was endogenized through the introduction of taxes, as in Hirshleifer and
Thakor (1992): inside debt allows the firm to increase F and thus create additional tax shields.
Covenants are an imperfect solution due to the incompleteness of contracts: see, for example, the
discussion in Myers (1977). Covenants may increase asset substitution, as the manager risk-shifts even
when the firm is some distance from bankruptcy to avoid breaching the covenant. Also, covenants may
not be breached until after the key decision has been made (e.g., R was irreversibly chosen and failed,
leading to the covenant violation).8
2.3 Debt, Equity, Project Selection and Effort
Section 2 followed prior literature by takingα as exogenous and deriving the optimal accompanying com-
pensation scheme to achieve efficient project selection. However, a complete analysis must provide an
endogenous justification for equity compensation, else the optimal contract would be α = β = 0. This
section endogenizes α> 0 as the solution to an effort problem. In addition to project selection, the man-
ager now also makes an effort decision. He chooses a pair

e g , eb

where e g , eb ε [0, eH ] and eH < 1. e g
increases the firm’s solvency value by g with probability e g and costs the manager
1
2
e 2g ; eb increases the
firm’s bankruptcy value by b with probability eb , where VBS +b < F , and costs the manager
1
2
e 2
b
. If the
firm has abundant intangible growth opportunities, such as employee training and building customer
relationships, g will be high; if there is scope to scrap investment projects or liquidate assets, b will be
high.
To keep the model tractable in the presence of an effort decision, it is necessary to specialize it to
pR = pS = p . This rules out complex feedback effects between effort and project selection.9 The two de-
8Several studies demonstrate that executive compensation has a significant effect on risk, despite covenants. Examples in-
clude DeFusco et al. (1990), Guay (1999), and Coles et al. (2006).
9Tractability concerns also motivate the assumption that effort only affects firm values, not the probability of success. If
effort affects both parameters, it is impossible to solve analytically for the manager’s effort choice, and to compute the effect of
compensation on effort. In reality, it is plausible that effort increases the probability of success. This has a very similar effect to
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cisions can thus be analyzed separately, allowing the effects of compensation on each to be seen cleanly.
For example, an increase in β directly raises effort, since the manager benefits more from enhancing liq-
uidation value. Raising β also directly leads to S being chosen with greater frequency. If p R = pS = p ,
this change in project selection does not affect the probability of solvency (which always equals p ), and
thus does not feed back into the effort decision (which depends on the probability of solvency). If instead
pS > pR , the greater frequency with which S is chosen leads to a higher probability of solvency. If effort
is particularly productive in solvency, this creates a positive feedback effect on effort: in (2.8) below, e g
is increasing in the probability of solvency. While such feedback makes it easier to justify inside debt,
the model can no longer be solved analytically since project selection and effort cannot be considered
separately. A consequence of pR = pS is that the bonus is ineffective (see Proposition 2.2.1) and so effi-
cient compensation involves debt and equity alone. Note that even with pS > pR , the bonus provides no
incentives to exert effort: a rise in bankruptcy value has no effect on the bonus but increases the value of
inside debt. Thus, if inside debt is preferred to bonuses for solving asset substitution, it remains superior
when an effort decision is introduced.
Shareholders maximize firm value net of pay to the manager, i.e. solve
max
α,β
V0−αE0−βD0 =max
α,β
(1−α)E0+
 
1−βD0, (2.7)
subject to α≥ 0 and β ≥ 0.10 We first consider the manager’s effort decisions.
Lemma 2.3.1. The manager chooses effort levels
e ∗g = pαg , (2.8)
e ∗b = (1−p )βb.
We now consider project selection. Firm value is maximized if R is selected if and only if VG R > V
∗∗
G R ,
raising g , the value created by effort in success, in the analysis that follows (i.e. it increases the optimal ratio of α to β ), and thus
has the same comparative static effect.
10This is because of limited liability. In addition, we rule out α< 0 since it is illegal for CEOs to short their own firm. Allowing
β < 0 would, under some parameters, lead to the uninteresting result that the CEO should borrow to buy the entire firm. It
is standard that a moral hazard problem under risk neutrality requires limited liability, otherwise the first-best can always be
achieved. In addition, β < 0 would correspond to the CEO being given a loan by his firm. In the U.S., executive loans were
prohibited by the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
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where V ∗∗G R is defined by
V ∗∗G R = VGS +
(1−p )
p
(VBS −VBR ). (2.9)
However, the manager will choose R if and only if VG R > V
∗
G R , where
V ∗G R =VGS +
β (1−p )
αp
(VBS −VBR). (2.10)
The cutoff V ∗G R is undefined for α = β = 0, since the manager is indifferent between all projects. We
assume that he chooses the efficient project as this is Pareto optimal.11 The optimal levels of debt and
equity are determined by a trade-off between their differential effects on effort and project selection. We
are interested not only in the absolute levels of α and β but also their relative magnitudes – in particular,
Jensen and Meckling (1976) speculated the optimal compensation scheme would involve β =α. We thus
also study the ratio β/α which we define as k . In particular, we are interested in whether k = 1 (i.e.
β = α) or whether the contract involves an equity bias (k > 1) or a debt bias (k < 1). Our main results are
summarized in the following Proposition.
Proposition 2.3.2. The optimal compensation scheme (β ∗,α∗) satisfies the following:
(i) β ∗ < 1
2
and α∗ < 1
2
;
(ii) If p 2 g 2+(1−p )2b 2 > VG RH+VGS
2
+ 1
2
(1−p )2
p
(VBS−VBR )2
VG RH−VGS +(1−p )VBR and (1−p )
2b 2− [p F +(1−p )(VBS −
VBR )]≤ 0, then α∗ > 0;
(iii) If p 2 g 2+ (1−p )2b 2 > VG RH+VGS
2
+ 1
2
(1−p )2
p
(VBS−VBR )2
VG RH−VGS + (1−p )VBR and
2(1−p )2
p
(VBS−VBR )2
VG RH−VGS + (1−p )
2b 2 >
p F +(1−p )VBR , then β ∗ > 0.
If the conditions in (ii) and (iii) are satisfied, we also have the following comparative statics:
(iv) β ∗ is increasing in b; α∗ is increasing in g ;
(v) If p F +(1−p )VBR > 2(1−p )b 2 , then k ∗ < 1. k ∗ is increasing in VBS−VBR and decreasing in g and p;
(vi) If p

VG RH+VGS
2
− F

> p 2 g 2 + 1
2
(1−p )2
p
(VBS−VBR )2
VG RH−VGS , then k
∗ > 1. k ∗ is increasing in b, and decreasing in
VBS −VBR and F.
(vii) D0 is increasing in β , E0 is decreasing in β .
11If we instead assume that he always takes project R if α=β = 0, this allows us to drop the first condition in parts (ii) and (iii)
of Proposition 2.3.2.
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We now discuss the intuition behind each component of Proposition 2.3.2. Starting with part (i),
increasing α augments effort, but is costly to the firm. Given the convex cost function, equity has a di-
minishing marginal effect on effort; when α ≥ 1
2
, this benefit is insufficient to outweigh the costs and so
the optimal α is less than 1
2
. A similar argument applies for β .
The common condition in parts (ii) and (iii), p 2 g 2+(1−p )2b 2 > VG RH+VGS
2
+ 1
2
(1−p )2
p
(VBS−VBR )2
VG RH−VGS +(1−p )VBR ,
is sufficient to rule out the optimum involving α∗ =β ∗= 0. Intuitively, if effort is very unproductive (g and
b are small), then it is not worth giving the manager incentive compensation to induce effort; instead, the
firm should set α= β = 0 to guarantee optimal project selection. The condition guarantees that effort is
sufficiently important for at least one of α or β to be strictly positive.
Combining this with the second condition in part (ii) is sufficient to guarantee α∗ > 0. The latter is a
technical condition to rule out a boundary case. If b is high, then effort is effective in bankruptcy; if p is
low, bankruptcy is likely. Both factors mean that effort has a high expected productivity in bankruptcy;
since debt is sensitive to the bankruptcy payoff, the optimal β is high. The disadvantage of high β is that
it leads to excessive conservatism in project selection, and so α> 0 is typically optimal to counterbalance
this. However, if β is sufficiently high that
β (1−p )
αp
VBS−VBR
VG RH−VGS > 1, then we are at the boundary case where S
is always selected. The cutoff V ∗G R exceeds VG RH , and so R is never chosen. Even if α increases by a small
amount, the cutoff remains above VG RH and so project selection is unchanged. The second condition in
part (ii) places an upper bound on b and
 
1−p to rule this out.
Part (iii) gives a sufficient condition for β ∗ > 0, and thus pure equity compensation to be suboptimal.
The condition is more likely to be satisfied if VBS −VBR and b are high, and p is low. VBS −VBR measures
the manager’s ability to destroy liquidation value by inefficiently choosing R , and thus the magnitude of
the asset substitution effect. If the firm has few tangible assets, creditors recover very little regardless of
the severity of liquidation: both VBS and VBR are close to zero. If the firm has illiquid, tangible assets (such
as buildings) that cannot be eroded by risk-taking, both VBS and VBR are high. In both cases, VBS −VBR
is low: there are few gains from making the manager sensitive to the liquidation value, since he has little
effect on it. On the other hand, if R reduces liquidation value (such as an advertising campaign, which
transforms tangible cash into an intangible asset), VBS−VBR is high and so the optimal level of inside debt
is strictly positive. Similarly, if effort is effective at improving liquidation value (b is high), then debt is
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effective at increasing effort and so again inside debt is justified. If p falls, bankruptcy becomes likelier.
This increases the severity of the asset substitution issue; it also augments the effectiveness of debt in
inducing effort, because debt is sensitive to the firm’s value in bankruptcy which is enhanced by effort.
Both factors lead to β ∗> 0.
In sum, the previous literature’s justification of exclusively equity-linked incentives is warranted for
firms where the agency costs of debt are low and effort considerations are first-order, such as start-ups
with high growth opportunities. However, inside debt is desirable in companies with a significant risk of
bankruptcy (low p ), where the investment decision affects liquidation value (high VBS −VBR ), and where
effort can improve liquidation value (high b ). One example is LBOs, which are frequently undertaken in
mature firms where the main agency problem is excessive investment. Indeed, the private equity firm
can be considered the “manager” in LBOs, given its close involvement in operations, and typically holds
strips of debt and equity to minimize conflicts.
If the conditions in parts (ii) and (iii) are satisfied, then we have interior solutions for α∗ and β ∗. This
permits comparative statics, which are given in parts (iv)-(vi). The intuition for part (iv) is standard. Parts
(v) and (vi) consider the optimal ratio of debt to equity, k =β/α. The optimal k is a trade-off between its
differential effects on project selection and effort. For project selection, k = 1 (i.e. β = α) is optimal as
then V ∗G R = V
∗∗
G R . However, effort considerations may cause the optimal k to deviate from 1. To illustrate
this, define “output” as
η= p g e g +
 
1−pb eb −αE0−βD0,
i.e. the contribution to firm value provided by effort, minus the manager’s pay. We prove in the Appendix
that
∂ η
∂ k
= 2p 2 g 2α
∂ α
∂ k
+2(1−p )2b 2kα∂ (kα)
∂ k
, (2.11)
∂ α
∂ k
<
∂ (kα)
∂ k
.
If effort has a high expected productivity in solvency (either because solvency is likely (p is high) or effort
is particularly effective in solvency states (g is high relative to b )), then equity is more effective than debt
in inducing effort, since it is sensitive to the payoff in solvency. Thus, reducing debt and increasing equity
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augments effort; indeed, inspecting (2.11) shows that
∂ η
∂ k
< 0 if p is sufficiently high and g is sufficiently
larger than b .12 The Appendix proves that, if and only if
∂ η
∂ k
|k=k ∗ < 0, k ∗ < 1 and so the contract involves
an equity bias (β ∗ <α∗). The condition in part (v), p F > 2(1−p )b 2, is a sufficient condition for ∂ η
∂ k
|k=k ∗ < 0
and is indeed satisfied if p is high and b is low. Even though increasing k towards 1 would improve project
selection, it would also reduce output, and so the optimal k is less than 1. The actual value of k ∗ is a trade-
off between the positive effect on project selection and the negative effect on effort, and thus depends on
the magnitude of the two agency problems. If VBS −VBR is high, asset substitution is relatively important
and so k ∗ is closer to the level of 1 that optimizes project selection. If g rises, the benefits from effort are
more concentrated in solvency and so equity is more effective at inducing effort, reducing k ∗. An increase
in p augments the potency of equity in inducing effort and reduces the severity of asset substitution; both
factors reduce k ∗.
Conversely, if p is low or b is high relative to g , then effort has a high expected productivity in liqui-
dation and so debt is more effective than equity in inducing effort, since it is sensitive to the liquidation
payoff. If and only if
∂ η
∂ k
|k=k ∗ > 0, we have k ∗ > 1 and the contract involves a debt bias (β ∗ > α∗ ). The
condition in part (vi) is a sufficient condition for
∂ η
∂ k
|k=k ∗ > 0, and is indeed satisfied if g and p are low.
Even though increasing k above 1 leads to excessive conservatism in project selection, it also improves
output and so the optimal k exceeds 1. This debt bias contrasts the traditional view that insufficient effort
results from the “agency costs of equity”, i.e. raising too much outside equity leaves the manager with too
few shares. For a firm close to bankruptcy, effort may be more efficiently induced by giving the manager
more debt. For the comparative statics, the effect of VBS−VBR is reversed: if it increases, project selection
becomes more important and so k should be closer to 1; since k ∗ > 1, this involves a reduction in k ∗. A
rise in F increases the importance of asset substitution and has the same effect. By contrast, an increase
in b augments the importance of effort and so raises k ∗.
While parts (i) to (vi) of Proposition 2.3.2 consider the optimal compensation scheme, part (vii) ad-
dresses the effect of the compensation scheme on security prices. An increase in β leads to greater con-
servatism in project selection and thus increases (decreases) the value of debt (equity).
12Habib and Johnsen (2000) also feature the idea that equity induces an agent to improve firm value in solvency, and debt
induces an agent to improve firm value in bankruptcy. They consider a different setting where equity (debt) is given to outside
investors rather than the manager, to induce them to credibly assess the firm’s value in its primary (secondary) use.
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2.4 Empirical Implications
The model generates a number of empirical predictions involving inside debt as both an independent
and dependent variable, i.e. implications for the effects of inside debt holdings and the firm character-
istics that affect the optimal debt level. We outline the predictions below. Existing evidence on pensions
appears to be consistent with the first five; the other predictions are unexplored and thus may be fruitful
topics for future research.
The “big picture” prediction is that inside debt should be used in executive compensation, whereas
prior theories do not advocate debt. Indeed, Bebchuk and Jackson (2005), Sundaram and Yermack (2007),
and Gerakos (2007) document the extensive use of pensions. While pensions for rank-and-file employees
are typically insured by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation and thus insensitive to bankruptcy,
executive pensions typically substantially exceed the maximum insured amount. In a bankruptcy, they
represent unsecured, unfunded debt claims with equal priority to other unsecured creditors.13 Thus, pen-
sions constitute inside debt. Moreover, Sundaram and Yermack find the percentage debt stake exceeds
the percentage equity stake for 13% of CEOs. This finding represents an even sharper disparity with theo-
ries that advocate only equity, whereas this paper shows that a debt bias is sometimes optimal. Moreover,
current evidence understates the extent of inside debt as it typically focuses on executive pensions and
ignores deferred compensation, owing to data limitations thus far. Section 409a of the Internal Revenue
Code has recently increased the reporting requirements for deferred compensation, and it would be use-
ful to test the predictions below using the CEO’s total inside debt holdings; Wei and Yermack (2009) is
one such paper that does this. By contrast, there appears to be very little evidence for the fixed bonuses
advocated by previous theories of stockholder-bondholder conflicts. Murphy’s (1999) survey documents
that bonuses in practice are instead typically increasing in equity value (up to an upper limit), and thus
augment risk-shifting tendencies.
In addition to this “high-level” prediction on the existence of debt, there are a number of “detail-
level” comparative statics predictions. In reality, g is likely to be significantly higher than b and so k ∗ < 1;
indeed, empirically, α > β for 87% of CEOs, so we use part (v) of Proposition 2.3.2 to form the empirical
predictions. From (2.10), an increase in k augments the “cutoff” V ∗G R for the manager to choose the risky
13See Sundaram and Yermack (2007) and Gerakos (2007) for further detail on the priority of pensions in bankruptcy.
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project. Therefore, firm risk should decrease with the manager’s personal leverage (i.e. his ratio of inside
debt to equity). This is indeed found by Sundaram and Yermack, using distance to default as a measure
of firm risk. Similarly, Gerakos finds that CEO pension holdings are associated with higher credit ratings.
Empiricists sometimes measure the manager’s personal leverage not using percentages of debt and
equity (
β
α
) but using dollar values (
β
α
D0
E0
). Using this measure, the model predicts a positive relationship
between dollar personal leverage and firm leverage ( D0
D0+E0
) for two reasons. First, an increase in firm
leverage

D0
D0+E0

mechanically increases personal leverage through augmenting the second term. Sec-
ond, changes in the underlying parameters can jointly increase both firm and personal leverage. From
Proposition 2.3.2, an increase in b and a decrease in g both augment k . From Equations (B.1) and (B.2)
in the Appendix, these changes also increase D0 and reduce E0. Indeed, Sundaram and Yermack find a
strong correlation between firm leverage and personal leverage.
In firms with growth options, the effort decision is first-order (g is high). Consequently, pension enti-
tlements should fall, as found by Gerakos. As with the leverage association, this relationship is difficult to
reconcile with tax or stealth compensation justifications for pensions, but consistent with efficient con-
tracting. Indeed, Gerakos concludes that contracting variables explain a greater proportion of pension
levels than do measures of CEO power.
Turning from the determinants of the compensation scheme to its effects, part (vii) of Proposition
2.3.2 predicts that the value of debt (equity) should rise (fall) with inside debt holdings. SEC regulations
mandated disclosure of CEO’s inside debt holdings (both pensions and deferred compensation) in Spring
2007. Wei and Yermack (2009) find that firms that disclosed large inside debt holdings indeed experienced
increases in bond prices and decreases in equity prices, and that post-disclosure bond yields are signifi-
cantly positively related to k .
We now move to untested predictions. In Section 2, Case 1 (2) predicts that inside debt is decreasing
(increasing) in private benefits. Case 2 depicts a highly levered firm for which liquidation is very likely,
and so Case 1 likely applies to the majority of firms. Sundaram and Yermack find that personal leverage is
significantly increasing in firm age, which is consistent since the present value of future salary is lower for
older managers closer to retirement. Note that this link is not automatically mechanical – while pension
benefits naturally increase over time with the CEO’s tenure, the same is true for equity compensation (e.g.
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Gibbons and Murphy, 1992.) However, sharper tests of this prediction may be possible with measures of
private benefits that do not depend on CEO age.
The last implication comes from Proposition 2.3.2, which predicts that inside debt is most valuable
where the manager has greatest effect on liquidation values. Note that this is different from raw asset
tangibility: if assets are highly intangible (tangible), liquidation values are low (high) regardless of the
manager’s actions. A possible proxy could be the intensity of covenants.
It is important to note some caveats with interpreting recent pensions findings as being fully consis-
tent with the model and thus evidence that real-life practices are optimal. In many firms, pensions are
sufficiently large, and have sufficiently similar payoffs to debt, that they fulfill the role of inside debt ad-
vocated by the model and explain why executives do not need to hold actual debt securities in addition.
However, these conditions may not be fulfilled in certain circumstances, in which case there may be an
argument for supplementing pensions with actual debt, as advocated by Bebchuk and Spamann (2009)
in a normative proposal for compensation reform.
First, existing studies are focused on large firms in the U.S. It is not clear whether these findings are
representative of all firms, or of firms overseas. While Sundaram and Yermack find that the CEO’s debt-
equity mix is independent of firm size, potentially implying their results may also apply to smaller firms
outside their sample, this has yet to be directly shown. Further research is necessary to investigate the
generality of recent results.
Second, the model illustrates that the payoff of a pension has to be very similar to debt for it to be
effective: small departures may lead to pensions either not affecting or exacerbating the issue. If debt is
secured, pensions are junior and thus similar to the bonus J ; they may therefore encourage risk-shifting
(Proposition 3). In other cases, the payoff may be close to risk-free and thus pensions do not affect man-
agerial incentives. Executives can put pension fund assets into a “secular” trust fund, ring-fenced from
the reach of creditors, or a “springing” trust which converts into a secular trust upon trigger events, such
as a credit downgrade. Note, however, that these trusts are very rare. The CEOs of Delta Airlines and AMR
(the parent of American Airlines) lost their jobs after such trusts were disclosed (Sundaram and Yermack,
2007.)
Finally, debt securities may have a role even in companies where pensions are currently sufficient to
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mitigate risk-shifting. Such firms may have low agency costs of debt because they are addressing them by
reducing leverage or inside equity.14 Since these measures are costly, the importance of the agency costs
of debt in practice cannot be ascertained solely by looking at actual cases of risk-shifting. Debt grants
may allow leverage or equity to increase, and thus be a less costly solution.
2.5 Conclusion
The simplest theory of executive compensation would advocate aligning the manager with firm value.
Since empiricists have long believed that managers are compensated exclusively with cash and equity in
practice, a number of theory papers rationalize such a scheme. However, recent research has shown that
debt-like instruments such as pensions are in fact substantial components of executive compensation.
Debt is critically different from other instruments as it is sensitive to the value of assets in bankruptcy.
These findings suggest the need for new theories to explain why and when inside debt has a role in effi-
cient compensation, and how much debt should be used.
This paper is a first step in this direction. Inside debt can be a more effective solution to creditor ex-
propriation than salaries, bonuses, reputation and private benefits, owing to its sensitivity to liquidation
value. When equity compensation is endogenized via an effort decision, the optimal level of inside debt
is typically strictly positive and so pure equity compensation is inefficient. However, contrary to intu-
ition, it typically does not equal the fraction of inside equity due to a trade-off between effort and project
selection. An equity bias is usually optimal; the manager’s debt-to-equity ratio is increasing in his effect
on the liquidation value and the probability of bankruptcy, and decreasing in growth opportunities.
The model generates a number of empirical predictions, many of which appear to be supported with
existing findings. However, since data on debt compensation has only recently become available, there
are a number of untested predictions that may be interesting topics for future empirical research. In
terms of future theoretical directions, this paper has derived conditions under which inside debt is su-
perior to bonuses, and analyzed the optimal relative proportions of debt and equity when compensation
14There is a widely documented negative relationship betweenα and leverage (Friend and Lang, 1988; Agrawal and Nagarajan,
1990; Ortiz-Molina, 2007). One interpretation is that firms for which high debt is optimal are reducing the manager’s equity stake
to attenuate risk-shifting (as predicted by John and John, 1993), or firms that require highα to induce effort are under-leveraging
for the same reason.
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comprises of these instruments. It would be fruitful to study the conditions under which debt is optimal
in a general contract design setting.
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Chapter 3
Incentive Contracting under
Ambiguity-Aversion
3.1 Introduction
Standard models on executive compensation usually assume that the distribution on future firm value
is known and study the optimal CEO pay under this assumption. In this paper, I study executive com-
pensation in the case where there are multiple possible distributions on firm value. For example, due to
the lack of information, this is quite possible for new firms and new industries to have some ambiguous
information on their prospects.
Following the literature on ambiguity-aversion, I assume that managers are risk-averse and ambiguity-
averse. When facing ambiguity, they will derive their utility from the worst case. The behavior of ambiguity-
aversion is consistent with some experimental evidence, e.g., the most notable example Ellsberg Paradox
(Ellsberg (1961)) and the portfolio choice experiments (Ahn, Choi, Gale, and Kariv (2009)). The appli-
cations of ambiguity-aversion have been well studied in asset pricing. Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)
provide an axiomatic basis for a "max-min" preference that is used to model ambiguity-aversion. Ep-
stein and Wang (1994) show how such an approach could be incorporated into a dynamic asset pric-
ing model. Moreover, people have successfully applied ambiguity-aversion to explain many empirical
puzzles in finance. For example, it can be applied to explain the puzzles on excess volatility, negative
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skewness and excess kurtosis of stock market returns (Epstein and Schneider (2008), Illeditsch (2010)).
Easley and O’hara (2009) use ambiguity-aversion to study the participation puzzle in stock markets and
the implications of regulation on asset prices. Easley and O’hara (2010) show that ambiguity-aversion can
explain sudden market freezes. In this paper, I apply the "max-min" preference to an ambiguity-averse
manager and study how this will affect the structure of an optimal contract.
I first consider the case where firm risk is ambiguous. I assume that firm risk could be either high or
low. Since a rise of firm risk only increases the variance of stock, but has no effect on the mean value of
stock, a risk-averse and ambiguity-averse manager will always perceive a high risk when she owns stock.
This requires shareholders to pay a high risk premium to managers. On the other hand, a rise of firm risk
increases both the mean and variance of options. While an increase in the variance of options decreases
the manager’s utility, an increase in the mean of options also has a positive effect on her utility. If the man-
ager is not too risk-averse, she could perceive a low risk in the worst case. As a result, shareholders only
need to pay a low risk premium. If the savings from risk premium are large enough (which requires that
the manager’s risk-aversion is not too small), options can be less costly than stock to induce managers to
exert effort. Thus, the model provides an explanation for the use of options. The calibration of a standard
principal-agent model shows that options should not be a part of an optimal contract (Dittmann and
Maug (2007)). Thus it is puzzling that why options are used so widely in practice. A general argument is
based on the risk-taking incentives. That is, options can encourage managers to take more risk, through
which the mean of firm value will also be raised up. Since shareholders can diversify their risk in markets,
they will be happy with risk-taking to some extent. Thus, it can justify the use of options in executive
compensation (Feltham and Wu (2001), Dittmann and Yu (2008)). However, several papers (Carpenter
(2000), Ross (2004)) notice that it is not always true that giving options to agents will make them more
willing to take risk. Bettis, Bizjak, and Lemmon (2005) show that managers exercise their options earlier
when volatility increases. Hayes, Lemmon and Qiu (2010) also find little evidence to support the view that
the convexity inherent in option-based compensation is used to reduce risk-related agency problems be-
tween managers and shareholders. Therefore, this paper provides another way for people to look at the
role of options.
Secondly, I show that when the target effort goes up, it becomes more difficult to induce managers to
52
perceive a low risk. This is because inducing a manager to exert higher efforts requires granting her higher
incentives. Since managers are risk-averse, they tend to perceive a higher risk when they are granted more
incentives. Therefore, at some cut-off point of efforts, the risk premium paid to managers will move from
low to high. As a result, shareholders will be reluctant to induce managers to exert higher efforts above this
point, even if there are some improvements in managers’ ability or in firms’ investment opportunities.
This can help to explain the use of benchmark pay documented by empirical studies (Bizjak, Lemmon,
and Naveen (2008), Faulkender and Yang (2010)). The reason is: for firms with some similarities, although
these firms could differ a little bit in some dimensions, the cost arising from ambiguity will align their
target efforts and make their managers’ contracts look similar.
Lastly, I show that when there is ambiguity in the mean of firm value, options can still be more effi-
cient than stock. I prove that a manager always perceives a low mean of firm value with stock, but could
perceive a high mean of firm value with options. The perception of a high firm value not only increases
the subjective value of options to the manager, but also reduces the number of options required to induce
effort. These two benefits can make options less costly than stock. I then consider the case where am-
biguity comes from market returns. I compare four different instruments: non-indexed stock, indexed
stock, non-indexed options and indexed options, 1 and prove that non-indexed options can be the most
efficient way to induce effort. Thus, tying CEO pay to markets can be optimal. This helps to explain the
pay-for-luck puzzle (Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001)).
3.2 Model
3.2.1 Basic Set-up without Ambiguity
Consider a one-period principal-agent model in which the principal are shareholders and the agent is a
manager. At time t = 0, the manager exerts an effort a , which is unobservable to shareholders. I assume
that a feasible set of actions is a bounded interval, i.e. a ∈ [a , a¯ ]. The upper bound a¯ reflects the fact that
there is a limit to the number of positive NPV projects that the manager can undertake or a limit to the
number of hours that the manager can spend. Then at time t = 1, firm value is given by x = a + l + ε,
1Indexed instruments mean that market returns are excluded from their payoffs.
53
where ε is a noise term, which is normally distributed with mean zero and variance σ2. The noise is
realized after the manager exerting effort. l is a constant term which can be considered as the base value
of firm or the expected market return (also called luck). 2
Then the mean and variance of an option with exercise price k are
mk = σ[φ− (1−Φ)η], (3.1)
σ2k = σ
2[(1−Φ−φ2)−φ(2Φ−1)η+Φ(1−Φ)η2]. (3.2)
where η= k−a−l
σ
, and
φ =
1p
2pi
exp

−1
2
η2

,
Φ =
∫ η
−∞
1p
2pi
exp

−1
2
t 2

d t
Lemma 3.2.1. mk andσ
2
k are increasing in a , l andσ, and decreasing in k .
The main objective of the paper is to compare linear contracts with non-linear contracts in the pres-
ence of ambiguity, so I consider a stock-based contract as a linear contract and let m−∞ = a + l and
σ2−∞ =σ
2 to be the mean and variance of stock.
Since the manager’s action is unobservable, shareholders can only tie the manager’s pay to the out-
come of firm value to implement the target effort a . At time t = 0, the contract is signed. For tractability,
I restrict contracts to be either stock-based or option-based. An option-based contract consists of a base
salary α and βk options with exercise price k . The manager’s payoff with the option-based contract is
w =α+βk max(x −k ,0).
For a stock-based contract with a base salary α and β−∞ shares, the payoff is
w =α+β−∞x .
2In Section 3.2.3, I will allow l to be an ambiguous term.
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The manager is risk-averse and her expected utility is given by the following mean-variance prefer-
ence:
E [u ] = E [w ]− 1
2
λV a r [w ]− g (a ) (3.3)
where g (a ) = 1
2
a 2 is the cost function if the manager exerts effort a andλ is the measure for the manager’s
risk-aversion.
The shareholders are risk-neutral and want to maximize the expected firm value net of CEO pay:
max
α,βk ,aˆ
E [x −w ] = aˆ + l −α−βk mk
s.t. IR constraint: E [u (a )]≥ 0 3 and IC constraint: a ∈ arg maxaˆ E [u (aˆ )].
Grossman and Hart (1983) provide a two-stage approach to solve the principal-agent problem. The
first stage is to find the minimum cost c (a ) for implementing the target effort a . Then in the second step,
the principal will search for the optimal target effort over all possible pairs of effort a and minimized cost
c (a ). In this paper, I focus on the first stage and compare the cost of a stock-based contract to implement
the target effort with that of an option-based contract. 4
First-order approach
The managers’ expected utility is
E [u ] = E [w ]− 1
2
λV a r [w ]− g (a )
= α+βk mk −
1
2
λβ 2kσ
2
k −
1
2
a 2.
In general, the above utility function is not concave in the manager’s effort a , hence it might be invalid
to replace the IC constraint by the first-order condition. In Appendix, I provide some conditions under
which the use of the first-order condition is valid. Here I assume that those conditions hold and replace
3Here I normalize the reservation utility to be 0.
4 Edmans and Gabaix (2010) prove a maximum effort principle, which says that if the productivity of a manager’s effort is
sufficiently large, then the maximum effort a¯ is optimal. Therefore, we can skip the second step if we apply the maximum effort
principle.
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the IC constraint by the first-order condition:
βk
∂mk
∂ a
− 1
2
λβ 2k
∂ σ2
k
∂ a
−a = 0. (3.4)
Note that α does not affect the manager’s effort choice, so the IR constraint must be binding:
α+βk mk −
1
2
λβ 2kσ
2
k −
1
2
a 2 = 0
Thus the expected CEO pay (i.e., the cost of implementing a ) can be rewritten as
E [w ] =α+βk mk =
1
2
λβ 2kσ
2
k +
1
2
a 2. (3.5)
Formula (3.5) is the cost of an option-based contract. It consists of two parts: the risk premium paid to
managers and the cost of managers’ effort. It can also be shown that the cost of a linear contract (i.e., a
stock-based contract) corresponds to (3.5) with k = −∞. 5 Since the target effort a is given, 1
2
a 2 is just a
constant. Hence I drop 1
2
a 2 from (3.5) and refer to 1
2
λβ 2
k
σ2
k
as the cost of implementing the target effort
a . Denote it by
ck =
1
2
λβ 2kσ
2
k (3.6)
We can see that when the target effort is fixed, the cost of implementing efforts is equal to the risk pre-
mium paid to managers. If the manager is risk-neutral (i.e., λ = 0), then there is no difference between
stocked-based contracts and option-based contracts. However, if the manager is risk-averse, the follow-
ing proposition shows that the risk premium of a stock-based contract is smaller.
Proposition 3.2.2. The minimum number of options required to induce the target effort a is
βk =
(1−Φ)−
p
∆
2λΦmk
=
2a
(1−Φ)+
p
∆
≥ a ,
where∆= (1−Φ)2−4aλΦmk . βk increases in the manager’s risk aversion λ and the option’s exercise price
k .
5That is why I use m−∞ andσ2−∞ to denote the mean and variance of stock.
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Moreover, the total cost of inducing effort a is
ck =
1
2
λβ 2kσ
2
k =
2λa 2σ2y1
(1+
p
1−4aλσy2)2
,
where
y1 =
(1−Φ−φ2)−φ(2Φ−1)η+Φ(1−Φ)η2
(1−Φ)2 ,
y2 =
Φ[φ− (1−Φ)η]
(1−Φ)2 .
The cost ck increases in k , hence stock-based contracts are less costly than option-based contracts;
Proof. See Appendix.
When people compare stock to options, there are two perspectives. On one hand, options are expen-
sive since they are riskier, e.g., $100 of options are worth less to an undiversified risk-averse manager than
$100 of stock; but on the other hand, options usually can provide more incentives to induce effort than
stock. If the base salary is rigid, the cost of a stock-based or an option-based contract equals to the market
value of stock or options. In this case, options are less costly to provide the same level of incentives. This
is illustrated in the top graph of Figure 3.1, which shows that the market value is decreasing in exercise
price. However, if the base salary is adjustable, since stock usually provides more subjective values to a
manager than options, a stock-based contract can save more on the base salary than an option-based
contract. As a result, we have shown above that the cost of a contract equals to the risk premium of the
contract. Now stock dominates options as shown in Proposition 3.2.2 and the bottom graph of Figure 3.1.
The intuition here is the same as in Dittmann and Maug (2007).
In fact, the result in Proposition 3.2.2 is also consistent with the linearity result of Holmstrom and
Milgrom (1987). In Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987), it is a continuous time model over the time interval
[0,1]. They make the following assumptions in the model: 1) the agent is risk-averse with an exponential
utility; 2) the agent chooses efforts continuously over the time interval [0,1] to control the drift vector
of a Brownian motion {x (τ) : 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1}; 3) the agent can observe the accumulated performance before
acting. Then they show that an optimal contract specifies that the agent will choose a constant effort a
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Figure 3.1: Market Value and Risk Premium of An Option-Based Contract
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This picture describes a numerical example showing that how the market value and the risk premium
of an option-based contract change w.r.t the change of exercise price k . In the example, we set that the
target effort a = 0.5; l = 0; σ= 0.1; λ= 2.
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over time, regardless of the history at any time τ, and the agent’s wage has the form w =α+βx (1), which
is a linear function of the final outcome regardless of any intermediate outcomes. Then we can see that
although the two models are different (one is discrete, one is continuous), they coincide at time 0 and 1.
At time 0 the manager exerts an effort a which determines the mean of firm value; at t = 1 the manager’s
payoff is realized and only depends on the firm value at time 1. If the manager with an exponential utility
function is granted a linear contract, then the certainty-equivalent of her utility is exactly given by (3.3).
Hence if the result in Proposition 3.2.2 is not true, then we should be able to provide a counter example to
the Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987)’s linearity result. Thus the result in Proposition 3.2.2 is not surprising
from this point of view.
3.2.2 Ambiguity in Firm Risk
In the basic model, firm value x is normally distributed with mean a + l and variance σ2. A manager
infers her expected utility from this objective distribution. However, a question arises that does the man-
ager know firm riskσ2 exactly? Especially, for new firms or new industries, since the available information
is little, can the manager evaluate future risk correctly? If not, then there may be some ambiguous infor-
mation on firm risk. Then instead of one number for sure, she may only know a set of possible variances
{σ21,σ22, · · · ,σ2n } for firm risk. In this section, I study how the presence of this ambiguity affect managers’
contracts.
Following the literature on ambiguity-aversion, I assume that the manager is both risk-averse and
ambiguity-averse. When facing ambiguity, she will first minimize her utility under possible distributions
(i.e. her utility is inferred in the worst case) and then choose an effort to maximize her utility that has
been minimized under the possible distributions. That is, the manager’s objective is
max
aˆ
min
σ2∈{σ21 ,··· ,σ2n }
E [w ]− 1
2
λV a r [w ]− g (aˆ ) (3.7)
Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) provide an axiomatic basis for this "max-min" preference. For simplicity, I
assume that n = 2 (i.e. there are only two possible values for firm risk, low risk or high risk) andσ21 <σ
2
2.
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For the shareholders, I assume that their perception of risk is σs , where σs can be σ1 or σ2. 6 In the
following proposition, we can see that either σs = σ1 or σs = σ2 does not affect the results. The main
forces driving the results are the assumption that the manager is ambiguity-averse.
Given the target effort a , the shareholders’ objective is to minimize α+ βk mk (a ,σs ). Suppose the
manager’s perception of risk is σm . Then to induce the manager to exert effort a , we must have βk =
βk (a ,σm ). Also as before we must have the binding IR constraint (becauseα does not affect the manager’s
effort decision), that is
α+βk (a ,σm )mk (a ,σm )−
1
2
λβ 2k (a ,σm )σ
2
k (a ,σm )−
1
2
a 2 = 0
Then we have that the expected CEO pay from shareholders’ perspective is
α+βk (a ,σm )mk (a ,σs ) =
1
2
λβ 2k (a ,σm )σ
2
k (a ,σm )+βk (a ,σm )[mk (a ,σs )−mk (a ,σm )]+
1
2
a 2
Since 1
2
a 2 is just a constant, dropping it from the expression above, we obtain that the cost of implement-
ing the target effort is 1
2
λβ 2k (a ,σm )σ
2
k (a ,σm )+βk (a ,σm )[mk (a ,σs )−mk (a ,σm )]. I use cˆk to denote this
new cost, i.e.
cˆk (a ,σm ) =
1
2
λβ 2k (a ,σm )σ
2
k (a ,σm )+βk (a ,σm )[mk (a ,σs )−mk (a ,σm )].
If the manager’s perception of risk is always the same as shareholders’, i.e.,σm =σs , then everything is
the same as in the case without ambiguity and Proposition 3.2.2 shows that stock-based contracts are less
costly. However, because of the convexity of options’ payoffs, options can induce managers to perceive
a lower risk than stock. In the following lemma, I show that if a manager’s risk-aversion λ is not too big,
then options will induce the manager to perceive a low risk, which is different from the case of stock. (i.e.,
the manager perceives a high risk with stock but perceives a low risk with options). The intuition is as
follows: the mean and variance of stock are given by m−∞ = a + l and σ2−∞ = σ
2. So a rise of σ has no
effect on the mean value of stock, but increases the variance of stock. A risk-averse manager will always
perceive the high risk σ22 when she is granted shares of stock. However, for options, a rise of σ increases
6It can be shown that if shareholders are ambiguity-averse, thenσs =σ2.
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both the mean and variance of options. For a risk-averse manager, while an increase in the variance of
options decreases her utility, an increase in the mean value of options also has a positive effect on her
utility. So whether the manager perceives a high risk or low risk depends on which effect dominates. If
the rise ofσ has a larger effect on the mean value of options and the manager is not too risk-averse, then
her utility can be minimized at the low risk. In that case, she will perceive the low riskσ21.
Lemma 3.2.3. Suppose the manager is both risk-averse and ambiguity-averse.
1) The manager will always perceive a high riskσ22 if she is granted stock;
2) If the manager is granted βk =βk (a ,σ1) options with exercise price k , then she will perceive the low
riskσ21 and exert the target effort a if
λ<
2
βk
mk (a ,σ2)−mk (a ,σ1)
σ2k (a ,σ2)−σ2k (a ,σ1)
(3.8)
Proof. See Appendix.
Now let’s analyze the effect of changing the manager’s perception of firm risk. Recall that under am-
biguity, the new cost of inducing the target effort a is
cˆk (a ,σm ) =
1
2
λβ 2k (a ,σm )σ
2
k (a ,σm )+βk (a ,σm )[mk (a ,σs )−mk (a ,σm )].
We can see that the new cost cˆk (a ,σm ) consists of two parts: ck (a ,σm ) andβk (a ,σ)[mk (a ,σs )−mk (a ,σm )].
The first part is the risk premium paid to the manager for the risk that she is bearing, which is the same as
in the previous section; but in the presence of ambiguity, we have a new part in the cost, which is the dif-
ferent valuations of options between shareholders and a manager. Lemma 3.2.3 shows that the manager
will always perceive the high risk with a stock-based contract, thus the cost of a stock-based contract is
cˆ−∞(a ,σm ) =
1
2
λβ 2−∞(a ,σ2)σ
2
−∞(a ,σ2)+β−∞(a ,σ2)[m−∞(a ,σs )−m−∞(a ,σ2)]
=
1
2
λa 2σ22,
where the second equality follows from the fact that m−∞(a ,σs ) =m−∞(a ,σ2) = a + l .
On the other hand, if the manager perceives the low risk with options of exercise price k , then the cost
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of the option-based contract is
cˆk (a ,σm ) =
1
2
λβ 2k (a ,σ1)σ
2
k (a ,σ1)+βk (a ,σ1)[mk (a ,σs )−mk (a ,σ1)].
Note that the shareholders’ valuation of options is increasing in their perception of risk σs , thus the cost
cˆk is increasing inσs . Hence let us consider the worst case where shareholders perceive the high riskσ2.
If the manager perceives a lower risk with options, then there are two effects on the cost of the option-
based contract. First, it increases the second part of the cost cˆk , because shareholders value options more
than the manager. Second, perceiving a lower risk by the manager reduces the risk premium paid to her
(i.e., the first part of the cost). Thus the total cost of an option-based contract may be larger or smaller
than the cost of a stock-based contract, depending on which effect dominates. Intuitively, if σ1 is small
enough and λ is an intermediate value, then it is possible that using options is less costly to induce effort.
The reason is that when a manager perceives firm risk, there are two forces - higher risk increases the
market value of options, but it also reduces the value of options to the manager because he is risk-averse.
The more risk-averse he is, the greater the second effect, and so a very risk-averse manager will perceive
a high risk. Thus, we need risk aversion to be small enough to induce the manager to perceive a low
risk with options (see Lemma 3.2.3). But, if a manager’s risk aversion is too small, risk has little effect on
the manager’s valuation of her compensation contract (she does not care about it) and so changing the
manager’s perception of firm risk from high to low does not change the result that stock is optimal. Thus,
we need the manager’s risk aversion to be large enough, such that a change in the manager’s perception
of firm risk can reduce the cost of option-based contracts sufficiently large and therefore render options
optimal. The following proposition shows that options are less costly than stock for an intermediate value
of λ.
Proposition 3.2.4. If the manager’s risk aversion λ satisfies
2βk (a ,σ1)[mk (a ,σ2)−mk (a ,σ1)]
a 2σ22 −β 2k (a ,σ1)σ2k (a ,σ1)
<λ<
2
βk (a ,σ1)
mk (a ,σ2)−mk (a ,σ1)
σ2
k
(a ,σ2)−σ2k (a ,σ1)
.
then it is less costly to induce effort a by using options with exercise price k than using stock.
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Corollary 1. Given k < a + l , if
2[mk (a ,σ2)− (a + l −k )]
aσ22
<λ<
2[mk (a ,σ2)− (a + l −k )]
aσ2
k
(a ,σ2)
, (3.9)
then there exists a cut-off σˆ(λ,k ) such that when σ1 < σˆ(λ,k ), it is cheaper to induce effort a by using
options with exercise price k than using stock.
Remark: since σ2
k
(a ,σ2) is always less thanσ
2
2 =σ
2
−∞(a ,σ2) by Lemma 3.2.1, the condition (3.9) can
be satisfied.
An inertia property of compensation contracts under ambiguity
Given the target effort, options can be more efficient than stock because they induce a manager to
perceive a low risk, which reduces the risk premium paid to the manager. Then the question is can we
always use an option-based contract to induce the manager to perceive a low risk? Intuitively, when the
target effort goes up, shareholders need to give a manager more incentives to induce effort. Because the
manager is risk-averse, he is more likely to perceive a higher risk when she is granted more incentives. As a
result, it becomes more difficult to make the manager perceive a low risk when the target effort increases.
Lemma 3.2.5. Given two effort levels a 1 < a 2, if people can use a contract consisting of stock and options
to implement a 2 and keep the manager perceive a low risk, then they can also use a contract with stock and
options to implement a 1 and keep the manager perceive the low risk as well.
Lemma 3.2.5 implies that there could exist a cut-off a 0 such that for any effort level below a 0, share-
holders can implement efforts with a contract that keeps the manager to perceive the low risk, In this
case, they only need to pay the manager a low risk premium. However, for any effort level above a 0,
the incentives to induce the target effort is so high that the manager will perceive the high risk. In this
case, a high risk premium is required. This implies that there could be a discontinuous jump in the cost
of compensation contracts when the target effort moves from below a 0 to above a 0. Suppose the cur-
rent target effort is a 0, then even if there are some small improvements in the manager’s ability (e.g. the
manger gains more experiences or the manager’s effort becomes more productive) or in the firm’s invest-
ment opportunities (e.g. a few more positive NPV projects come out), shareholders may be reluctant to
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take advantage of these improvements. If they want to take advantage of improvements, they will have
to grant the manager more incentives, but granting more incentives will move the manager’s perception
of risk from low to high. As a result, there will be a large increase in the risk premium that has to be paid
to the manager. If this cost is large enough, it will prevent shareholders from increasing the manager’s
incentives. Therefore the manager’s compensation contract will exhibit an inertia property around the
point a 0. The inertia property of compensation contracts may help to explain why benchmark pay is
so widely used in practice (e.g. Bizjak, Lemmon and Naveen (2008) and Faulkender and Yang (2010)).
Standard principal-agent models usually require that contracts should change according to parameters.
For example, high productive CEOs or low risk-averse CEOs can be induced to exert effort more easily, so
shareholders should grant them more incentives to induce them to exert higher target effort. But in real-
ity, contracts appear to be quite standard and benchmark pay is widely used. Faulkender and Yang (2010)
find that CEO compensation of the compensation peers explains CEO compensation at the sample firm
beyond traditional pay determinants and proxies for CEO labor market conditions. They also find that
size, industry and similar visibility are important determinants of selecting peer firms in benchmarking.
For firms in the same industry with similar size or visibility, they probably have similar target efforts for
their CEOs, though the target efforts may differ a little bit. According to Lemma 3.2.5, the cost arising
from ambiguity would align their target efforts and small changes in parameters would not change the
target efforts and the corresponding contracts.
In addition, it also implies that shareholders may be reluctant to grant a manager high incentives,
because high incentives induce the manager to perceive a high risk which imposes a high risk premium
for the contracts. Thus low CEO incentives (e.g. Jensen and Murphy (1990)) may be desirable.
3.2.3 Ambiguity in Expected Firm Value
In this section, I study the case where there is ambiguity about the mean of firm value. A firm’s future
performance is affected by market conditions or industrial conditions. However, if the information about
the future market or industrial conditions is ambiguous, then the expectation on firm value is also am-
biguous. Recall that the mean of firm value is given by a + l , where a is the manager’s effort and l is a
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constant which may reflect the base value of firm or the expectation on market returns or industrial re-
turns. To introduce ambiguity in this part, I assume that l is an ambiguous term. People do not know the
exact value of l , but only know a set of possible values {l 1, · · · , ln } for l . To simplify the analysis, I assume
that firm risk σ has no ambiguity. In this section, I focus on the case where the mean of firm value is
ambiguous.
As in section 3.2.2, I assume that the manager is both risk-averse and ambiguity-averse. His objective
is
max
aˆ
min
l ∈{l 1,··· ,l n }
E [w ]− 1
2
λV a r [w ]− g (aˆ ) =max
aˆ
min
l ∈{l 1 ,··· ,l n }
α+βk mk (aˆ , l )−
1
2
λβ 2kσ
2
k (aˆ , l )−
1
2
aˆ 2.
For simplicity, I also assume that n = 2 and l 1 < l2.
Suppose l s is the shareholders’ perception of l . 7 As in the previous section, I will show that the
shareholders’ perception is not crucial to the results in this section. Let l m be the manager’s perception
of l . Then to induce the target effort a , the number of options granted to the manager must be βk =
βk (a , l m ). We also have the binding IR constraint as follows:
α+βk mk (a , l m )−
1
2
λβ 2kσ
2
k (a , l m )−
1
2
a 2 = 0.
Then the cost of the compensation contract from the shareholders’ perspective is
α+βk mk (a , l s )
=
1
2
λβ 2kσ
2
k (a , l m )+βk [mk (a , l s )−mk (a , l m )]+
1
2
a 2
Dropping the constant term 1
2
a 2, I define that
c¯k (a , l m ) =
1
2
λβ 2kσ
2
k (a , l m )+βk [mk (a , l s )−mk (a , l m )]
is the cost of inducing the target effort a . Similar to the cost cˆk in section 3.2.2, the cost c¯k also contains
two parts: the first part is the risk premium paid to the manager and the second part βk [mk (a , l s ) −
7It can be shown that l s = l 1 for most of cases if shareholders are ambiguity-averse.
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mk (a , l m )] is the different valuations of the options between the shareholders and the manager.
If the manager is granted shares of stock, then he will always perceive a low l . Since a higher l in-
creases the expected value of stock, but has no effect on the variance of stock, the manager’s utility is
minimized at low l and thus an ambiguity-averse manager will perceive a low l . However, the situation
is different if the manager is granted options. When the manager perceives the return l with options, a
higher l increases the market value of options, but it also increases the variance of options, which reduces
the value of options to a risk-averse manager. The more risk-averse she is, the greater the second effect,
and so a high risk-averse manager would perceive a higher return l 2. In the following lemma, I show that
the manager will always perceive a low l with stock, but may perceive a high l with options.
Lemma 3.2.6. 1) A risk-averse and ambiguity-averse manager will always perceive l 1 if she is granted
shares of stock;
2) If she is granted βk =βk (a , l 2) options with exercise price k , then she will perceive l 2 and exert effort
a if
λ>
2
βk
mk (a , l 2)−mk (a , l 1)
σ2k (a , l 2)−σ2k (a , l 1)
(3.10)
Now let us compare the cost of implementing a by using stock and options respectively. With a stock-
based contract, the manager will always perceive a low l , hence the cost is
c¯−∞(a , l 1) =
1
2
λβ 2−∞σ
2
0(a , l 1)+β−∞[m−∞(a , l s )−m−∞(a , l 1)] (3.11)
=
1
2
λa 2σ2+a [m−∞(a , l s )−m−∞(a , l 1)].
For options, suppose the manager’s perception of l is l 2 (i.e. the condition (3.10) is satisfied), then the
cost will be
c¯k (a , l 2) =
1
2
λβk (a , l 2)
2σ2k (a , l 2)+βk (a , l 2)[mk (a , l s )−mk (a , l 2)].
Although the perception of a high l increases the variance of each option (since σ2k (a , l ) is increasing in
l ), there are two benefits from the perception of a high l . First, if the manager perceives a high l , the
options are more valuable to her and it becomes easier to induce the target effort. The reason is that
suppose a + l 1 < k < a + l 2. If the manager perceives l 1, since a + l 1 < k , even she exerts effort a , the
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options are still more likely to expire with value zero. So she will be less willing to exert effort a . But if the
manager perceives l 2, then she will be more likely to exert effort a , because a + l 2 > k and she will think
that the options are more likely to have a positive payoff if she exerts effort a . Therefore shareholders
only need to grant less options to the manager (i.e. βk (a , l ) is decreasing in l ) to implement the target
effort. As a result, although the perception of a high l increases the variance of each option, the total risk
premium is reduced due to the reduction in the number of options granted to the manager. 8 Second, the
perception of a high l also increases the subjective value of options to a manager. Thus the base salary
paid to the manager is not as high as in the base case where there is no ambiguity. If the two benefits are
large enough, then the cost of an option-based contract can be smaller. The following proposition proves
the result.
Proposition 3.2.7. If the manager’s risk aversion λ satisfies
2
βk (a , l 2)
mk (a , l 2)−mk (a , l 1)
σ2
k
(a , l 2)−σ2k (a , l 1)
<λ<
2a [mk (a , l 2)−mk (a , l 1)]
β 2
k
(a , l 2)σ
2
k
(a , l 2)−a 2σ2
, (3.12)
then it is less costly to implement effort a by using options with exercise price k than by using stock.
Pay for luck
The model in this section is also helpful to explain the pay-for-luck puzzle. Bertrand and Mullainathan
(2001) documented that CEOs are rewarded for general market upswings beyond CEO’s control, i.e., paid
for luck. This is puzzling because the market return is beyond managers’ control and is also volatile, but
since the manager is risk-averse, tying her pay to luck seems only increasing the risk premium required
to compensate the manager.
However if market return is ambiguous and managers are ambiguous-averse, then we can apply the
result above to explain the puzzle. Let us consider l as the expectation of market return. I assume that the
market return is normally distributed with mean value l and varianceσ2
l
, where the variance is given, but
the mean is ambiguous with two possible values l 1, l2. Also I assume that market return is uncorrelated
with idiosyncratic risk ε. The variance of idiosyncratic risk isσ2−σ2l , and the total variance of firm value
8It is easy to apply the result in Proposition 3.2.2 to show that 1
2
λβk (a , l )2σ
2
k (a , l ) is decreasing in l .
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is still σ2. The following lemma shows that to implement the target effort a , the cost of using indexed
stock (i.e., no pay for luck) is lower than the cost of using non-indexed stock or indexed options.
Lemma 3.2.8. The cost of implementing the target effort a is
1) 1
2
λa 2σ2+a [m−∞(a , l s )−m−∞(a , l 1)], if the manager is granted non-indexed stock; or
2) ck evaluated at the varianceσ2−σ2l (where ck is defined in (3.6)), if the manager is granted indexed
options;
3) 1
2
λa 2(σ2−σ2
l
), if the manager is granted indexed stock.
So it is less costly to implement effort using indexed stock than using non-indexed stock or indexed
options.
If shareholders are optimistic about market return, i.e. their perception of l is high, (i.e., l 2), then they
would like to grab the market return as much as possible. Thus indexed stock should be the best choice.
But if shareholders’ perception of market return is low, then paying non-indexed options can be better
if managers perceive a high market return with non-indexed options, because the non-indexed options
look more valuable to managers than to shareholders. The different valuations of options between man-
agers and shareholders will reduce the cost of non-indexed options from shareholders’ perspective. As a
result, the optimal way to implement effort is using non-indexed options.
Proposition 3.2.9. 1) If shareholders’ perception of market return is high, i.e. l s = l2, then it is less costly to
implement the target effort by using indexed stock than using non-indexed options.
2) If shareholders’ perception of market return is low, i.e. l s = l1 and the manager’s risk-aversion λ
satisfies
2
βk (a , l 2)
mk (a , l 2)−mk (a , l 1)
σ2k (a , l 2)−σ2k (a , l 1)
<λ<
2βk (a , l 2)[mk (a , l 2)−mk (a , l 1)]
β 2k (a , l 2)σ
2
k (a , l 2)−a 2(σ2−σ2l )
, (3.13)
then among the four ways to pay the manager: 1) indexed stock; 2) non-indexed stock; 3) indexed options
4) non-indexed options, the least costly way to implement the target effort is using non-indexed options.
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3.3 Conclusion
Standard models on executive compensation usually assume that the distribution on future firm value is
known. This paper attempts to study the implications on CEO compensation if there are multiple possible
distributions on future firm value (For example, due to the lack of information, this is quite possible for
new firms and new industries). Following the literature on ambiguity-aversion, I assume that managers
are ambiguity-averse, i.e., they will pick the worst case to evaluate their contracts and utilities. The paper
finds that when there are multiple possible distributions on firm value, different types of contracts (e.g.,
linear contracts VS non-linear contracts) can induce managers to evaluate firm value and their contracts
using different distributions. As a result, this can change the cost of contracts in different directions.
In particular, I find that in the model, when there is no ambiguity, stock is less costly than options to
induce effort. However, if there is ambiguity in firm risk and the manager is risk-averse and ambiguity-
averse, options can be more efficient than stock. When the manager is granted more incentives, she
tends to perceive a higher risk. Hence, shareholders are reluctant to grant a manager high incentives
and take advantage of some small improvements, such as improvements in the manager’s ability or firm’s
investment opportunities. Thus, compensation contracts exhibit an inertia property and benchmark pay
is reasonable. Finally, I study the case where there is ambiguity in the mean of firm value. I also show that
options can be more efficient. Especially, if the ambiguity is from market return, Tying CEO pay to the
market can be optimal, which helps to explain the pay-for-luck puzzle.
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Appendix A
Supplement to Relative Wealth Concerns
and Executive Compensation
A.1 Proofs for Chapter 1
Derivation of (1.3)
Hi = ri
∫ 1
0
wk d k = ri [
∫ 1
0
(αk +βkpik a k )d k +
∫ 1
0
βk m˜ d k +
∫ 1
0
βkηk d k ] = ri [W +M m˜ +
∫ 1
0
βkηk d k ].
Since (ηk )k∈[0,1] are independent of each other, and the variance of βkηk is bounded by σ2ηk which is
bounded byσ2max, by Kolmogorov’s strong law of large numbers,
∫ 1
0
βkηk d k converges to 0 almost surely.
So Hi = ri [W +M m˜ ].
Proof of Proposition 1.2.2
Given a linear contract w =α+βV , if a CEO exerts an effort a , then her expected utility is
U =α+βpia − r W − 1
2
λ
h
(β − r M )2σ2m +β 2σ2η
i
− 1
2
a 2.
Taking the first-order derivative w.r.t a yields that the optimal effort taken by the CEO is a = βpi. Note
that the base salary α does not affect the CEO’s effort decision, it must be set to make the participation
constraint bind, i.e.
α+βpia − r W − 1
2
λ
h
(β − r M )2σ2m +β 2σ2η
i
− 1
2
a 2 = u . (A.1)
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The shareholders’ objective is to maximize the expected firm value net of CEO pay. Combining with the
binding IR constraint (A.1), we can obtain that the shareholders’ objective is
max
β
βpi2−

r W +
1
2
λ
h
(β − r M )2σ2m +β 2σ2η
i
+
1
2
β 2pi2+u

Taking the first-order derivative w.r.t β yields that the optimal CEO incentives are
β ∗ =min
 
pi2+λr Mσ2m
pi2+λ(σ2m +σ
2
η)
,1
!
.
So if r Mσ2m ≥σ2m +σ2η, then β ∗ = 1.
If r Mσ2m < σ
2
m +σ
2
η, β
∗ =
pi2+λr Mσ2m
pi2+λ(σ2m+σ
2
η)
is an optimal interior solution. From the solution of β ∗, it is
straight-forward to check that β ∗ is increasing in pi, r , and M ; decreasing in λ and σ2η. For the relation
between β ∗ andσ2m ,
∂ β ∗
∂ σ2m
=
λ
[pi2+λ(σ2m +σ
2
η)]
2

r
∂ (Mσ2m )
∂ σ2m
[pi2+λ(σ2m +σ
2
η)]− (pi2+λr Mσ2m )

.
So if r
∂ (Mσ2m )
∂ σ2m
>
pi2+λr Mσ2m
pi2+λ(σ2m+σ
2
η)
, then β ∗ is increasing in σ2m ; if r
∂ (Mσ2m )
∂ σ2m
<
pi2+λr Mσ2m
pi2+λ(σ2m+σ
2
η)
, then β ∗ is decreasing
inσ2m .
Plugging the solution of β ∗ into (A.1) yields that
α∗ =
(pi2−λr Mσ2m )(pi2+λr Mσ2m )
2[pi2+λ(σ2m +σ
2
η)]
−
pi2(pi2+λr Mσ2m )
2
[pi2+λ(σ2m +σ
2
η)]
2
+ r W +
1
2
λr 2M 2σ2m +u .
The expected CEO pay is
E [w ] =α∗+β ∗pia =
pi4
2[pi2+λ(σ2m +σ
2
η)]
+ r W +
1
2
λr 2M 2σ2m

1− λσ2m
pi2+λ(σ2m +σ
2
η)

+u ,
which is increasing in W and M .
Proof of Lemma 1.2.4
Proof of necessity
Suppose an (hiring) equilibrium exists and let M be the aggregate CEO incentives and W be the ag-
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gregate expected CEO pay in the equilibrium. Then by Proposition 1.2.2, for each firm i , the optimal CEO
incentives are given by β ∗i =
pi2i+λi ri Mσ
2
m
pi2i+λi (σ
2
m+σ
2
ηi )
. And the expected CEO pay is E [w i ] =
pi4i
2[pi2i +λi (σ
2
m+σ
2
ηi )]
+ ri W +
1
2
λi r
2
i M
2σ2m

1− λiσ
2
m
pi2i+λi (σ
2
m+σ
2
ηi )

+u i . Since M =
∫ 1
0
β ∗i d i and W =
∫ 1
0
E [w i ]d i , we can solve that M has a
unique solution M =
∫ 1
0
pi2
i
pi2
i
+λi (σ
2
m+σ
2
ηi
)
d i
1−
∫ 1
0
λi riσ
2
m
pi2
i
+λi (σ
2
m+σ
2
ηi
)
d i
; and W =
∫ 1
0

pi4
i
2[pi2
i
+λi (σ
2
m+σ
2
ηi
)]
+ 1
2
λi r
2
i M
2σ2m

1− λiσ
2
m
pi2
i
+λi (σ
2
m+σ
2
ηi
)

+u i

d i
1−
∫ 1
0
ri d i
. Since
W > 0 and M > 0, we must have
∫ 1
0
ri d i < 1. To ensure that each firm will hire its CEO, i.e. an interior
solution exists, we must have β ∗i ≤ 1 for each i ∈ [0,1], which is equivalent to ri Mσ2m ≤σ2m +σ2ηi for each
i ∈ [0,1]. Also in each firm, shareholders’ payoff must be nonnegative, i.e. (1.6) is satisfied.
Proof of sufficiency
Let
M =
∫ 1
0
pi2i
pi2i+λi (σ
2
m+σ
2
ηi )
d i
1−
∫ 1
0
λi riσ2m
pi2i+λi (σ
2
m+σ
2
ηi )
d i
,
W =
∫ 1
0

pi4i
2[pi2i +λi (σ
2
m+σ
2
ηi )]
+ 1
2
λi r
2
i M
2σ2m

1− λiσ
2
m
pi2i+λi (σ
2
m+σ
2
ηi )

+u i

d i
1−
∫ 1
0
ri d i
.
Since
∫ 1
0
ri d i < 1, W > 0 and M > 0. Then we can check that

α∗i =
(pi2i−λi ri Mσ2m )(pi2i+λi ri Mσ2m )
2[pi2i +λi (σ
2
m+σ
2
ηi )]
− pi
2
i (pi
2
i+λi ri Mσ
2
m )
2
[pi2i+λi (σ
2
m+σ
2
ηi )]
2 + ri W +
1
2
λi r
2
i M
2σ2m +u i ,
β ∗i =
pi2i+λi ri Mσ
2
m
pi2i+λi (σ
2
m+σ
2
ηi )
≤ 1,
a ∗i =piiβ
∗
i .
is the unique equilibrium that satisfies the properties in Definition 1.2.3.
Proof of Lemma 1.2.5
The shareholders’ payoffs are
pi2(pi2+λr Mσ2m )
pi2+λ(σ2m +σ
2
η)]
−
(
pi4
2[pi2+λ(σ2m +σ
2
η)]
+ r W +
1
2
λr 2M 2σ2m

1− λσ2m
pi2+λ(σ2m +σ
2
η)

+u
)
,
which is quadratic in r . Therefore it is easy to see that if
λMσ2mpi
2
pi2+λ(σ2m+σ
2
η)
−W ≤ 0, r ∗ = 0; if λMσ
2
mpi
2
pi2+λ(σ2m+σ
2
η)
−W > 0,
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r ∗ =
λMσ2mpi
2−W [pi2+λ(σ2m+σ2η)]
λM 2σ2m (pi
2+λσ2η)
> 0.
Proof of Lemma 1.2.6
Proof of necessity
Given any rˆ < r , if a CEO of type r chooses the contract (α(rˆ ),β (rˆ )) and exerts an effort a , then her
relative payoff is
w −H =α(rˆ )+β (rˆ )pia +(β (rˆ )− r M )m˜ +β (rˆ )η− r W.
Then we can calculated that her expected utility is given by
U (rˆ |r ) = E [w −H ]− 1
2
λVa r [w −H ]− 1
2
a 2
= α(rˆ )+β (rˆ )pia − r E [W ]
− 1
2
λ
h
(β (rˆ )− r E [M ])2σ2m +β (rˆ )2σ2η+ r 2V a r [M ]σ2m + r 2V a r [W ]
i
− 1
2
a 2.
Thus the optimal effort taken by the CEO is a =β (rˆ )pi and her expected utility is
U (rˆ |r ) = α(rˆ )+ 1
2
β (rˆ )2pi2− r E [W ] (A.2)
− 1
2
λ
h
(β (rˆ )− r E [M ])2σ2m +β (rˆ )2σ2η+ r 2V a r [M ]σ2m + r 2V a r [W ]
i
.
By the IC constraint, U (rˆ |r )≤U (r |r ) implies that
α(r )−α(rˆ )≥ 1
2
[pi2−λ(σ2m +σ2η)](β (rˆ )2−β (r )2)+λr E [M ]σ2m (β (rˆ )−β (r )). (A.3)
Similarly, U (rˆ |rˆ )≥U (r |rˆ ) implies that
α(r )−α(rˆ )≤ 1
2
[pi2−λ(σ2m +σ2η)](β (rˆ )2−β (r )2)+λrˆ E [M ]σ2m (β (rˆ )−β (r )). (A.4)
Thus, combining (A.3) and (A.4), and also note that rˆ < r , we must have β (rˆ ) ≤ β (r ) for any rˆ < r . So
∂ β (r )
∂ r
≥ 0. Dividing the both sides of (A.3) and (A.4) by r − rˆ and letting rˆ → r yield
lim
rˆ→r
α(r )−α(rˆ )
r − rˆ =−
n
[pi2−λ(σ2m +σ2η)]β (r )+λr E [M ]σ2m
o ∂ β (r )
∂ r
,
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i.e.
∂ α(r )
∂ r
=−
n
[pi2−λ(σ2m +σ2η)]β (r )+λr E [M ]σ2m
o
∂ β (r )
∂ r
.
Proof of Sufficiency
Given the two conditions in the lemma, we can calculate that
∂U (rˆ |r )
∂ rˆ
=λE [M ]σ2m (r − rˆ )
∂ β (r )
∂ r
.
Then it is easy to see that
∂U (rˆ |r )
∂ rˆ
is positive when rˆ < r and negative when rˆ > r . So U (rˆ |r ) is maximized
at rˆ = r . In other words, U (rˆ |r )≤U (r |r ) for any rˆ and r , i.e. IC constraint holds.
Proof of Proposition 1.2.7
Suppose U (r0|r0) =minr∈[0,rmax]U (r |r ), then we have U (r0|r0) =u . Since from (A.2), we can obtain that
dU (r |r )
d r
=λE [M ]σ2mβ (r )− E [W ]−λr

E [M 2]σ2m +Va r [W ]

. (A.5)
For brevity, let Y (r ) = E [W ] + λr

E [M 2]σ2m +Va r [W ]

. Then the CEO of type r has obtain a utility
U (r |r ) =u −
∫ r0
r

λE [M ]σ2mβ (r )−Y (r )

d r. Then the expected CEO pay is
E [w (r )] = r E [W ]+
1
2
λ
h
(β (r )− r E [M ])2σ2m +β (r )2σ2η+ r 2V a r [M ]σ2m + r 2Va r [W ]
i
+
1
2
β (r )2pi2+U (r |r )
= r E [W ]+
1
2
λ
h
(β (r )− r E [M ])2σ2m +β (r )2σ2η+ r 2V a r [M ]σ2m + r 2Va r [W ]
i
(A.6)
+
1
2
β (r )2pi2+u −
∫ r0
r

λE [M ]σ2mβ (r )−Y (r )

d r.
Then the shareholders’ objective is to maximize the expected firm value net of CEO pay across CEOs of
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all possible types, i.e. max
∫ rmax
0
f (r )

β (r )pi2− E [w (r )]d r, which is equal to
∫ r0
0
f (r )
n
β (r )pi2− r E [W ]− 1
2
β (r )2pi2−u + F (r )
f (r )

λE [M ]σ2mβ (r )−Y (r )

− 1
2
λ
h
(β (r )− r E [M ])2σ2m +β (r )2σ2η+ r 2Va r [M ]σ2m + r 2V a r [W ]
io
d r
+
∫ rmax
r0
f (r )
n
β (r )pi2− r E [W ]− 1
2
β (r )2pi2−u − 1− F (r )
f (r )

λE [M ]σ2mβ (r )−Y (r )

− 1
2
λ
h
(β (r )− r E [M ])2σ2m +β (r )2σ2η+ r 2Va r [M ]σ2m + r 2V a r [W ]
io
d r
Proof of Part 1)
If r0 = 0, then the pointwise optimization of the above objective function yields that the derivative
w.r.t β (r ) is
pi2+λσ2m E [M ]

r − 1− F (r )
f (r )

− [pi2+λ(σ2m +σ2η)]β (r ).
Let β1(r ) =
pi2+λσ2m E [M ]
h
r− 1−F (r )
f (r )
i
pi2+λ(σ2m+σ
2
η)
. Then the objective function is increasing in β (r ) if β (r ) < β1(r ); and
decreasing in β (r ) if β (r )>β1(r ); So the optimal incentives in this case are β ∗(r ) =
pi2+λσ2m E [M ]
h
r− 1−F (r )
f (r )
i
pi2+λ(σ2m+σ
2
η)
.
Proof of Part 2)
Similarly, if r0 = rmax, let β2(r ) =
pi2+λσ2m E [M ]
h
r+ F (r )
f (r )
i
pi2+λ(σ2m+σ
2
η)
, then the objective function is increasing in β (r )
if β (r ) < β2(r ); and decreasing in β (r ) if β (r ) > β2(r ); So the optimal incentives in this case are β ∗(r ) =
pi2+λσ2m E [M ]
h
r+
F (r )
f (r )
i
pi2+λ(σ2m+σ
2
η)
.
Proof of Part 3)
If 0< r0 < rmax, then without IC constraint, for r < r0, the optimal incentives areβ ∗(r ) =β2(r ); and r >
r0, the optimal incentives are β ∗(r ) =β1(r ). However, the IC constraint requires that β ∗(r ) is increasing in
r , and also note that β1(r )<β2(r ), so in this case, we cannot get the first-best solution.
Suppose β ∗(r )|r∈[0,rmax] is the solution. I first show that for r ≥ r0, the optimal incentives must have
the following form: there exists r2 ≥ r0 such that β ∗(r ) is constant for r0 ≤ r ≤ r2 and β ∗(r ) = β1(r ) for
r ≥ r2. If β ∗(r ) < β1(r ) for for any r ≥ r0, then the shareholders’ payoffs can be improved by increasing
β ∗(r ) to β1(r ) for each r ≥ r0. Thus let r2 be the minimum r ∈ [r0,rmax] that satisfies β ∗(r2) =β1(r2). Then
similar argument implies that β ∗(r ) = β1(r ) for r ≥ r2. For r0 ≤ r ≤ r2, by the definition of r2, we must
have either 1) β ∗(r ) < β1(r ) for any r0 ≤ r ≤ r2; or 2) β ∗(r ) > β1(r ) for any r0 ≤ r ≤ r2. In the first case,
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the shareholders’ payoffs can be improved by increasing β ∗(r ) to β1(r ). In the second case, if there exists
r0 ≤ r3 < r2 such that β ∗(r3) < β ∗(r2), then the shareholders’ payoffs can be improved by reducing β ∗(r )
to max(β ∗(r3),β1(r )) for r ∈ [r3,r2]. So we must have β ∗(r ) is constant for r0 ≤ r ≤ r2 and β ∗(r ) = β1(r ) for
r ≥ r2.
Similarly, for r ≤ r0, the optimal incentives must have the following form: there exists r1 ≤ r0 such that
β ∗(r ) =β2(r ) for 0≤ r ≤ r1 and β ∗(r ) is constant for r1 ≤ r ≤ r0. If limr→r0−β ∗(r )< limr→r0+β ∗(r ), then the
shareholders’ payoffs can be improved by reducing β ∗(r ) around right side of r0 a little bit. So there must
exist r1 ≤ r0 ≤ r2 such that β ∗(r ) = β2(r ) for 0 ≤ r ≤ r1, β ∗(r ) is constant for r1 ≤ r ≤ r2, and β ∗(r ) = β1(r )
for r ≥ r2.
Proof of Example 1
Firstly, notice that by Kolmogorov’s strong law of large numbers, M converges to E [M ] and W con-
verges to E [W ] almost surely. Thus I treat M and W as contants in the following proof and Va r [M ] =
Va r [W ] = 0. Now I will characterize the two equilibria as follows:
Equilibrium 1
Suppose r0 = 0 (i.e. the CEO of type r = 0 is at the reservation utility), then by Proposition 1.2.7, the
optimal incentives for firm i are βi 1(r ) =
pi2+λσ2m M 1(2r−rmax)
pi2+λ(σ2m+σ
2
η)
. Aggregating all the CEO incentives yields that
M1 =
∫ rmax
0
βi 1(r )d i = Er

pi2+λσ2m M1(2r − rmax)
pi2+λ(σ2m +σ
2
η)

= pi2
pi2+λ(σ2m +σ
2
η)
.
From the proof of Proposition 1.2.7, the expected CEO pay in each firm is given by (A.6). Then aggregating
the expected CEO pay from all the firms yields that
W1 =
1
2
[pi2+λ(σ2m +σ
2
η)]
1− 1
3
 
λσ2m rmax
pi2+λ(σ2m +σ
2
η)
!2M 21 +u .
r0 = 0 means that U (r |r )≥U (0|0) for any r ∈ [0,rmax]. From (A.5), this is equivalent to
∫ r
0

λM 21σ2m
 
1+
λσ2m (2r − rmax)
pi2+λ(σ2m +σ
2
η)
!
−W1−λr M 21σ2m

d r ≥ 0, for any r ∈ [0,rmax].
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Finally, the above condition can be satisfied as long as
λM 21σ
2
m ·min
 
1− 1
2
rmax,1−
λσ2m rmax
pi2+λ(σ2m +σ
2
η)
!
−W1 ≥ 0.
Equilibrium 2
Suppose r0 = rmax (i.e. the CEO of type r = rmax is at the reservation utility), then by Proposition 1.2.7,
the optimal incentives for firm i are βi 2(r ) =
pi2+2rλσ2m M 2
pi2+λ(σ2m+σ
2
η)
. Aggregating all the CEO incentives yields that
M2 =
pi2
pi2+λ(σ2m +σ
2
η)−λσ2m rmax
.
Then βi 2(r ) =

1+
λσ2m (2r−rmax)
pi2+λ(σ2m+σ
2
η)

M2. Similarly, we can compute that the sum of the expected CEO pay
from all the firms is
W2 =
1
1− rmax
1
2
[pi2+λ(σ2m +σ
2
η)]
1− λσ2m rmax(2− rmax)
pi2+λ(σ2m +σ
2
η)
− 1
3
 
λσ2m rmax
pi2+λ(σ2m +σ
2
η)
!2M 22 +u
 .
r0 = rmax means that U (r |r )≥U (rmax|rmax) for any r ∈ [0,rmax]. From (A.5), this is equivalent to
∫ rmax
r

λM 22σ2m
 
1+
λσ2m (2r − rmax)
pi2+λ(σ2m +σ
2
η)
!
−W1−λr M 22σ2m

d r ≤ 0, for any r ∈ [0,rmax].
The above condition can be satisfied as long as
λM 22σ
2
m ·max
 
1− 1
2
rmax,1− rmax+
λσ2m rmax
pi2+λ(σ2m +σ
2
η)
!
−W2 ≤ 0.
Proof of Proposition 1.2.8
Similar to the proof of Proposition 1.2.2.
Proof of Lemma 1.3.1
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Given the contract w =α+βV , the CEO’s utility is given by
U = E [w −H ]− 1
2
λVa r [w −H ]− 1
2
a 2
= α+βpia − r W − 1
2
λ[(βa − r M )2σ2m +(βa )2σ2η]−
1
2
a 2.
U is concave in a , so taking the derivative w.r.t a yields that the optimal effort is
a =
β (pi+λσ2m r M )
λ(σ2m +σ
2
η)β
2+1
.
Then the comparative statics are straight-forward.
Proof of Proposition 1.3.2
By Lemma 1.3.1, the CEO will exert an effort a =
β (pi+λr Mσ2m )
λ(σ2m+σ
2
η)β
2+1
if he is granted a contract w = α+
βV . Note that the base salary α does not affect the CEO’s effort decision, it must be set to make the
participation constraint bind, that is
α+βpia − r W − 1
2
λ[(βa − r M )2σ2m +(βa )2σ2η]−
1
2
a 2 = u .
So we have
E [CEO pay] =α+βpia = r W +
1
2
λ[(βa − r M )2σ2m +(βa )2σ2η]+
1
2
a 2+u .
Then the shareholders’ payoffs are
E [V −w ] = pia − (α+βpia )
= pia −

r W +
1
2
λ[(βa − r M )2σ2m +(βa )2σ2η]+
1
2
a 2+u

=
βpi(pi+λr Mσ2m )
λ(σ2m +σ
2
η)β
2+1
− 1
2
β 2(pi−λr Mσ2m )(pi+λr Mσ2m )
λ(σ2m +σ
2
η)β
2+1
− r W − 1
2
λ(r M )2σ2m −u .
Taking the derivative w.r.t β yields that
∂ E [V −w ]
∂ β
=
pi(pi+λr Mσ2m )
[λ(σ2m +σ
2
η)β
2+1]2

−λ(σ2m +σ2η)β 2−

1−
λr Mσ2m
pi

β +1

.
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∂ E [V−w ]
∂ β
is increasing in β when β < 2
1− λr Mσ
2
m
pi

+
r
1− λr Mσ
2
m
pi
2
+4λ(σ2m+σ
2
η)
and decreasing in β when β >
2
1− λr Mσ
2
m
pi

+
r
1− λr Mσ
2
m
pi
2
+4λ(σ2m+σ
2
η)
, therefore the optimal incentives are
β ∗ =min
 2
1− λr Mσ
2
m
pi

+
Ç
1− λr Mσ
2
m
pi
2
+4λ(σ2m +σ
2
η)
,1
 .
If r Mσ2m ≥ h(σ2m +σ2η), then β ∗ = 1.
If r Mσ2m <h(σ
2
m +σ
2
η), then β
∗ = 2
1− λr Mσ
2
m
pi

+
r
1− λr Mσ
2
m
pi
2
+4λ(σ2m+σ
2
η)
. For the comparative statics, let
F (β ,q ) =−λ(σ2m+σ2η)β 2−

1− λr Mσ
2
m
pi

β+1, where q refers to basic parameters. Then ∂ F
∂ β
|β ∗ < 0, so from
∂ F
∂ β
∂ β
∂ q
+ ∂ F
∂ q
= 0,
∂ β
∂ q
|β ∗ has the same sign with ∂ F∂ q |β ∗ . Then it is straight-forward to derive the results in part
1). For part 2), ∂ F
∂ σ2m
|β ∗ =−λβ ∗2+ λrβ
∗
pi

∂M
∂ σ2m
σ2m +M

. So when r M + rσ2m
∂M
∂ σ2m
<piβ ∗, β ∗ is decreasing in
σ2m ; when r M + rσ
2
m
∂M
∂ σ2m
>piβ ∗, β ∗ is increasing inσ2m . Part 3) is obvious.
Proof of Lemma 1.3.3
Letσ2 =σ2m +σ
2
η. From lemma 1.3.1, we can calculate that
d a
d r
=
λβσ2m M
λσ2β 2+1
+(pi+λσ2m r M )
1−λσ2β 2
(λσ2β 2+1)2
∂ β
∂ r
.
Since −λσ2β 2−

1− λr Mσ
2
m
pi

β +1= 0,
∂ β
∂ r
=
λMσ2mβ
pi
2λσ2β +

1− λr Mσ
2
m
h
 = λMσ
2
mβ
2
pi
λσ2β 2+1
.
So
d a
d r
=
λMβσ2m
λσ2β 2+1

1+(pi+λσ2m r M )
β
pi
1−λσ2β 2
(λσ2β 2+1)2

.
Note that (pi+λσ2m r M )
β
pi
=λσ2β 2+2β −1,
d a
d r
=
λMβσ2m
(λσ2β 2+1)3

(λσ2β 2+1)2− (λσ2β 2+2β −1)(1−λσ2β 2)

> 0.
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So d a
d r
> 0. By the similar argument, d a
d M
> 0.
Proof of Lemma 1.3.5
The procedure of solving an equilibrium is as follows:
1) Guess a value for M =
∫ 1
0
a iβi d i , the sum of the sensitivity of CEO pay to the aggregate shock.
2) Then for each firm i , we can solve the optimal incentives and CEO’s effort from Proposition 1.3.2
and Lemma 1.3.1. Specifically, given M , we have βi (M ) =
2
1− λiσ
2
m ri M
pii

+
r
1− λiσ
2
m ri M
pii
2
+4λi (σ2m+σ
2
ηi )
and a i =
βi (M )(pii+λiσ2m ri M )
λi (σ2m+σ
2
ηi )βi (M )
2+1
.
3) Plugging the expressions for βi (M ) and a i into M =
∫ 1
0
a iβi d i , we can solve for M .
4) Plugging the solution of M into βi (M ) =
2
1− λiσ
2
m ri M
pii

+
r
1− λiσ
2
m ri M
pii
2
+4λi (σ2m+σ
2
ηi )
to check that the
incentives are not greater than 1 (ensured by (1.11)).
5) Bounded efforts: let a k = maxi∈[0,1] a i . Then by Lemma 1.3.1, a k =
βk (pik+λk rk Mσ2m )
λk (σ2m+σ
2
ηk )β
2
k
+1
. Since M =∫ 1
0
a iβi d i ≤ a k
∫ 1
0
βi d i ≤ a k , a k ≤ βk (pik+λk rk a kσ
2
m )
λk (σ
2
m+σ
2
ηk )β
2
k
+1
. Note that βk ≥ 2
1+
Æ
1+4λk (σ2m+σ
2
ηk )
, so by (1.10), a k ≤
βkpik
λkβk [βk (σ2m+σ
2
ηk )−rkσ2m ]+1
≤pik .
The procedure above is summarized in Lemma 1.3.5.
Proof of Example 2
Let β and a denote the optimal incentives and CEO’s effort for firms in [0,k ]. Let β¯ and a¯ denote the
optimal incentives and CEO’s effort for firms in [1− k ,1]. Then M =
∫ 1
0
a iβi d i = k aβ + (1− k )a¯ β¯ . For
brevity, letσ2 =σ2m +σ
2
η and σ¯
2 =σ2m + σ¯
2
η. By Lemma 1.3.1, a =
β (pi+λσ2m r M )
λσ2β2+1
, and a¯ =
β¯ (pi+λσ2m r¯ M )
λσ¯2 β¯2+1
. Then
M = k aβ +(1−k )a¯ β¯ =
kβ 2(pi+λσ2m r M )
λσ2β 2+1
+
(1−k )β¯ 2(pi+λσ2m r¯ M )
λσ¯2β¯ 2+1
,
which implies that
M =
kβ2pi
λσ2β2+1
+
(1−k )β¯2pi
λσ¯2β¯2+1
1−λσ2m
h
r kβ2
λσ2β2+1
+
r¯ (1−k )β¯2
λσ¯2β¯2+1
i .
By the proof of Proposition 1.3.2, β satisfies that
−λσ2β 2−

1−
λσ2m r M
pi

β +1= 0. (A.7)
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β¯ satisfies that
−λσ¯2β¯ 2−

1−
λσ2m r¯ M
pi

β¯ +1= 0. (A.8)
From (A.7) and (A.8), we obtain that
r¯
r
=
λσ¯2β¯ +1−1/β¯
λσ2β +1−1/β . (A.9)
Thus we can solve β¯ in terms of β , i.e. β¯ = β¯ (β ). Then β is a solution to
−λσ2β 2−

1−
λσ2m r M (β )
pi

β +1= 0.
Let F (β ) denote the left side of the above equation. It is obvious that F (0)> 0. Note that β¯ (1) = 1 by (A.9)
and the condition 2) in the lemma (i.e. λr σ¯2 = λr¯σ2), then it is easy to check that F (1) > 0 if and only if
σ2m (1−k )> σ
2
r
−σ2m k . Similarly, F (
Æ
1
λσ2
)< 0 if and only if
σ2m (1−k )

λσ2+λσ2
r¯
r

1
λσ2 r¯
r
+ 1
β¯ (
Æ
1
λσ2
)2
<
σ2
r
−σ2m k . (A.10)
From (A.9), we can solve that β¯ (
Æ
1
λσ2
) =
(r¯−r )+
p
(r¯−r )2+4λσ2 r¯ r
2λσ2 r¯
. Plugging it into (A.10) yields that F (
Æ
1
λσ2
)<
0 if and only if r+r¯
2r¯

1+ r¯−rp
(r¯−r )2+4λσ2 r¯ r

<
σ2m+σ
2
η−σ2m r k
σ2m r (1−k )
. Hence given the four conditions in the lemma, we
have F (0) > 0, F (
Æ
1
λσ2
) < 0, and F (1) > 0. Thus for firms in [0,k ], there is an equilibrium in which β is
less than
Æ
1
λσ2
; and there is another equilibrium in which β is greater than
Æ
1
λσ2
.
Proof of Lemma 1.4.1
Since firms are identical, we can assume that in equilibrium, for firms in [0,k ], the shareholders are
using an option-based contract (αO+βO max(e1(m˜+η),0)) to induce their CEOs’ efforts; for firms in [k ,1],
the shareholders are using a stock-based contractαS+βS(pi+e1(m˜+η)) to induce their CEOs’ efforts. Then
the sum of all CEOs’ wages is C =
∫ 1
0
w i d i = kαO+(1−k )αS+kβO
∫ 1
0
max(e1(m˜ +ηi ),0)d i +(1−k )βS (pi+
e1m˜ ) (because
∫ 1
0
ηi d i = 0).
Then for any representative firm (i.e. I drop subscript i for brevity), if shareholders use a stock con-
tract, then if the CEO exerts an effort at a cost c , her relative payoff is wS−r C =αS+βS(pi+e1(m˜+η))−r C .
Since m˜ = σm , or −σm with probability 12 for each, C = C+ = kαO + (1− k )αS + kβO Eη[max(e1(σm +
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η),0)] + (1− k )βS(pi+ e1σm )] with probability 12 and C = C− = kαO + (1− k )αS + kβO Eη[max(e1(−σm +
η),0)] + (1 − k )βS(pi − e1σm )] with probability 12 . Then we can calculate that the mean of wS − r C is
αS +βSpi− r C
++C−
2
, and the variance of wS − r C is

βSe1σm − r C
+−C−
2
2
+β 2S e
2
1σ
2
η. Therefore the CEO’s
expected utility under working is αS + βSpi− r C
++C−
2
− 1
2
λ
h
βSe1σm − r C
+−C−
2
2
+β 2S e
2
1σ
2
η
i
− c . Simi-
larly, if the CEO does not work and given that all the other CEOs are working, then her relative payoff
is αS +βSe0(m˜ +η)− r C . It can be calculated that her expected utility under shirking is αS − r C
++C−
2
−
1
2
λ
h
βSe0σm − r C
+−C−
2
2
+β 2S e
2
1σ
2
η
i
. So to guarantee that the CEO is working, we must have
αS +βSpi− r
C++C−
2
− 1
2
λ

βSe1σm − r
C+−C−
2
2
+β 2S e
2
1σ
2
η

− c
≥ αS − r
C++C−
2
− 1
2
λ

βSe0σm − r
C+−C−
2
2
+β 2S e
2
1σ
2
η

,
which can be simplified to βSpi− 12λβ 2Sσ2η(e 21 −e 20 )−
1
2
λβSσm (e1−e0)[βS(e1+e0)σm −r (C+−C−)]−c ≥ 0.
The base salary αS must be set to make the participation constraint binding, thus the expected CEO pay
is equal to E [wS] = r
C++C−
2
+ 1
2
λ
h
βSe1σm − r C
+−C−
2
2
+β 2S e
2
1σ
2
η
i
+ c +u . Therefore, if the shareholders
use stock, then their objective is
min
βS
r
C++C−
2
+
1
2
λ

βSe1σm − r
C+−C−
2
2
+β 2S e
2
1σ
2
η

+ c +u ,
subject to βSpi− 12λβ 2Sσ2η(e 21 − e 20 )−
1
2
λβSσm (e1− e0)[βS(e1+ e0)σm − r (C+−C−)]− c ≥ 0.
Due to the assumption that shareholders will use stock compensation if there is no difference between
stock and options, and since each firm is identical, we must have that k = 0 or k = 1. If all the firms use
stock (i.e. k = 0), then we have C+−C− = 2βSe1σm . Then it is easy to see that the optimal β ∗S ≥ 0 must be
the minimum solution to the constraint βSpi− 12λβ 2Sσ2η(e 21−e 20 )−
1
2
λβSσm (e1−e0)[βS(e1+e0)σm −r (C+−
C−)]− c ≥ 0, which yields that β ∗S = 2cpi+Æpi2−2cλ[(e 21−e 20−2r e1(e1−e0))σ2m+(e 21−e 20 )σ2η] . Also note that
C++C−
2
= αS +
βSpi= E [wS], so we get that the cost of stock is E [wS] =
1
1−r

1
2
λ[(β ∗S e1σm )
2(1− r )2+(β ∗S e1ση)2]+ c +u

.
If shareholders use options, then we will calculate the cost of options in two cases: ση ≤σm or ση >
σm .
Case 1: ση ≤σm .
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In this case, if the CEO works, then we can compute that the mean of wO − r C is αO + 12βO e1σm −
r C
++C−
2
, and the variance of wO − r C is

1
2
βO e1σm − r C
+−C−
2
2
+ 1
2
(βO e1ση)2. Similarly, we can obtain
that shareholders’ objective is
min
βO
r
C++C−
2
+
1
2
λ

1
2
βO e1σm − r
C+−C−
2
2
+
1
2
(βO e1ση)
2

+ c +u ,
subject to 1
2
βO e1σm − 12λ
1
2
(βO e1ση)2− 12λ
1
2
βO e1σm

1
2
βO e1σm − r (C+−C−)

− c ≥ 0.
If all the firms use options (i.e. k = 1), then C+ −C− = βO e1σm and C
++C−
2
= E [wO ]. So similarly
we can derive the optimal number of options is 1
2
β ∗O =
2c
e1σm+
Æ
(e1σm )2−2cλ[e 21 (1−2r )σ2m+2e 21σ2η]
, and the cost of
options is E [wO ] =
1
1−r
h
1
2
λ
h
1
2
β ∗O e1σm
2
(1− r )2+2

1
2
β ∗O e1ση
2i
+ c +u
i
.
Case 2: ση >σm .
Similarly, we have that the optimal number of options is 1
2
β ∗O =
2c
e1ση+
Æ
(e1ση)2−2cλ[e 21 (2−2r )σ2m+e 21σ2η]
, and
the cost of options is E [wO ] =
1
1−r
h
1
2
λ
h
1
2
β ∗O e1σm
2
(1+(1− r )2)+

1
2
β ∗O e1ση
2i
+ c +u
i
.
Combining the two cases, we can conclude that the cost of options is
E [wO ] =
1
1− r

1
2
λ

1
2
β ∗O e1σm
2
(1− r )2+

1
2
β ∗O e1ση
2
+

1
2
β ∗O e1σmin
2
+ c +u

,
where 1
2
β ∗O =
2c
e1σmax+
Æ
(e1σmax)2−2cλ[e 21 (1−2r )σ2m+e 21σ2η+e 21σ2min]
,σmin =min(σm ,ση),σmax =max(σm ,ση).
Then it is easy to see that the ratio of the risk premium of one unit of stock to the risk premium of one
unit of options is κ(r ) =
4[(1−r )2σ2m+σ2η]
(1−r )2σ2m+σ2η+σ2min
.
Comparing the cost of stock with the cost of options, there exists pˆi such that all the firms will use
stock if and only if pi≥ pˆi.
pˆi=
1
4
e1σmax
p
κ(r )

1+ 4Q
κ(r )P

+

1− 4Q
κ(r )P
È
1− 4Pc
e 21σ
2
max

 , (A.11)
where P = 1
2
λ[e 21σ
2
m (1−2r )+ e 21σ2η+ e 21σ2min], Q = 12λ[(e 21 − e 20 −2r e1(e1− e0))σ2m +(e 21 − e 20 )σ2η].
Proof of Part 1)
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As
ση
σm
goes to 0,
∂ κ(r )
∂ r
goes to 0. Thus it can be calculated that
∂ pˆi
∂ r
=
e0σm
2(1+
p
1−2cλ(1−2r ))2
p
1−2cλ(1−2r )
p
1−2cλ(1−2r )+1−2λc +2λc r + e0λc
e1

> 0.
Proof of Part 2)
Note that

1+
4Q
κ(r )P

+

1− 4Q
κ(r )P
q
1− 4Pc
e 21σ
2
max
can be rewritten as
D(r ) = 1+
È
1− 4Pc
e 21σ
2
max
+
16Qc
κ(r )e 21σ
2
max
1
1+
q
1− 4Pc
e 21σ
2
max
.
So the sign of ∂ pˆi
∂ r
is the same as the sign of
∂
p
κ(r )D(r )
∂ r
= 1
2
p
κ(r )
∂ κ(r )
∂ r
D(r ) +
p
κ(r ) ∂D(r )
∂ r
. Note that
∂ κ(r )
∂ r
< 0
and r
1+
q
1− 4Pc
e 2
1
σ2max
is increasing in r . We can obtain that
∂
p
κ(r )D(r )
∂ r
<
1
2
p
κ(r )
∂ κ(r )
∂ r
1+ 16Qcκ(r )e 21σ2max
1
1+
q
1− 4Pc
e 21σ
2
max

+
p
κ(r )
2λcσ2mσ2max
1q
1− 4Pc
e 21σ
2
max
− 16Qc
κ(r )2e 21σ
2
max
1
1+
q
1− 4Pc
e 21σ
2
max
∂ κ(r )
∂ r

=
1
2
p
κ(r )
∂ κ(r )
∂ r
1− 16Qcκ(r )e 21σ2max
1
1+
q
1− 4Pc
e 21σ
2
max
+pκ(r )2λcσ2mσ2max
1q
1− 4Pc
e 21σ
2
max
Since 2≤κ(r )≤ 4, and Q ≤ 1
2
λ(e 21 − e 20 )(σ2m +σ2η),
∂
p
κ(r )D(r )
∂ r
< 0 if the following condition is satisfied.

1
2
−4λc

(1− r )σ2mσ2min
[(1− r )2σ2m +σ2η+σ2min][(1− r )2σ2m +σ2η]
>
λcp
1−6λc
.
Suppose thatσ2m ≥σ2η, then the above condition is satisfied if
(1−r )σ2η
2[(1−r )2σ2m+σ2η]
> X , where X = 2λc
(1−8λc )
p
1−6λc .
This can be simplified toσ2η >
2X (1−r )2σ2m
(1−r )−4X .
Proof of Part 3)
As σm
ση
goes to 0, κ(r )→ 4, P
e 21σ
2
max
→ 1
2
λ, and
Q
P
→ e
2
1−e 20
e 21
. So from (A.11), we can see that ∂ pˆi
∂ r
goes to 0 as
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well.
A.2 Two Firms with RWCs
In the main part of the paper, I have assumed that a continuum of firms and CEOs exist. Each firm
represents an infinitesimal portion of the continuum, so the change of one CEO’s incentives will not
affect other CEOs’ actions. This nice property leads to the result that CEO incentives are increasing in a
CEO’s RWCs r (Proposition 1.3.2), because the rise of a CEO’s RWCs increases the CEO’s effort and also
helps to reduce the risk premium associated with the aggregate shock. However, if a firm’s compensation
policy affects some other CEOs’ actions largely, then the result can be changed. In this section, I consider
the case with two firms. If the two CEOs compare compensation with each other, then the increase of one
CEO’s incentives can increase the other CEO’s effort. The rise of the other CEO’s effort will increase her
own income, which in turn reduces the target CEO’s relative payoff because of the RWCs. As a result, the
relation between CEO incentives and RWCs may change.
Suppose there are two firms with both CEOs having RWCs: firm 1 and firm 2. I use parameters for
firm 2. For example, the measure of a CEO’s risk aversion is λ for firm 1 and λ¯ for firm 2. CEOs’ efforts
increase both the mean and variance of firm value, which is given by (1.8). CEO 1’s utility with RWCs is
U = E [u ,H ] = E [w −H ]− 1
2
λVa r [w −H ]− 1
2
a 2,
where H = r w¯ = r

α¯+ β¯

p¯ia¯ + a¯ (m˜ + η¯)

denotes CEO 1’s RWCs. A larger r means that the CEO 1 cares
more about CEO 2’s wage. Similarly, CEO 2’s utility with RWCs is
U¯ = E [u¯ ,H¯ ] = E [w¯ − H¯]− 1
2
λ¯V a r [w¯ − H¯]− 1
2
a¯ 2,
where H¯ = r¯ w = r¯
 
α+β

pia +a (m˜ +η)

denotes CEO 2’s RWCs. A larger r¯ means that the CEO 2 cares
more about CEO 1’s wage.
The equilibrium is a subgame perfect equilibrium. In the first stage (t = 0), each firm will choose an
optimal contract given the other firm’s contract. In the second stage (t = 1), after the contracts are signed,
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each CEO will exert an optimal effort given the other CEO’s contract and effort. I will solve the problem
using backward induction.
First, I consider the CEOs’ effort decisions. Suppose that CEO 1 is granted β shares of stock, and CEO
2 is granted β¯ shares of stock. Given CEO 2’s effort a¯ , a similar derivation as in Lemma 1.3.1 shows that
CEO 1’s effort is given by
a =
β (pi+λσ2m r a¯ β¯ )
λ(σ2m +σ
2
η)β
2+1
. (A.12)
Similarly, given CEO 1’s effort a , CEO 2’s effort is given by
a¯ =
β¯ (p¯i+ λ¯σ2m r¯ aβ )
λ¯(σ2m +σ
2
η¯)β¯
2+1
. (A.13)
I focus on solving the principal-agent problem for firm 1. The solution for firm 2, then, is straight-forward
by symmetry.
Lemma A.2.1. Given the two contracts w =α+βV and w¯ = α¯+ β¯ V¯ ,
1) the optimal effort taken by CEO 1 is
a =
β (pi+λσ2m A)
λ(σ2m +σ
2
η−σ2m B )β 2+1
,
where A =
r β¯2p¯i
λ¯(σ2m+σ
2
η¯)β¯
2+1
and B =
r r¯ λ¯β¯2σ2m
λ¯(σ2m+σ
2
η¯)β¯
2+1
. The optimal effort a is increasing in r and r¯ .
2) CEO 2’s expected pay increase in CEO 1’s incentives, i.e.
∂ E [w¯ ]
∂ β
> 0. Thus, ∂ E [H ]
∂ β
> 0.
The increase of r increases CEO 1’s concerns about CEO 2’s payoff; hence it increases CEO 1’s incen-
tives to exert a higher (risk-taking) action to catch up with CEO 2’s exposure to aggregate shock. Similarly,
the increase of r¯ increases CEO 2’s effort, and thus increases CEO 2’s exposure to the aggregate shock.
Since CEO 1 cares about CEO 2’s payoff, then the increase of CEO 2’s exposure to aggregate shock incen-
tivizes CEO 1 to exert a higher effort. For the shareholders in firm 1, when they grant higher incentives
to CEO 1, it will increase CEO 1’s exposure to aggregate shock, thus it will increase CEO 2’s incentives to
exert effort. Higher incentives granted to CEO 1 will also induce CEO 2 to exert a higher effort (by (A.13),
we see that a¯ is increasing in β ), which in turn will affect CEO 1’s utility through her RWCs. Lemma A.2.1
shows that the rise of CEO 1’s incentives increases CEO 2’s expected payoff and hence reduces CEO 1’s
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relative payoff. As a result, the shareholders in firm 1 may have to increase CEO pay due to the participa-
tion constraint. So the optimal CEO incentives may decrease in RWCs. In other words, RWCs can lead to
low CEO incentives, which has been documented in empirical studies (Jensen and Murphy (1990)).
Proposition A.2.2. The optimal linear contract w = α∗ + β ∗V for firm 1 is that β ∗ is a solution to the
following equation,
pi−
2λ(σ2−σ2m B )piβ 2
λ(σ2−σ2m B )β 2+1
−
β (pi−λΓσ2m )
λσ2β 2+1
+

(λσ2m )
2β 2
λσ2β 2+1
−λσ¯2

Γ− p¯i

2Bβ
λ(σ2−σ2m B )β 2+1
= 0,
where Γ= r a¯ β¯ =A + B aβ = A +
β2(pi+λσ2m A)B
λ(σ2m+σ
2
η−σ2m B )β2+1
, A and B are defined in Lemma A.2.1. α∗ is set to make
the participation constraint binding.
Moreover, if (2λσ2m + 1)pi <

2− λ
r¯ λ¯

p¯i, then
∂ β ∗
∂ r
|r=0 < 0. This implies that if p¯i and r¯ are big, then for
small r , β ∗ is decreasing in r .
The intuition behind Proposition A.2.2 is that when CEO 1’s RWCs increase (i.e., r goes up), it in-
creases CEO 1’s effort and also helps to reduce the risk premium associated with aggregate shock. These
two effects would push up the optimal incentives for CEO 1. However, if r¯ is big, then CEO 2 cares a lot
about CEO 1’s payoff, then increasing CEO 1’s incentives will increase CEO 2’s effort significantly. Since
the productivity of CEO 2’s effort is big (i.e., p¯i is big), the increase in CEO 2’s effort will increase CEO 2’s
pay greatly. Then because CEO 1 also cares about CEO 2’s payoff, the shareholders may have to pay a high
premium for CEO 1’s RWCs. Thus increasing CEO 1’s incentives may lead to a large increase in CEO 1’s
pay. If this cost is too big, then there will be a negative relation between CEO incentives and r .
Proof of Proposition A.2.2
Given a linear contract w = α + βV for CEO 1 and w¯ = α¯+ β¯ V¯ for CEO 2, CEO 1’s effort is a =
β (pi+λσ2m A)
λ(σ2m+σ
2
η−σ2m B )β2+1
by Lemma A.2.1. Also note that CEO 1’s RWCs are
H = r w¯ = r α¯+Γ(p¯i+ m˜ + η¯),
where Γ= r a¯ β¯ = A+B aβ =A+
β2(pi+λσ2m A)B
λ(σ2m+σ
2
η−σ2m B )β2+1
and recall that A =
r β¯2p¯i
λ¯(σ2m+σ
2
η¯)β¯
2+1
and B =
r r¯ λ¯β¯2σ2m
λ¯(σ2m+σ
2
η¯)β¯
2+1
.
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Combining with the binding participation constraint, the shareholders’ objective in firm 1 is to maximize
βpi(pi+λσ2m A)
λ(σ2m +σ
2
η−σ2m B )β 2+1
− 1
2
β 2(pi−λΓσ2m )(pi+λΓσ2m )
λ(σ2m +σ
2
η)β
2+1
− 1
2
λ(σ2m +σ
2
η¯)Γ
2− p¯iΓ− r α¯.
For brevity, letσ2 = (σ2m +σ
2
η) and σ¯
2 = (σ2m +σ
2
η¯). Taking the first-order condition w.r.t β yields that
pi(pi+λσ2m A)
λ(σ2−σ2m B )β 2+1
−
2λ(σ2−σ2m B )pi(pi+λσ2m A)β 2
[λ(σ2−σ2m B )β 2+1]2
−
β (pi−λΓσ2m )(pi+λΓσ2m )
(λσ2β 2+1)2
+

(λσ2m )
2β 2
λσ2β 2+1
−λσ¯2

Γ− p¯i

2(pi+λσ2m A)Bβ
[λ(σ2−σ2m B )β 2+1]2
= 0.
Note that a =
β (pi+λσ2m A)
λ(σ2m+σ
2
η−σ2m B )β2+1
=
β (pi+λσ2mΓ)
λσ2β2+1
, the above equation can be simplified to
pi−
2λ(σ2−σ2m B )piβ 2
λ(σ2−σ2m B )β 2+1
−
β (pi−λΓσ2m )
λσ2β 2+1
+

(λσ2m )
2β 2
λσ2β 2+1
−λσ¯2

Γ− p¯i

2Bβ
λ(σ2−σ2m B )β 2+1
= 0.
Let F (β ,r ) denote the left side of the above equation. Then since ∂ F
∂ β
< 0,
∂ β
∂ r
has the same sign with ∂ F
∂ r
.
We can calculate that
∂ F
∂ r
|r=0 =
2λpiβ 2
(λσ2β 2+1)2
r¯ λ¯β¯ 2(σ2m )
2
λ¯σ¯2β¯ 2+1
+
λσ2mβ
λσ2β 2+1

β¯ 2p¯i
λ¯σ¯2β¯ 2+1
+
β 2pi
λσ2β 2+1
r¯ λ¯β¯ 2σ2m
λ¯σ¯2β¯ 2+1

+

(λσ2m )
2β 2
λσ2β 2+1
−λσ¯2

∂
∂ r

2ΓBβ
λ(σ2−σ2m B )β 2+1

− 2p¯iβ
λσ2β 2+1
r¯ λ¯β¯ 2σ2m
λ¯σ¯2β¯ 2+1
<
r¯ λ¯β¯ 2σ2m
λ¯σ¯2β¯ 2+1
β
λσ2β 2+1

2λσ2mpiβ
λσ2β 2+1
+
p¯iλ
r¯ λ¯
+
λσ2mpiβ
2
λσ2β 2+1
−2p¯i

<
r¯ λ¯β¯ 2σ2m
λ¯σ¯2β¯ 2+1
β
λσ2β 2+1

2λσ2mpi+
p¯iλ
r¯ λ¯
+pi−2p¯i

.
So if (2λσ2m +1)pi<

2− λ
r¯ λ¯

p¯i, then ∂ F
∂ r
|r=0 < 0. Thus ∂ β∂ r |r=0 < 0.
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Appendix B
Supplement to Inside Debt
Proof of Equation (2.3)
Rearranging Equations (2.1) and (2.2) yields
pR VG R −pSVGS ≤ (1−pS)VBS − (1−pR )VBR
pR VG R −pSVGS ≤ F (pR −pS)+
1
α
[
 
pS −pR
 
βF + J

+(1−pS)βVBS − (1−pR )βVBR ].
Equating the right-hand sides of each inequality leads to (2.3). To prove that the denominator of (2.3) is
positive, we have:
F (pS −pR )+ (1−pS)VBS − (1−pR )VBR = (VBS −VBR )(1−pR )+
 
pS −pR

(F −VBS)> 0.
Proof of Proposition 2.2.1
To find the cheapest contract that satisfies (2.3), we first calculate the cost of debt and the bonus. The
firm is solvent with probability p = pRq +pS(1−q ). A bonus of J costs p J ; debt of β costs
β [p F +q (1−pR )VBR +(1−q )(1−pS)VBS].
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Hence an incentive compatible contract will cost
W = p J +

α− J (pS −pR )
F (pS −pR )+ (1−pS)VBS − (1−pR )VBR

[p F +q (1−pR )VBR +(1−q )(1−pS)VBS],
where
∂W
∂ J
= p − (pS −pR )[p F +q (1−pR )VBR +(1−q )(1−pS)VBS]
F (pS −pR )+ (1−pS)VBS − (1−pR )VBR
.
Since the derivative is constant, we have a corner solution. The manager is paid entirely with debt if
∂W
∂ J
> 0, i.e.,
pR (1−pS)VBS > pS(1−pR )VBR ,
and entirely with the bonus if ∂W
∂ J
< 0.
Proof of Equation (2.6)
Rearranging (2.1) and (2.2) yields
pR VG R ≤ pSVGS +(1−pS)VBS − (1−pR )VBR
pR VG R ≤ pR F −
1
α
pR J +
β
α

pSVGS +(1−pS)VBS − (1−pR )VBR −pR F

.
Equating the left-hand sides of each inequality leads to (2.6).
Proof of Lemma 2.3.1
The manager’s objective function for effort is given by:
αp g e g +β
 
1−pb eb − 1
2
e 2g −
1
2
e 2b
and differentiating with respect to e g and eb gives Equation (2.8).
Proof of Proposition 2.3.2
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For conciseness, it is helpful to define the following:
X =
(1−p )2
p
(VBS −VBR )2
VG RH −VGS
Y = p

VG RH +VGS
2
− F

.
From (2.10), the manager will choose S if and only if
VG R <VGS +
β (1−p )
αp
(VBS −VBR).
Since VG R ∼U [VGS ,VG RH ], this occurs with probability min

1,
β (1−p )
αp
VBS−VBR
VG RH−VGS

. There are three cases
to consider.
Case 1:
β (1−p )
αp
VBS−VBR
VG RH−VGS ≤ 1 and at least one of α and β is strictly positive. Here, both R and S are
selected with strictly positive probability, and we need not worry about boundary cases. Then the values
of equity and debt are given by:
E0 = p
VG RH +VGS +
β (1−p )
αp
(VBS −VBR )
2
×
VG RH −VGS − β (1−p )αp (VBS −VBR )
VG RH −VGS
+pVGS ×
β (1−p )
αp
VBS −VBR
VG RH −VGS
−p F +p 2 g 2α
= Y − β
2
2α2
X +p 2 g 2α. (B.1)
D0 = [p F +(1−p )VBR ]×
VG RH −VGS − β (1−p )αp (VBS −VBR )
VG RH −VGS
+[p F +(1−p )VBS]×
β (1−p )
αp
VBS −VBR
VG RH −VGS
+(1−p )2b 2β
= p F +(1−p )VBR +
β
α
X +(1−p )2b 2β . (B.2)
Differentiating the objective function (2.7) with respect to β and α yields:
(β ) : −(1−α) β
α2
X −D0+(1−β )

X
α
+(1−p )2b 2

= 0 (B.3)
(α) : −E0+(1−α)

β 2
α3
X +p 2 g 2

+(1−β )

− β
α2
X

= 0. (B.4)
91
Using the expressions for E0 and D0 in (B.1) and (B.2), the above first-order conditions become:
(β ) : −p F +(1−p )VBR+

1−β
α
− β
α2

X +(1−2β )(1−p )2b 2 = 0 (B.5)
(α) : −Y +

β 2
2α2
+
β 2
α3
− β
α2

X +(1−2α)p 2 g 2 = 0. (B.6)
Case 2:
β (1−p )
αp
VBS−VBR
VG RH−VGS > 1 and at least one of α and β is strictly positive. In this case, S is always
selected. Shareholders’ payoff (2.7) is
(1−α) (pVGS −p F +p 2 g 2α)+ (1−β )(p F +(1−p )VBS +(1−p )2b 2β ).
Differentiating this yields
α∗ = max

0,
p g 2 − (VGS − F )
2p g 2

(B.7)
β ∗ =
(1−p )2b 2− (p F +(1−p )VBS)
2(1−p )2b 2 . (B.8)
There is no max (0, ·) function for β ∗ since β (1−p )
αp
VBS−VBR
VG RH−VGS > 1 rules out β
∗ = 0.
Case 3: α = β = 0. This must be considered separately from Cases 1 and 2 since the expression
β (1−p )
αp
VBS−VBR
VG RH−VGS is undefined. We assume that the manager takes the efficient project in this case.
Proof of part (i)
For Cases 2 and 3, it is immediate that α∗ < 1
2
and β ∗ < 1
2
, so we only need to tackle Case 1.
First, we consider the case in which the optimum is on the boundaries of Case 1, and so the first-order
conditions do not apply. The boundaries of Case 1 are {(α,β ) : β = 0,α > 0} and {(α,β ) : β (1−p )
αp
VBS−VBR
VG RH−VGS =
1}. On the boundary {(α,β ) :β = 0,α> 0}, shareholders’ payoff is
(1−α)(Y +p 2 g 2α)+p F +(1−p )VBR .
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Differentiating this yields
α∗ =
p 2 g 2−Y
2p 2 g 2
β ∗ = 0,
and so α∗ < 1
2
and β ∗ < 1
2
.
The second boundary can be rewritten {(α,k ) : k (1−p )
p
VBS−VBR
VG RH−VGS = 1}. Shareholders solve
max
α,β
(1−α)(pVGS −p F +p 2 g 2α)+ (1−β )(p F +(1−p )VBS +(1−p )2b 2β )
subject to the constraint
β (1−p )
αp
VBS −VBR
VG RH −VGS
= 1.
Defining A =
p (VG RH−VGS )
(1−p )(VBS−VBR ) , we have
α∗ =
p 2 g 2−p (VGS − F )+A[(1−p )2b 2−p F − (1−p )VBS]
2[p 2 g 2+A2(1−p )2b 2]
β ∗ = Aα∗.
It is automatic that α∗ < 1
2
. A necessary condition for the optimum to be on this boundary is that
∂
∂ k

(1−α)(Y − 1
2
k 2X +p 2 g 2α)+ (1−kα)(p F +k X +(1−p )2b 2kα)

≥ 0
at k =A. This derivative at k =A equals:
−(1−α)k X −α[p F +k X +(1−p )2b 2kα]+ (1−kα)(X +(1−p )2b 2α)
≤ −α[p F +(1−p )(VBS −VBR )− (1−2kα)(1−p )2b 2]. (B.9)
For the derivative to be non-negative, 1−2kαmust be positive and so β ∗ = k ∗α∗ < 1
2
.
We now move to the interior of Case 1, which allows us to use first-order conditions. If β ≥ 1
2
, then
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from (B.5) we must have
1−β
α
− β
α2
> 0. This yields
α>
β
1−β ≥
1/2
1−1/2 = 1.
This is a contradiction, so β < 1
2
.
Similarly, from (B.6), we have

−Y + β
2
2α2
X

+

β 2
α3
− β
α2

X +(1−2α)p 2 g 2 = 0.
From (B.1), the first term is the negative of the value of equity if g = 0. Since equity value must be
positive, this first term must be negative. Thus if α ≥ 1
2
, we must have
β2
α3
− β
α2
> 0, i.e. α < β . However,
since β < 1
2
, this is inconsistent with α≥ 1
2
. Hence α< 1
2
.
Proof of part (ii)
First, we derive a sufficient condition to rule out Case 3 being optimal. Under Case 3, shareholders’
payoff is
VG RH +VGS
2
+
1
2
X +(1−p )VBR .
To show that Case 3 is suboptimal, it is sufficient to prove that shareholders’ payoff is lower than under
Case 1 with an arbitrary contract – then it will definitely be lower than under Case 1 with the optimal
contract. Consider the contract α=β = ε. Then, in Case 1, shareholders’ payoff is
(1−ε)

p 2 g 2ε+(1−p )2b 2ε+ VG RH +VGS
2
+
1
2
X +(1−p )VBR

.
The derivative of this function with respect to ε at ε= 0 is
p 2 g 2+(1−p )2b 2− VG RH +VGS
2
− 1
2
X − (1−p )VBR .
Thus, to rule out α=β = 0, it is sufficient to show that
p 2 g 2+(1−p )2b 2 > VG RH +VGS
2
+
1
2
X +(1−p )VBR . (B.10)
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In addition, if (1−p )2b 2 − [p F + (1−p )(VBS −VBR )] < 0, then β ∗ in Equation (B.8) is negative and so
Case 2 is not feasible. Hence, the optimum must be Case 1. Since Case 1 involves
β (1−p )
αp
VBS−VBR
VG RH−VGS ≤ 1, we
have α∗ > 0.
Proof of part (iii)
Condition (B.10) is sufficient to rule out Case 3. Case 2 requires
β (1−p )
αp
VBS−VBR
VG RH−VGS > 1so β
∗ > 0 automat-
ically holds. We thus only need to consider Case 1. Differentiating the objective (2.7) with respect to β
yields:
−p F +(1−p )VBR+1−β
α
− β
α2

X +(1−2β )(1−p )2b 2.
At β = 0, this becomes
−p F +(1−p )VBR+ 1
α
X +(1−p )2b 2.
Since α∗ < 1
2
, 2X > p F +(1−p )VBR−(1−p )2b 2 is sufficient to guarantee that this derivative is positive and
so β ∗ > 0.
Proof of part (iv)
First, note that the condition (1−p )2b 2 − [p F + (1−p )(VBS −VBR )] ≤ 0 in part (ii) of the Proposition
guarantees that (B.9), the derivative at the boundary where
β (1−p )
αp
VBS−VBR
VG RH−VGS = 1, is negative. Thus, the
optimum is interior and so we can use first-order conditions.
Differentiating the objective (2.7) with respect to β , and treating α as a function of β , yields
−Y ∂ α
∂ β
−p F − (1−p )VBR +X
α− ∂ α∂ β β
α2

1− β
α

+
β 2
2α2
∂ α
∂ β
− β
α

+ (1−2α)p 2 g 2 ∂ α
∂ β
+
 
1−2β(1−p )2b 2 = 0. (B.11)
If we solve for α from (B.6), then the solution for α is independent of b . Let h denote the left hand side of
(B.11). Thus, the partial derivative of h with respect to b is 2
 
1−2β(1−p )2b . From h(β ,b ) = 0, we have
∂ h
∂ β
∂ β
∂ b
+ ∂ h
∂ b
= 0; since ∂ h
∂ β
< 0 at the optimum, the sign of
∂ β
∂ b
is the same as the sign of ∂ h
∂ b
. The latter is
positive since β < 1
2
. Thus, β ∗ is increasing in b . A similar analysis proves that α∗ is increasing in g .
Proof of parts (v) and (vi)
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Defining k =
β
α
and plugging into (B.5) and (B.6) yields the first-order conditions:
(β ) :−p F +(1−p )VBR+

1−kα
α
− kα
α2

X +(1−2αk )(1−p )2b 2 = 0 (B.12)
(α) :−Y +

k 2
2
+
k 2
α
− k
α

X +(1−2α)p 2 g 2 = 0. (B.13)
Multiplying (B.3) by k and adding it to (B.4) yields:
αE0+βD0 = (1−β )β (1−p )2b 2+(1−α)αp 2 g 2. (B.14)
Using the expressions for E0 and D0 in (B.1) and (B.2) yields
Yα+
1
2
k 2αX +

p F +(1−p )VBR

kα= p 2 g 2α(1−2α)+ (1−p )2b 2(kα)(1−2kα), (B.15)
and so
α=
p 2 g 2+(1−p )2b 2k −Y − 1
2
k 2X −k p F +(1−p )VBR
2[p 2 g 2+(1−p )2b 2k 2] . (B.16)
Inserting (B.14) into (2.7) gives the shareholders’ objective function as:
V0− [(1−β )β (1−p )2b 2+(1−α)αp 2 g 2].
Differentiating this with respect to k , and treating α as a function of k , yields:
f (k ,θ ) =X (1−k )+2p 2 g 2α∂ α
∂ k
+2(1−p )2b 2kα∂ (kα)
∂ k
= 0. (B.17)
(All of these derivatives are being evaluated at k = k ∗; we suppress “|k=k ∗” notation for brevity.) Divide
the left side of the equation into two parts:
f 1 = X (1−k )
f 2 = 2p
2 g 2α
∂ α
∂ k
+2(1−p )2b 2kα∂ (kα)
∂ k
.
The first part represents the effect of k on project selection; the second represents the effect on effort, i.e.
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f 2 =
∂ η
∂ k
. From (B.17), it is easy to see that k ∗ < 1 if and only if ∂ η
∂ k
< 0.
We are interested in the relationship between k ∗ and a parameterθ . From f (k ,θ ) = 0, we have ∂ f
∂ k
∂ k
∂ θ
+
∂ f
∂ θ
= 0. Since
∂ f
∂ k
< 0 at a maximum, the sign of ∂ k
∂ θ
is the same as the sign of
∂ f
∂ θ
.
∂ f 1
∂ θ
is simple to calculate;
for
∂ f 2
∂ θ
, we have
∂ f 2
∂ θ
=
∂
∂ θ

∂
∂ k
(p 2 g 2α2+(1−p )2b 2(kα)2)

=
∂
∂ k

∂
∂ θ
(p 2 g 2α2+(1−p )2b 2(kα)2)

.
From (B.16), we have
p 2 g 2α2+(1−p )2b 2(kα)2 =
[p 2 g 2+(1−p )2b 2k −Y − 1
2
k 2X −k p F +(1−p )VBR]2
4[p 2 g 2+(1−p )2b 2k 2] ,
and so
∂ f 2
∂ θ
=
∂
∂ k
∂
∂ θ
 
[p 2 g 2+(1−p )2b 2k −Y − 1
2
k 2X −k p F +(1−p )VBR]2
4[p 2 g 2+(1−p )2b 2k 2]
!
.
Differentiating (B.16) with respect to k gives
∂ α
∂ k
=
(1−p )2b 2−k X − p F +(1−p )VBR
2[p 2 g 2+(1−p )2b 2k 2]
−
p 2 g 2+(1−p )2b 2k −Y − 1
2
k 2X −k p F +(1−p )VBR
2[p 2 g 2+(1−p )2b 2k 2]2 ×2(1−p )
2b 2k
=
(1−p )2b 2−k X − p F +(1−p )VBR
2[p 2 g 2+(1−p )2b 2k 2] −
2(1−p )2b 2kα
p 2 g 2+(1−p )2b 2k 2 . (B.18)
From (B.12) we have:
(1−p )2b 2−k X − p F +(1−p )VBR= k −1
α
X +2kα(1−p )2b 2.
Inserting this into (B.18) yields:
∂ α
∂ k
=
(k −1)X
2α[p 2 g 2+(1−p )2b 2k 2] −
(1−p )2b 2kα
p 2 g 2+(1−p )2b 2k 2 . (B.19)
We commence with the case of p F +(1−p )VBR > 2(1−p )b 2 , considered in part (v) of the Proposition.
(B.12) yields 1−kα
α
− kα
α2
> 0. This implies 1−k −kα> 0, and so k ∗ < 1
1+α
< 1. From (B.19), we have ∂ α
∂ k
< 0.
97
We now calculate
∂ f
∂ θ
for various parameters θ . For θ =VBS −VBR , we have
∂ f 1
∂ θ
=
2X
VBS −VBR
(1−k )
∂ f 2
∂ θ
= − X
VBS −VBR
∂ (αk 2)
∂ k
.
Hence,
∂ f
∂ θ
=
X
VBS −VBR

2(1−k )− ∂ (αk
2)
∂ k

=
X
VBS −VBR

2(1−k −αk )−k 2 ∂ α
∂ k

, (B.20)
Since (1−k −αk )> 0 and ∂ α
∂ k
< 0, this is positive.
For θ = g ,
∂ f
∂ θ
depends on the sign of
(1−2α)∂ α
∂ k
.
Since α< 1
2
and ∂ α
∂ k
< 0, this is negative.
For θ = p , it depends on the sign of
1
2
∂ X
∂ p

2(1−k )− ∂ (αk
2)
∂ k

−2α(1−p )b 2(1−2αk )− (F −VBR)α
+ 2
∂ α
∂ k

(1−2α)p g 2 − (1−p )b 2k (1−2αk )− 1
2

k (F −VBR )+

VG RH +VGS
2
− F

.
From (B.20), we know 2(1− k )− ∂ (αk 2)
∂ k
> 0; since also β = αk < 1
2
, the first three terms of the above
expression are negative. For the whole expression to be negative, it is sufficient to show that (1−2α)p g 2−
(1−p )b 2k (1−2αk )− 1
2

k (F −VBR )+

VG RH+VGS
2
− F

> 0 (since ∂ α
∂ k
< 0). From (B.15), we know that
(1−2α)p g 2 = 1
p

Y +
1
2
k 2X

+
1
p

p F +(1−p )VBR

k − (1−p )
2
p
b 2k (1−2kα),
and so
(1−2α)p g 2 − (1−p )b 2k (1−2αk )− 1
2

k (F −VBR )+

VG RH +VGS
2
− F

=
1
p

1
2
Y +
1
2
k 2X

+k

1
2
F +
1−p
p
VBR +
1
2
VBR

− 1−p
p
b 2k (1−2αk ).
This is positive, since the first term is positive, and the combination of the second and third terms is
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positive because p F +(1−p )VBR > 2(1−p )b 2. Thus k ∗ is decreasing in p .
We now turn to the case of Y > 1
2
X +p 2 g 2, considered in part (vi) of the Proposition. From (B.13), we
have 
k 2
α
− k
α

X = Y − k
2
2
X − (1−2α)p 2 g 2.
If k ≤ 1, then the right hand side of the above equation is positive, which implies that k 2
α
− k
α
> 0, i.e. k > 1.
This is a contradiction, so we must have k > 1. We also have
∂ (αk )
∂ k
= α+k
∂ α
∂ k
= α+
k (k −1)X
2α[p 2 g 2+(1−p )2b 2k 2] −
(1−p )2b 2k 2α
p 2 g 2+(1−p )2b 2k 2
=
k (k −1)X
2α[p 2 g 2+(1−p )2b 2k 2] +
p 2 g 2α
p 2 g 2+(1−p )2b 2k 2 > 0 when k > 1. (B.21)
Therefore,
∂ (αk 2)
∂ k
must be also positive. We also have
∂ (αk )
∂ k
> ∂ α
∂ k
. For k > 1, this is immediate by comparing
(B.19) with (B.21). For k < 1, note that ∂ (kα)
∂ k
> ∂ α
∂ k
if and only if α>

1− β
α

∂ α
∂ k
. If k < 1, ∂ α
∂ k
< 0 and so the
right-hand side of this inequality is negative and less than the left-hand side.
From (B.20), k ∗ is decreasing in VBS −VBR . For θ =b , ∂ f∂ θ depends on the sign of
(1−2αk )∂ (αk )
∂ k
,
which is positive, and so k ∗ is increasing in b . For θ = F , ∂ f
∂ θ
depends on the sign of
∂
∂ k
(α(1−k )) = ∂ α
∂ k
− ∂ (αk )
∂ k
,
which is negative, and so k ∗ is decreasing in F .
Proof of part (vii)
Immediate from Equations (B.1) and (B.2).
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Appendix C
Supplement to Incentive Contracting under
Ambiguity-Aversion
Discussion of First-Order Approach
In general, the IC constraint cannot be replaced by the first-order condition. A sufficient condition
for the validity of first-order approach (FOA) is that the agent’s objective function is concave. Rogerson
(1985) provides a sufficient condition for the validity of FOA: If MLRP (Monotone Likelihhood Ratio Prop-
erty), together with CDFC (Convexity of the Distribution Function Condition), hold then the FOA is valid.
But unfortunately, CDFC together with MLRP are very restrictive, it is even not true for normal distribu-
tion. Hence here I will provide some conditions under which the FOA is valid. Also these conditions are
applicable to Section 3.2.2 and 3.2.3.
Lemma C.0.1. 1) If the manager’s contract consists of a base salary and stock, then his utility function is
concave in a . Thus the FOA is valid;
2) Given l and k < a + l , the FOA is valid whenσ is small;
3) Given k andσ, the FOA is valid when l is large.
Proof. Part 1):
The the mean and variance of stock are m−∞ = aˆ + l and σ2−∞ =σ
2, so with a stock-based contract,
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the manager’s expected utility is
E [u ] =α+β−∞(aˆ + l )−
1
2
λβ 2−∞σ
2− 1
2
aˆ 2,
which is obviously concave in aˆ .
Part 2):
For options with exercise price k , the manager’s expected utility is
E [u ] =α+βk mk −
1
2
λβ 2kσ
2
k −
1
2
aˆ 2
Taking partial derivative w.r.t aˆ yields that
∂ E [u ]
∂ aˆ
=βk (1−Φ)−λβ 2kΦmk − aˆ .
Similarly, the second derivatve of E [u ]w.r.t aˆ is
∂ 2E [u ]
∂ aˆ 2
=βk
φ
σ
−λβ 2k

−φ
σ
mk +Φ(1−Φ)

−1.
If k < a + l , then we have
βk
φ
σ
−λβ 2k

−φ
σ
mk +Φ(1−Φ)

−1
≤ βk
φ
σ
+λβ 2k
φ
σ
mk −1
≤

βk +λβ
2
k (a¯ + l )
 1
σ
p
2pi
exp

−1
2
(k −a − l )2
σ2

−1
→ −1, asσ→ 0.
Thus when σ is small, then the second derivative is negative, which implies that the manager’s objective
is concave.
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If a + l ≤ k < a + l , then given any ε, for any aˆ ∈ [a ,k − l −ε)∪ (k − l +ε, a¯ ], we have
βk
φ
σ
−λβ 2k

−φ
σ
mk +Φ(1−Φ)

−1
≤ βk
φ
σ
+λβ 2k
φ
σ
mk −1
≤

βk +λβ
2
k (a¯ + l )
 1
σ
p
2pi
exp

−1
2
ε2
σ2

−1
→ −1, asσ→ 0.
On the other hand, note that βk ≥ a by Proposition 3.2.2, so
∂ E [u ]
∂ aˆ
|aˆ=k−l−ε→βk + l +ε−k > 0 as σ→ 0.
Hence given a small ε, when σ is small, the manager’s utility E [u ] is concave in aˆ for aˆ ∈ [a ,k − l −ε)∪
(k − l +ε, a¯ ] and increasing in aˆ for aˆ ∈ [a ,k − l −ε). Also note that asσ→ 0,
E [u ]|aˆ=k−l =α−
1
2
(k − l )2 <α+βk l +
1
2
β 2k = E [u ]|aˆ=a .
Therefore, when ε is small,
E [u ]|aˆ∈[k−l−ε,k−l+ε] < E [u ]|aˆ=a .
Hence the maximum must be achieved in (k − l +ε, a¯ ]. Since E [u ] is concave in (k − l +ε, a¯ ], the FOA is
valid in this case.
Part 3)
When l is large, we have
βk
φ
σ
−λβ 2k

−φ
σ
mk +Φ(1−Φ)

−1
≤ βk
φ
σ
+λβ 2k
φ
σ
mk −1
≤

βk +λβ
2
k (a¯ + l )
 1
σ
p
2pi
exp

−1
2
(k −a − l )2
σ2

−1
→ −1, as l →∞.
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Thus, when l is large, the manager’s utility is concave, and so the FOA is valid.
In Proposition 3.2.4, we need k < a + l and a small σ1 to justify the use of options. These conditions
coincide with the conditions in Part 2). In Propostion 3.2.7, we need a large l 2 to justify the use of options,
which also coincides with the condition in Part 3).
Proof of Proposition 3.2.2
Taking the partial derivtive of mk andσ
2
k
w.r.t a yields that
∂mk
∂ a
= 1−Φ
∂ σ2
k
∂ a
= 2Φmk
Then from the first-order condition (3.4), we can solve for the number of options βk that are needed to
induce the target effort a . That is
βk =
(1−Φ)±
p
∆
2λΦmk
,
where∆= (1−Φ)2−4aλΦmk .
The shareholders will choose βk optimally (i.e. as small as possible), so we have
βk =
(1−Φ)−
p
∆
2λΦmk
=
2a
(1−Φ)+
p
∆
. (C.1)
So the cost ck is
ck =
1
2
λβ 2kσ
2
k =
2λa 2σ2y1
(1+
p
1−4aλσy2)2
Then it can be shown that y ′1(η)≥ 0 and y ′2(η)≥ 0 (see Feltham and Wu (2001)). Note that
∂ η
∂ k
= 1
σ
> 0,
so we have ∂ ck
∂ k
> 0. Thus the cheapest way to induce the target effort a is using the stock.
Similarly, if k ≤ a + l , then ∂ η
∂ σ
=− k−a−l
σ2
≥ 0 hence, ck is increasing inσ in this case.
Note that from (C.1), we have
βk =
2a/(1−Φ)
1+
p
1−4aλσy2
.
Thus it is straight-forward to see that βk is increasing in λ and k , and βk ≥ a .
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Proof of Lemma 3.2.3
The manager’s expected utility is
E [u ] =α+βk mk −
1
2
λβ 2kσ
2
k −
1
2
a 2
In the case of low probability of bankruptcy, the mean and variance of stock are m−∞ = a + l andσ2−∞ =
σ2. Thus we have
∂ E [u ]
∂ σ
|k=0 =−β 2−∞λσ< 0.
So the manager will always perceive high riskσ22 if he is granted stock.
Then for options, let
A1 = {aˆ : E [u (aˆ )]|σm=σ1 < E [u (aˆ )]|σm=σ2},
A2 = {aˆ : E [u (aˆ )]|σm=σ2 ≤ E [u (aˆ )]|σm=σ1},
where A1 is the set of efforts for which the manager’s expected utility is minimized under low risk and A 2
is the complement set of A1. Then the manager’s objective (3.7) can be rewritten as
max

max
aˆ∈A1
E [u (aˆ )]|σm=σ1 ,max
aˆ∈A2
E [u (aˆ )]|σm=σ2

.
By the condition (3.8), we have
α+βk mk (a ,σ1)−
1
2
λβ 2kσ
2
k (a ,σ1)−
1
2
a 2
< α+βk mk (a ,σ2)−
1
2
λβ 2kσ
2
k (a ,σ2)−
1
2
a 2,
so the target effort a belongs to the set A1, i.e. a ∈ A1. Note that βk = βk (a ,σ1) is exactly the number of
options to induce the effort a if the manager’s perception of risk is σ1. Hence we have
a ∈ arg max
aˆ∈A1∪A2
E [u ]|σm=σ1 .
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On the other hand, for any aˆ ∈ A2, we have
E [u (aˆ )]|σm=σ2 ≤ E [u (aˆ )]|σm=σ1 < E [u (a )]|σm=σ1 .
Therefore at the optimum, the manager will perceive low riskσ1 and exert the target effort a ∈ A1.
Proof of Proposition 3.2.4
Note that if k < a + l ,
lim
σ1→0
2
βk (a ,σ1)
mk (a ,σ2)−mk (a ,σ1)
σ2
k
(a ,σ2)−σ2k (a ,σ1)
=
2[mk (a ,σ2)− (a + l −k )]
aσ2
k
(a ,σ2)
,
and
lim
σ1→0
2βk (a ,σ1)[mk (a ,σ2)−mk (a ,σ1)]
a 2σ22−β 2k (a ,σ1)σ2k (a ,σ1)
=
2[mk (a ,σ2)− (a + l −k )]
aσ22
.
Then by (3.9), there must exist a cut-off σˆ(λ) such that whenσ1 < σˆ(λ), we have
2βk (a ,σ1)[mk (a ,σ2)−mk (a ,σ1)]
a 2σ22 −β 2k (a ,σ1)σ2k (a ,σ1)
<λ<
2
βk (a ,σ1)
mk (a ,σ2)−mk (a ,σ1)
σ2k (a ,σ2)−σ2k (a ,σ1)
.
Then by Lemma 3.2.3, the manager will perceive low risk σ1 with the options of exercise price k and
perceive high riskσ2 with stock. Then we can derive that the cost of using stock is
cˆ−∞ =
1
2
λa 2σ22+a [m−∞(a ,σs )−m−∞(a ,σ2)] =
1
2
λa 2σ22,
where the second equality is derived from the fact that m−∞(a ,σs ) =m−∞(a ,σ2) = a + l because of low
probability of bankruptcy. The cost of using options is
cˆk =
1
2
λβ 2k (a ,σ1)σ
2
k (a ,σ1)+βk (a ,σ1) [mk (a ,σs )−mk (a ,σ1)]
≤ 1
2
λβ 2k (a ,σ1)σ
2
k (a ,σ1)+βk (a ,σ1) [mk (a ,σ2)−mk (a ,σ1)] .
Then since the condition
λ>
2βk (a ,σ1)[mk (a ,σ2)−mk (a ,σ1)]
a 2σ22−β 2k (a ,σ1)σ2k (a ,σ1)
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implies that
1
2
λβ 2k (a ,σ1)σ
2
k (a ,σ1)+βk (a ,σ1) [mk (a ,σ2)−mk (a ,σ1)]<
1
2
λa 2σ22,
we obtain that
cˆk (a ,σ1)< cˆ−∞(a ,σ2),
i.e. it is cheaper to implement a by using the options.
Proof of Lemma 3.2.6
If the manager is granted stock, then his expected utility is
E [u ] =α+β−∞(a + l )−
1
2
λβ 2−∞σ
2− 1
2
a 2,
which is obviously minimized at l = l 1. Hence the manager will perceive l 1 with stock.
For options, let
A1 = {aˆ : E [u (aˆ )]|l m=l 1 ≤ E [u (aˆ )]|l m=l 2},
A2 = {aˆ : E [u (aˆ )]|l m=l 2 < E [u (aˆ )]|l m=l 1},
where A2 is the set of efforts for which the manager’s expected utility is minimized under high expected
value of l and A1 is the complement set of A2. Then the manager’s objective can be rewritten as
max

max
aˆ∈A1
E [u (aˆ )]|l m=l 1 ,max
aˆ∈A2
E [u (aˆ )]|l m=l 2

.
By the condition (3.10), we have
α+βk mk (a , l 1)−
1
2
λβ 2kσ
2
k (a , l 1)−
1
2
a 2
> α+βk mk (a , l 2)−
1
2
λβ 2kσ
2
k (a , l 2)−
1
2
a 2,
so the target effort a belongs to the set A2, i.e. a ∈ A2. Note that βk = βk (a , l 2) is exactly the number of
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options to induce the effort a if the manager’s perception of the return l is l 2. Hence we have
a ∈ arg max
aˆ∈A1∪A2
E [u ]|l m=l 2 .
On the other hand, for any aˆ ∈ A1, we have
E [u (aˆ )]|l m=l 1 ≤ E [u (aˆ )]|l m=l 2 < E [u (a )]|l m=l 2 .
Therefore at the optimum, the manager will perceive l 2 and exert the target effort a ∈ A2.
Proof of Proposition 3.2.7
By Lemma 3.2.6, the left inequality in (3.12) implies that the manager will perceive high value l 2 if he
is granted options with exercise price k . The right inequality in (3.12) will imply that c¯−∞(a , l 1)> c¯k (a , l 2),
i.e. the cost of the stock-based contract is larger than the cost of the option-based contract. The proof is
as follows:
If l s = l1, then the cost of the stock-based contract is
c¯−∞(a , l 1) =
1
2
λa 2σ2,
and the cost of the option-based contract is
c¯k (a , l 2) =
1
2
λβk (a , l 2)
2σ2k (a , l 2)+βk (a , l 2)[mk (a , l 1)−mk (a , l 2)].
Then c¯−∞(a , l 1)> c¯k (a , l 2) is equivalent to
λ<
2βk (a , l 2)[mk (a , l 2)−mk (a , l 1)]
β 2k (a , l 2)σ
2
k (a , l 2)−a 2σ2
.
Note that βk (a , l 2)≥ a , so the right inequality in (3.12) is sufficient to ensure that c¯−∞(a , l 1)> c¯k (a , l 2).
The proof for l s = l2 is similar.
Proof of Lemma 3.2.8
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The cost of the non-indexed stock compensation has been derived in (3.11). For the cost of the in-
dexed stock or option compensation, since the ambiguity has been removed from the manager’s payoff,
it is the same as the case in the basic model. But since the risk associated with the market return is also
removed from the manager’s payoff, the cost is just ck in (3.6) which is evaluated at the varianceσ2−σ2l .
In particular, the cost of the indexed stock is c0(σ2−σ2l ) =
1
2
λa 2(σ2−σ2
l
).
Proposition 3.2.2 shows that c0(σ2 − σ2l ) < ck (σ2 − σ2l ). It is also obvious that 12λa 2(σ2 − σ2l ) <
1
2
λa 2σ2+a [m−∞(a , l s )−m−∞(a , l 1)]. So it is cheaper to implement the target effort using indexed stock
than using indexed options or non-indexed stock.
Proof of Proposition 3.2.9
1) If l s = l2, then the cost of using non-indexed options is
c¯k (a , l 2) =
1
2
λβk (a , l 2)
2σ2k (a , l 2),
which is greater 1
2
λa 2σ2 by Proposition 3.2.2. So indexed stock is better than non-indexed options.
2) If l s = l1, then the cost of using non-indexed options is
c¯k (a , l 2) =
1
2
λβk (a , l 2)
2σ2k (a , l 2)+βk (a , l 2)[mk (a , l 1)−mk (a , l 2)].
Following the proof of Proposition 3.2.7, we can show that it is optimal to grant the manager non-indxed
options.
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